If we were to assume that the (undescribed) office or position of "Permanent Director of the Division of Credit Union Examinations" (see the fourth sentence of G. L. c. 26, Section 3, as most recently amended by St. 1964, c. 269) which the petitioner held from June 8, 1970, until May 11, 1973, is (or was) one falling within the protection afforded by G. L. c. 30, Section 9A (as appearing in St. 1947, c. 242), we would be unable to conclude that the petitioner "held such office or position" (Chairman of State Housing Bd. v. Civil Serv. Commn. 332 Mass. 241 , 244 ; emphasis original) for the three-year period required by Section 9A. He did not do so as matter of fact, nor do we think he did so as matter of law during the earlier period (from June 15, 1969, until June 7, 1970) when he served as "Acting Director of the Division of Credit Union Examinations" and "assumed the responsibilities and discharged the duties of the Director of Bank Examinations in said Division." During that period he had no right to continue to serve as "Acting Director" (compare Fantini v. School Comm. of Cambridge, 362 Mass. 320 , 324 ), was subject to removal by the Commissioner (compare Cieri v. Commissioner of Ins. 343 Mass. 181 , 184 ), and had no right to be appointed to the position of "Permanent Director" (compare Murphy v. Cambridge, 342 Mass. 339 , 340-341 ).
Order for judgment affirmed.
The petitioners have attempted to appeal (by a claim filed on May 20, 1974) from orders of the Superior Court allowing the respondents' motions to dismiss a petition brought under G. L. c. 79 by which the petitioners sought to recover under G. L. c. 41, Section 81DD, the damages allegedly sustained by them by reason of the action of the town's planning board which was considered in Bigham v. Planning Bd. of No. Reading, 362 Mass. 860 (1972). The attempt must fail for the reasons set out in Flint v. Wilmington, 310 Mass. 66 (1941).
[Note 1] The planning board of said town.
The only exception in a needlessly reproduced transcript of 143 pages which is adverted to in the defendants'
brief of approximately five pages (including one page of statutory provisions) is overruled because the brief fails to contain anything bearing even a faint resemblance to argument of the exception. Rule 1:13 of the Appeals Court, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 889 (1972). Lolos v. Berlin, 338 Mass. 10 , 13-14 (1958). The brief is struck from the files. Rule 1:15 (1) (d) and (6) of the Appeals Court, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 890 , 891 (1972). The plaintiff is to have double costs from July 1, 1974, together with interest from that date on the damages found by the trial judge (and on the interest ordered on those damages), to be computed at the rate of twelve percent per annum. G. L. c. 211A, Section 15.