The judge was correct in ruling that, under the plaintiffs' employment contract with the town, which calls for two days off duty after each four days on duty, and the provisions of G. L. c. 41, Section 111D, which the town has accepted, a police officer is not entitled to additional off duty days computed on the days he would have worked but for the fact of his being on vacation. The assertedly contrary result reached in Holyoke Police Relief Assn. v. Mayor of Holyoke, 358 Mass. 350 (1970), turned on that city's having accepted not only the provisions of G. L. c. 41, Section 111D, but also the provisions of G. L. c. 147, Sections 16C and 17, which together provide for 104 days off each year which "shall be in addition to any annual vacation now or hereafter allowed to . . . [police], and such annual vacation shall not be diminished on account thereof." Westwood has not accepted those sections. Therefore, as the judge pointed out in his careful opinion, Westwood police are entitled to no minimum number of days off in addition to vacation time, but rather, by the terms of their contract, they are only entitled to two days off for each four days actually worked. Gurley v. Bridgewater, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 149 , 151 (1976). That conclusion is not inconsistent with the proposition that the "weeks" referred to in Section 111D are calendar weeks, as held in the Holyoke case. Neither party makes any objection to the form of the judgment.
The plaintiffs' action to restrain the use of residentially zoned land as an access road to an adjacent shopping center is barred by G. L. c. 40A, Section 22, as appearing in St. 1970, c. 678. The statute of limitations imposed by c. 678 was made expressly applicable by Section 2 to causes of action arising before the effective date of the statute as well as to those arising subsequently. (The reference in Section 2 applying the "second" paragraph of G. L. c. 40A, Section 22, to existing causes of action is obviously an error. It is clear that the first, rather than the second, paragraph of c. 40A, Section 22, was intended to apply to actions arising before the effective date of the statute. Compare Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. Cambridge, 347 Mass. 519 , 521 .) The statute of limitations took effect ninety days after its enactment. Article 48 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth, The Referendum, I. G. L. c. 4, Section 1. See Horton v. Attorney Gen. 269 Mass. 503 , 511 (1929). A statute of limitations which forecloses existing causes of action is constitutional if litigants are afforded a reasonable
period before the statute's effective date to commence their actions. Mulvey v. Boston, 197 Mass. 178 , 182 (1908). Cunningham v. Commonwealth, 278 Mass. 343 , 345 (1932). Brookline v. Carey, 355 Mass. 424 , 427 (1969). The ninety-day grace period provided by St. 1970, c. 678, allowed a reasonable time for affected persons to take appropriate action. See Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. Grassi, 356 Mass. 1 , 3 (1969). The defendants were not required to show that the developer had relied on the building permit in constructing the road, since the reference to "reliance" in the statute does not apply to actions seeking "abandonment, limitation or modification of the use contemplated by [a] permit." The plaintiffs have not disputed the judge's finding that the access road was an improvement under the 1970 amendment to the statute under which it need only be demonstrated that the property was improved in accordance with the terms of the original building permit issued by a person authorized to issue such permits (the building inspector). Therefore, inquiry may not now be made into the source of the building inspector's authority to require the access road as a condition of obtaining the permit. The plaintiffs' other arguments are groundless.