The judge did not err in ruling that the defendant could not invoke the New York usury law (N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law Section 5-501[1] [as amended through 1970 N.Y. Laws c. 611, Section 2], as implemented by N.Y. Banking Law Sections 14-a[1] and [2] [as amended through 1973 N.Y. Laws c. 667, Section 1, and c. 1055, Section 1], and made applicable to licensed branches of foreign banks by N.Y. Banking Law Section 202[1] [as amended through 1969 N.Y. Laws c. 1141, Section 3]) to avoid payment of principal and interest (at 9 3/4 per cent per annum) due on its note to the plaintiff. It is not disputed that the defendant, as a Massachusetts business trust, is an "association" as that word is defined in N.Y. Gen. Ass'ns Law, Art. I, Section 2(4), as appearing in 1938 N.Y. Laws c. 13, Section 1 (and also as that word is used in G. L. c. 182, Section 1). We can think of no plausible reason why it should not be considered an "association" within the meaning of N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law Section 5-521(1), as amended by 1965 N.Y. Laws c. 328, Section 6, which provides: "No corporation shall hereafter interpose the defense of usury in any action. The term corporation, as used in this section, shall be construed to include all associations, and joint-stock companies having any of the powers and privileges of corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships." We need not decide whether the language, "having any of the powers and privileges of corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships," is to be read as modifying the word "association," for it is clear that business trusts as a class fall within that language. See State St. Trust Co. v. Hall, 311 Mass. 299 , 301-303 (1942). See also Mulloney v. United States, 79 F.2d 566, 577 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 658 (1935); Bomeisler v. M. Jacobson & Sons Trust, 118 F.2d 261, 265 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 630 (1941); Swartz v. Sher, 344 Mass. 636 , 639 (1962), and authorities cited. As the case presented no genuine issue of material fact, the judge did not err in entering judgment under the provisions of Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). We cannot regard the appeal as other than frivolous and intended for delay. See G. L. c. 211A, Section 15.

Judgment affirmed with double costs and interest at twelve per cent from date of appeal.

After the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in Arlington v. Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769 (1976), a judge of the Superior Court entered judgments for the defendants confirming the arbitrators' awards and ordering the town to pay the amounts awarded "without interest and without costs." The collective bargaining

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representatives of the affected employees have appealed, contending that the omission of interest and costs on appeal was erroneous. 1. These cases fall within the usual rule that arbitrators' awards constitute unliquidated claims on which the parties in whose favor the awards have been made are entitled to interest from the date application is first made to the court for confirmation of the awards. Glenn Acres, Inc. v. Cliffwood Corp., 353 Mass. 150 , 156 (1967), and cases cited. The case of Trustees of B. & Me. Corp. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy., 367 Mass. 57 (1975), on which the town relies, fell outside the usual rule because the arbitrator's award which was confirmed in that case, unlike those before us, did not involve "an unconditional order that one party pay the other a specific sum of money." 367 Mass. at 61. 2. We see no reason to exclude reported cases from the application of Mass.R.A.P. 26, 365 Mass. 873 (1974), governing the award of costs on appeal, particularly in light of the language of Mass.R.A.P. 5, 365 Mass. 847 (1974), that "[a] report of a case for determination by an appellate court shall for all purposes under these rules be taken as the equivalent of a notice of appeal" (emphasis supplied). The Supreme Judicial Court having sustained the position of the defendants and having made no express order with respect to costs, the defendants were entitled by operation of Mass.R.A.P. 26(a) to their costs in the Supreme Judicial Court as if on appeal. The judgments are to be modified by adding thereto provisions for interest and costs in accordance herewith.

So ordered.