1. It is conceded that the judgment dismissing the wife's complaint against the husband for contempt of court must be reversed and that the complaint must be reheard in accordance with the principles set forth in Salvesen v. Salvesen, 370 Mass. 608 (1976). 2. The judgments entered on August 4, 1976, and August 26, 1976, which established the husband's obligations in respect of alimony and child support prospectively from July 7, 1976, are unaffected by the proceedings for contempt. It is immaterial whether they are regarded as judgments of modification under G. L. c. 208, Sections 28 and 37, or as judgments under G. L. c. 208, Sections 28 and 34, making original provision for child support and alimony subsequent to a divorce judgment omitting such provision. 3. We decline to pass on the question whether the husband's support obligations under the separation agreement became inoperative in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6.6 thereof seven months after entry of the judgment nisi, because that question may involve the resolution of factual issues which were not material to the view of the case originally taken by the probate judge. 4. The judgment dismissing the contempt complaint is reversed. The other judgments appealed from are affirmed.
1. It was error to overrule the plaintiffs' objections to the master's report and to allow the defendants' motion to adopt that report in view of the absence of a finding by the master with respect to the single question of fact stipulated by the parties to be determinative of the question whether building permits could lawfully be issued for three dwellings on the subject
land: namely, whether Windsor Street Extension, shown on exhibit 1 as a 10 foot wide right of way connecting Howard Street and Windsor Street, is a way within the meaning of the Subdivision Control Law (see G. L. c. 41, Section 81L) and the Melrose zoning ordinance. The plaintiffs' motion for recommittal for the purpose of securing such findings should have been allowed. See Turgeon v. Turgeon, 326 Mass. 384 , 386 (1950). 2. The planning board's endorsement, "approval not required," on the plan dividing the land in question into three lots gives the lots no standing under the zoning ordinance. Alley v. Building Inspector of Danvers, 354 Mass. 6 , 7-8 (1968). The finality of such an endorsement for purposes of the Subdivision Control Law (see Cassani v. Planning Bd. of Hull, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 451 ) has no bearing on compliance with zoning requirements. 3. Without passing on the question whether laches can be a defense against an action in the nature of mandamus to require a building inspector to enforce the zoning ordinance (compare Chilson v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal of Attleboro, 344 Mass. 406 , 410 , with McAleer v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 361 Mass. 317 , 323 ), we think that the master's finding of laches cannot be sustained as a conclusion from the stated subsidiary findings. See Brady v. Board of Appeals of Westport, 348 Mass. 515 , 517-523 (1965). A finding of laches in inherently general or conclusory in nature, although labelled as subsidiary, and the plaintiffs are at least entitled to recommittal for the purpose of having any unreported findings underlying the general finding of laches set out in the master's report. Bills v. Nunno, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 279 , 282-283 (1976). 4. The judgment is reversed, and the case is to stand for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.