This case was rightly decided for the reasons given by the trial judge. Our examination of the transcript and the exhibits convinces us that there is ample support for the judge's ruling that "there [were] implied contract[s]" between the plaintiffs and the defendants. LiDonni v. Hart, 355 Mass. 580 , 583 (1969). See Albiani v. Loudd, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 165 , 166-167 (1976). In light of this ruling and the facts found by the judge (see Mass.R.Civ.P. 52[a], 365 Mass. 816 ), we conclude that there is a sufficient basis in the record to justify the respective monetary damage awards ordered by the judge on all the claims and counterclaims. In addition, we discern no error in the manner in which the judge treated the other aspects of this case. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. None of the parties is to have costs of appeal.
The question raised by the complaint whether the order of the single member reducing weekly compensation from the amount originally fixed by agreement remained in effect (perhaps on analogy to a preliminary modification order under G. L. c. 152, Section 7, fourth sentence) after the reviewing board had remanded the case to the single member for the taking of additional testimony need not be answered, because the parties, following the entry of the appeal, agreed upon a lump sum settlement which has now rendered moot both the claim for compensation and the claim for an attorney's fee under Section 11A. The facts stated in the complaint (and reaffirmed by the parties in arguing the appeal) establish that the insurer did not act unreasonably in making compensation payments in the amount specified in the order of the single member, notwithstanding the reasonableness of the employee's contrary position that the order of remand in effect reinstated the prior agreement; thus, even if we assume, without deciding, that an employee seeking compensation under G. L. c. 152 is not confined to the remedies provided by that chapter, it is clear that this employee is not entitled to recover on theories of unfair practice or outrageous conduct. We shall therefore affirm the judgment of dismissal, passing, as academic in the circumstances, a question not argued by the parties whether, under
the holding of Assuncao's Case, 372 Mass. 6 , 10 (1977), the judgment of the Superior Court may have been interlocutory in nature and therefore not appealable.