A careful review of the trial transcript leads us to conclude that the motion for a new trial was properly denied for the reasons stated by the motion judge in his memorandum of decision.
The plaintiffs are appealing from that part of the Superior Court judge's order which partially denied their motion for a preliminary injunction. See G. L. c. 231, Section 118 (second paragraph), as appearing in St. 1977, c. 405. The judge granted the plaintiffs' request to enjoin the defendant from selling or transferring certain assets of the Chapin Riley Trust B, but refused to enjoin the defendant from selling certain other shares of the plaintiffs' stock which were in the defendant's possession.
On examination of the record, and consideration of the arguments, we are unable to discern any abuse of discretion in the Superior Court judge's ruling. Jones v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 914 (1979). See Foreign Auto Import, Inc. v. Renault Northeast, Inc., 367 Mass. 464 , 472-473 (1975). But see Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commn. v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
1. There is no genuine question as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant a finding of guilty of armed robbery. 2. No cause for a new trial arises out of the mere fact that the victim saw a police officer point to the defendant and heard the officer identify him by name in the courtroom as the trial was about to commence. That identification was admittedly inadvertent (see Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 738 , 747 app. B-6 , modified on other grounds, 378 Mass. 296 , and cases cited); it was not made in the presence of or otherwise brought to the attention of the jury; there was clear and convincing evidence before the jury from which they could find that the victim's in-court identification of the defendant was based solely on her observations of him during the course of the robbery (see Commonwealth v. Botelho, 369 Mass. 860 , 868 ); and in his charge the judge specifically delineated the various factors the jury should consider in determining the reliability of the victim's identification of the defendant as the person who had robbed her (see Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378 Mass. at 301-302). 3. The gun taken from the defendant's person when he was arrested was properly admitted in evidence. Commonwealth v. Mendes, 361 Mass. 507 , 514-515 (1972). 4. Any problem
arising out of the exclusion of the questions to the arresting officer concerning the defendant's right to possess the gun was obviated by the prosecutor's stipulation in the presence of the jury that the defendant's possession of the gun had been legal. 5. The third assignment of error was waived at the argument. 6. None of the other assignments requires any discussion; most of them border on the frivolous, and none of them has been argued with the meaning of Rule 1:13 of the Appeals Court, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 889 (1972), as amended, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 801 (1975). Lolos v. Berlin, 338 Mass. 10 , 13-14 (1958).