This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought against the superintendent of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole for the purpose of securing a determination of the deductions from his sentence to which the petitioner was entitled under the provisions of G. L. c. 127, Sections 129, 129B and 129D. See Beaton, petitioner, 354 Mass. 670 , 671 (1968). The petitioner was discharged from further imprisonment (G. L. c. 127, Section 129) pending his appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his petition. His counsel conceded at the argument that the Commissioner of Correction and the superintendent have now changed the manner in which they administer the provisions of the relevant statutes, and no sound reason has been advanced why the case has not become moot. Compare Jones v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Bridgewater, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 880 (1977). Contrast Pina v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole, 376 Mass. 659 , 663-664 (1978). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment appealed from with a notation that our decision is not on the merits and remand the case to the Superior Court with the direction to dismiss the petition on the ground that it is moot.
Various of the defendants
in these two cases have claimed appeals from an order entered by a single justice of this court, acting under the provisions of G. L. c. 214, Section 6(6) (as appearing in St. 1973, c. 1114, Section 72), following transfers to this court under G. L. c. 211, Section 4A (as most recently amended by St. 1978, c. 478, Section 100), which affirmed an order for the issuance of a preliminary injunction which had previously been entered by a three-judge panel of the Superior Court under the provisions of G. L. c. 212, Section 30 (as appearing in St. 1973, c. 1114, Section 58), and G. L. c. 214, Section 6(1)-(5) (as appearing in St. 1973, c. 1114, Section 62). All the appeals are dismissed on the authority of and for the reasons set out in Tammany Hall, Inc. v. Garrity, 362 Mass. 883 , 883-884 (1972), which was decided under statutory provisions (G. L. c. 214, Section 9A, as in effect prior to St. 1973, c. 1114, Section 62) identical in all material respects to those now found in G. L. c. 214, Section 6(6).
[Note 1] Revere Racing Association, Inc. vs. John Basile & another.