IN THE MATTER OF A.B.

COVEN, J. The principal issue in this appeal concerns the process through which a petition for commitment was brought against A.B., which, after a hearing, resulted

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in an order of commitment and approval of a medical treatment plan. The order of commitment has expired. We dismiss the appeal as moot.

On January 31, 2014, A.B. applied for psychiatric care and treatment on a conditional voluntary status under G.L. c. 123, §§ 10 and 11 at McLean Hospital (“hospital”). A.B.’s application was accepted. On February 10, 2014, A.B. was presented with a “Notification of Transfer” form pursuant to G.L. c. 123, § 3. [Note 1] The form indicates that A.B. refused to sign the form and that such refusal was deemed an objection to the proposed transfer. Based upon this objection, the hospital filed on February 11, 2014, a petition for involuntary commitment under G.L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8, and a petition under G.L. c. 123, § 8B, to administer medical treatment. [Note 2] After consultation with counsel appointed to represent A.B. on the petitions filed, A.B., on February 14, 2014, amended her deemed objection to the transfer by indicating, through a signature on the notification and the circling within the agreement section, that she agreed to the proposed transfer. A.B., however, on February 17, 2014, signed a “Notice of Intent to Leave Facility.” On February 18, 2014, A.B., through counsel,

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filed a motion to dismiss the petitions, raising the hospital’s failure to fill in the form properly and, as a result, A.B.’s continuing status as a conditional voluntary patient and, therefore, the hospital’s lack of authority to file the petitions. On February 19, 2014, A.B. was presented with another “Notification of Transfer” form, listing A.B.’s status as a conditional voluntary patient. A.B. signed the transfer notice and agreed to the transfer. The motion to dismiss was denied on February 20, 2014, [Note 3] the same day that A.B. purportedly withdrew her “Notice of Intent to Leave Facility.” Thereafter, the petitions were heard and allowed.

“Courts decline to hear moot cases because (a) only factually concrete disputes are capable of resolution through the adversary process, (b) it is feared that the parties will not adequately represent positions in which they no longer have a personal stake, (c) the adjudication of hypothetical disputes would encroach on the legislative domain, and (d) judicial economy requires that insubstantial controversies not be litigated.” Wolf v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 367 Mass. 293, 298 (1975). Yet it has been recognized that “‘[i]ssues involving the commitment and treatment of mentally ill persons are generally considered matters of public importance’ and present ‘classic examples’ of issues that are capable of repetition, yet evading review.” NewtonWellesley Hosp. v. Magrini, 451 Mass. 777, 782 (2008), quoting Acting Superintendent of Bournewood Hosp. v. Baker, 431 Mass. 101, 103 (2000). But this is not a case to exercise this discretionary function. See In Re: Commitment of M.B., 2013 Mass. App. Div. 8, 9 (review is discretionary).

A.B. presents the argument that the hospital’s failure to fill in properly the “Notification of Transfer” form required the dismissal of the subsequently filed petitions abstracted from any factual findings. For example, we have no factual findings as to who presented the “Notification of Transfer” form to A.B. or what, if any, information was orally communicated to A.B. at the time of presentation. It would be improvident for us to, in effect, declare what information may be necessary for inclusion in the “Notification of Transfer” form before a lack of sufficiency may (if at all) operate as a basis for the filing of a motion to dismiss a petition for commitment, without a full record and accompanying factual findings. In general, the Appellate Division is not vested “with the authority to issue an advisory opinion or anything in the nature of a declaratory judgment,” Filippone v. Gatzunis, 1990 Mass. App. Div. 108, 109, and the “scope of appellate review is limited to questions of law.” Quinn v. Dille, 1987 Mass. App. Div. 101, 103. See G.L. c. 231, § 108. [Note 4]

We also decline to exercise our discretion to review whether there was error in determining that A.B. was not capable of making informed medical treatment decisions.

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The particular question “is necessarily unique to this case . . . and would have little or no precedential value.” In Re: Commitment of K.R., 2012 Mass. App. Div. 229.

Appeal dismissed.