IN THE MATTER OF E.H.

FINNERTY, P.J. E.H. was the subject of a petition in the Brockton District Court for involuntary commitment to Bridgewater State Hospital pursuant to G.L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8. On September 12, 2018, the date of the scheduled hearing on the petition, E.H., represented by counsel, waived his right to a hearing in accordance with G.L. c. 123, § 6(b), which provides:

"Following the filing of a petition for a commitment to a facility or to the Bridgewater state hospital, a hearing shall be held unless waived in writing by the person after consultation with his counsel. In the event the hearing is waived, the person may request a hearing for good cause shown at any time during the period of commitment."

E.H.'s written waiver reads as follows:

"I, [E.H.], the Respondent named above, voluntarily waive my right to a hearing on the petition for my commitment to Bridgewater State Hospital pursuant to G.L. c. 123, §§ 7&8.

"I waive my right to a hearing, freely and not subject to any promises made to me about my care and treatment at the above-named facility. I understand that by making this waiver I am renouncing my opportunity to contest the evidence that Bridgewater State Hospital would present at this commitment hearing. I understand that by making this waiver I will remain for a period of up to one year at Bridgewater State Hospital.

"I understand that by waiving my right to a hearing I am nevertheless retaining the right, pursuant to G.L. c. 123, § 6(b), to request a hearing for good cause shown at any time during this commitment period."

The waiver of hearing was accepted by the court, [Note 1] and the respondent was committed

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for one year. [Note 2]

On June 12, 2019, E.H. filed a "Request for Hearing G.L. c. 123, § 6(b)," including in his request that "[r]espondent is currently clinically and behaviorally stable," and that "[r]espondent can receive ongoing treatment and monitoring in a less restrictive setting." The request was denied on July 2, 2019 with the notation, "The motion, as filed, lacks an affidavit or other information sufficient to set forth good cause as required by the statute."

E.H.'s motion to reconsider, which included affidavits of counsel and of a psychiatrist, was denied with the finding that "the 'good cause' provision requires a hearing where there is reason to believe that either the waiver was invalid or the initial order was invalidly entered. This provision is not for the purpose of litigating whether the respondent's status has changed or whether he should either be 'stepped down' or discharged."

E.H. has appealed to this Division the denial of his request for a hearing. Determination of his appeal requires us to consider the meaning of good cause in the context of G.L. c. 123, § 6(b) and the effect of a request for a hearing. [Note 3]

For the reasons that follow, we hold that good cause under G.L. c. 123, § 6(b) is not limited to circumstances where there is reason to doubt the validity of the waiver or the commitment order.

"Our primary duty in interpreting a statute is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature in enacting it. We construe statutes according to the Legislature's intent as expressed in the words of the statute and read in light of the ordinary and approved usage of the language. ... At the same time, a statute should be read as a whole to produce an internal consistency" (citations and quotations omitted). Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. 113, 118 (2018).

Appellee Bridgewater State Hospital argues that, as ruled by the trial judge, the G.L. c. 123, § 6(b) hearing request is limited to deficiencies in the hearing waiver or the initial commitment order because G.L. c. 123, § 9(b) provides a mechanism for a petition to the Superior Court by a person who contends that one should no longer be retained in a facility. Section 9(b) provides, "Any person may make written application to a justice of the superior court at any time and in any county, stating that he believes or has reason to believe that a person named in such application is retained in a facility or the Bridgewater state hospital, who should no longer be so retained . . . ." The justice "within seven days thereof shall order notice of the time and place for hearing to be given to the superintendent or medical director . . . and such hearing shall be given promptly before a justice

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of the superior court in any county."

We start with the plain language of the statute, which does not define "good cause." "[T]he statutory language itself is the principal source of insight into the legislative purpose." Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 37 (1977). In conducting this review, "[A] statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated." City of Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 139 (2013), quoting Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006).

Prior to 1970, Chapter 123 of the General Laws bore little resemblance to our current law. It was captioned, "Commitment and Care of the Insane and Other Mental Defectives."

Section 4 of Chapter 888 of the Acts of 1970, "An Act Revising the Laws Relative to the Admission, Treatment and Discharge of Mentally Ill and Mentally Retarded Persons," effective July 1, 1971, rewrote G.L. c. 123 in its entirety. Section 6(b) of G.L. c. 123 as introduced at that time required a person to affirmatively request a hearing either prior to a commitment order or, after a commitment order, during the commitment period, "provided that there shall be a right to only one such hearing." [Note 4]

St. 1970, c. 888, § 4. Section 9(a) of G.L. c. 123 as written in the 1970 legislation provided that a person aggrieved by a commitment order following a hearing in the District Court had the right to appeal such an order to the Probate Court. [Note 5] Id.

Section 4 of Chapter 760 of the Acts of 1971, "An Act Further Regulating the Treatment and Commitment of Mentally Ill and Mentally Retarded Persons," amended § 6(b) of G.L. c. 123 to provide that if no right to a hearing had been

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exercised prior to an order of commitment, the person could exercise his right to a hearing at any time during the period of such order. The amended statute required the hearing to be held "without delay" after such request. [Note 6] St. 1971, c. 760, § 4. Section 9(a) of G.L. c. 123 was also amended to provide for appeals of commitment orders to the Appellate Division of the District Court. [Note 7] St. 1971, c. 760, § 7. Section 9(b) of G.L. c. 123 was amended to provide the current procedure for petitions to the Superior Court. [Note 8] Id. Section 6(b) of G.L. c. 123 was further rewritten pursuant to Chapter 356 of the Acts of 1976, "An Act Providing for Legal Advice Regarding Hearing Waivers or Voluntary Admissions to Mental Health Facilities," with the current language of the statute. Legislation in 1986 amending sections of G.L. c. 123 retained the language in §§ 6(b) and 9(b) as those sections currently read. [Note 9]

Our law thus progressed from requiring a person who was the subject of a commitment petition to affirmatively request a hearing in order to receive one (whether before or after the entry of the commitment) to the requirement of a hearing prior to a commitment order, which hearing could be affirmatively waived by the person subject to a later request. At the same time, the provision for petitions to the Superior Court under G.L. c. 123, § 9(b) was added and retained.

Section 6(b) of G.L. c. 123 does not specifically require the court to accede to the request for a hearing after waiver. Nor does it establish a time within which such hearing must be held. Unlike the last previous version of the section, it does not refer to a person "exercising his right" to a hearing. Nor does it require a hearing to be held "without delay." It does require "good cause" for the request. Compare G.L. c. 123, § 9(b), which requires a petition to the Superior Court to be scheduled within seven days and held "promptly."

In acting upon a request under G.L. c. 123, § 6(b), then, the court would be left with discretion as to whether the request was based upon good cause and should be held. The Legislature did not define "good cause" for purposes of this statute. Nor

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do we have prior appellate court guidance. [Note 10] Where a relevant term is not defined in a statute, courts called upon to construe the term look first to the "plain meaning" of the words, so long as this plain meaning is also reasonable and consistent with the overall purpose and history of the statute. Matter of N.L., 476 Mass. 632, 636-637 (2017). See also Pembroke Hosp. v. D.L., 482 Mass. 346, 351-354 (2019). The "plain meaning" of the term will be considered reasonable if, in addition to being consistent with the overall purpose and history of the statute, it does not create inconsistencies within the statute and yields a "workable and logical" result. Hashimi v. Kalil, 388 Mass. 607, 610 (1983). Black's Law Dictionary defines "good cause" as "[a] legally sufficient reason." [Note 11] Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines it as "a cause or reason sufficient in law; one that is based on equity or justice or that would motivate a reasonable man under all the circumstances." [Note 12] Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines it as "a substantial reason put forth in good faith that is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or irrational and that is sufficient to create an excuse for an act under the law." [Note 13]

What constitutes a sufficient reason for a court to act in a particular context varies according to the type of proceeding and the rights of the parties involved. [Note 14]

We agree with E.H. that applying this analysis to "good cause" to request a commitment hearing subsequent to a waiver under G.L. c. 123, § 6(b) requires a court to allow a hearing upon a request that is not frivolous or unreasonable on its face. This broad interpretation of good cause is further supported by the fact that "[t]he right of an individual to be free from physical restraint is a paradigmatic fundamental right." Matter of E.C., supra at 119, quoting Commonwealth v. Knapp, 441 Mass. 157, 164 (2004). Due process requires that statutes that operate as a constraint on liberty be strictly construed in favor of the affected person. See Commonwealth v. Libby, 472 Mass. 93, 96 (2015). [Note 15]

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Given the legislative history of the statutes, including their parallel existence for many years through several amendments, we do not view the "safeguard" of the G.L. c. 123, § 9(b) petition to the Superior Court as the exclusive procedure for contesting continued commitment following a G.L. c. 123, § 6(b) waiver of hearing. Nor do we find that narrowing the definition of good cause to circumstances where the waiver procedure or the initial commitment order was defective in some way is what the Legislature intended. [Note 16]

The order denying E.H.'s request for a hearing is vacated.