WORLDWIDE ASSET PURCHASING II, LLC [Note 1] v. KATHLEEN NATALE

MELIKIAN, J. This appeal arises from an action commenced by Worldwide Asset Purchasing II, LLC ("Worldwide"), as assignee of Aspire Visa, seeking monetary damages against Kathleen Natale ("Natale") for breach of a credit agreement. Natale filed a motion for relief from judgment and dismissal of the action, which was allowed by the trial court. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.

Worldwide is a foreign limited liability company transacting business in Massachusetts. Worldwide initiated this action by filing a complaint against Natale, seeking monetary damages due to an alleged breach of a credit agreement. A copy of the complaint was delivered to Natale's last and usual place of abode. (Natale does not acknowledge receipt of the complaint but does acknowledge that it was delivered to her correct address.) Natale failed to file a responsive pleading, and default judgment was entered on behalf of Worldwide against Natale on April 2, 2008. Worldwide thereafter initiated an action for supplementary process, seeking to satisfy the judgment. Natale participated in the supplementary process action, and a payment order entered on October 8, 2008 for her to pay the judgment based upon a monthly payment schedule. Thereafter, on March 4, 2021, Natale filed a motion to vacate judgment and dismiss Worldwide's complaint. Natale's motion was brought pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) and Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), alleging that Worldwide lacked standing and, therefore, the judgment was void due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After a full hearing, the trial court allowed Natale's motion, vacated the judgment, and dismissed Worldwide's complaint. Worldwide filed the present appeal.

A motion to vacate judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge. See Scannell v. Ed. Ferreirinha & Irmao, Lda., 401 Mass. 155 , 157 (1987). The judge's decision "will not be overturned, except upon a showing of a clear abuse of discretion." Id. at 158. Under the abuse of discretion standard, the issue is whether the judge's decision resulted from a "clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision" (quotation and citation omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).

Natale brought her motion in the underlying action pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) and Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Rule 60(b) provides six categories for which

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relief from judgment may be sought. These categories are: 1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 2) newly discovered evidence; 3) fraud; 4) judgment is void; 5) judgment has been satisfied or discharged; and 6) any other reason justifying relief. Id. All motions must be made within one year (categories 1-3) or within a reasonable time after judgment was entered. Id. Worldwide contends Natale's motion for relief from judgment brought twelve years after it was entered is time barred under Rule 60(b)(4). Natale contends Worldwide lacked standing to initiate the action because of its failure to comply with the requirements of G.L. c. 156D, § 15.02(a) and, therefore, the judgment was void due to the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

"A judge has no discretion to deny a request for relief from [a void] judgment brought under rule 60(b)(4)." Fleishman v. Stone, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 916, 916 (2003), quoting Colley v. Benson, Young & Downs Ins. Agency, Inc., 42 Mass. App. Ct. 527, 533 (1997). While it is clear that a void judgment cannot remain effective and there is no time limit to vacate such a judgment, the issue is whether the underlying judgment is void due to Natale's contention that Worldwide lacked standing to initiate the action. See Bowers v. Board of Appeals of Marshfield, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 29, 32 (1983). General Laws c. 156D, § 15.02(a) requires that a "foreign corporation [or business entity including a limited liability company] transacting business in the commonwealth without delivering to the secretary of state for filing the certificate required by section 15.03 shall not maintain a proceeding in any court in the commonwealth until the certificate is delivered and filed." Id. Worldwide was a foreign limited liability company transacting business in the Commonwealth, and at the time the complaint was filed against Natale, it had not filed the required certificate pursuant to G.L. c. 156D, § 15.02(a).

The Supreme Judicial Court has characterized standing to bring suit as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction. "The issue of 'standing' is closely related to the question of whether an 'actual controversy' exists, and we have treated it as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction." Doe v. Governor, 381 Mass. 702, 705 (1980). While the absence of subject matter jurisdiction may make a judgment void, a "total want of jurisdiction must be distinguished from an error in the exercise of jurisdiction." Harris v. Sannella, 400 Mass. 392, 395 (1987). A court has the power to determine its own jurisdiction. Id. An error in such a determination will not render the judgment void. Id. Due to the interest in finality, the concept of void judgments is narrowly construed. O'Dea v. J.A.L., Inc., 30 Mass. App. Ct. 449, 455 (1991). As a result, "Only in the rare instance of a clear usurpation of power will a judgment be rendered void." Harris, supra at 395, quoting Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys., 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1972). "Whether the facts of a given case meet the standard for exercising jurisdiction -- whether the plaintiff has standing -- has been termed a 'quasi-jurisdictional' determination." Sarin v. Ochsner, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 421, 424 (2000). In such instances, the "facts do not go to the subject matter of jurisdiction, 'but to a preliminary fact necessary to be proven to authorize the court to act.'" Lubben, supra at 649 n.14. Subject matter jurisdiction is an issue of standing only in the sense that it is a criterion that must be met for the court to exercise jurisdiction when the court is otherwise competent to decide the case. See Sarin, supra at 424. Such a quasi-jurisdictional determination can be challenged on appeal. Id., citing Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 326 (1928). However, "Once a court has rendered judgment,

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and opportunities for appeal have been exhausted, a subsequent showing that the plaintiff did not, in fact, have standing does not mean that the judgment is void and must be vacated . . . ." Southwick v. Planning Bd. of Plymouth, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 266, 268 (2008), quoting Lubben, supra at 649. Rule 60(b) "does not provide for general reconsideration of an order or a judgement. . . . Nor does it provide an avenue for challenging supposed legal errors, nor for obtaining relief from errors which are readily correctable on appeal" (citation omitted). Pentucket Manor Chronic Hosp., Inc. v. Rate Setting Comm'n, 394 Mass. 233, 236 (1985).

In the present action, Natale did not file a timely appeal of the court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, unless the court's exercise of jurisdiction constituted a "'clear usurpation of power,' it is immune from attack under Rule 60(b)." Sarin, supra at 424, quoting Lubben, supra at 649. In the present matter, the initial action commenced by Worldwide was an action for breach of contract. The District Court has subject matter jurisdiction over such actions and is competent to hear and decide the case. There was no "clear usurpation of power" by the court in the present action. Therefore, the 2008 judgment is not void and should not have been vacated. Accordingly, the order allowing Natale's motion for relief from judgment and dismissal of the action is reversed.

So ordered.