EVERGREEN REALTY TRUST, Plaintiff v. JUDY BRASIER, Defendant, and JUDY BRASIER, JUSTIN BRASIER And MAKAYLA BRASIER, minors, through their Mother and Next Friend, Judy Brasier, Third Party Plaintiffs v. PUROCLEAN EMERGENCY RESTORATION SERVICES, Third Party Defendant

This is an action originally brought between Evergreen Realty Trust and Puroclean Emergency Restoration Services (hereinafter individually "Evergreen" and "Puroclean" and collectively "Plaintiff") and Defendants/Plaintiffs in Counterclaim Judy, Justin and Makayla Brasier (hereinafter collectively "Brasier") as a summary process matter in the Dedham District Court. The parties entered into an agreement for judgment on the issue of possession on January 8, 2014. The remaining claims were then converted to the civil docket and transferred first to the Superior Court and then subsequently to the Metro South Housing Court.

The matter now before the Court represents a request by Defendant Brasier for clarification of the court's prior order limiting the testimony of her proposed expert to facts and information that is admissible at trial. In her argument, Brasier seeks to have the Court allow Ms. Gordon base her opinion testimony on information contained in certain laboratory reports without referencing the specific findings and information contained within the reports. The Court in its prior ruling had excluded the reports and the information contained therein for all purposes with the exception of showing notice of the alleged defects.

As stated earlier by the Court, it is well established in Massachusetts that the facts and information relied upon to form the basis of an expert opinion must be admissible at trial. See Wing v Commonwealth, 359 Mass. 286 288 (1971) See also Commonwealth v LeFave, 407 Mass. 927 , 928 (1990). The Court has already determined that the underlying reports on which Gordon is to base her opinion are inadmissible for the reasons stated earlier. No new information or intervening controlling caselaw has been presented that would alter the Courts prior ruling in this matter. As a result, the Court re-affirms its prior ruling that Gordon's testimony cannot be allowed if she intends to base her opinions on information contained in the aforementioned reports.

With respect to Ms. Gordon testifying as to industry standards, as with any expert testimony, if Ms. Gordon can demonstrate the requisite expertise and her testimony will be relevant then she may be allowed to testify as to the protocols.

SO ORDERED.