JAMES M. LYMAN, FRANK LYMAN, EDWARD LYMAN, and REINER BEEUWKES, III, TRUSTEES OF THE LYMAN REAL ESTATE TRUST vs. CITY OF CAMBRIDGE

Plaintiffs filed their unverified Complaint on August 29, 2006, challenging the validity of an amendment to the Zoning Ordinance of the City of Cambridge (the “Ordinance”) pursuant to G. L. c. 240, § 14A. Defendant City of Cambridge (“Defendant” or the “City”) filed its Answer on September 28, 2006. A case management conference was held on November 17, 2006. Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on October 30, 2008, together with supporting memorandum, Statement of Undisputed Material facts, and Affidavits of Gordon M. Jones, III and James M. Lyman. On January 29, 2009, Defendant filed its Opposition, together with supporting memorandum, Statement of Additional Undisputed Material Facts, and Affidavit of Vali Buland. Plaintiffs filed their Reply on February 27, 2009, together with Second Affidavit of Gordon M. Jones, III. Defendant filed its Reply on April 14, 2009. A hearing was held on the motion on April 22, 2009, at which time the matter was taken under advisement.

Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and where the summary judgment record entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. See Cassesso v. Comm’r of Corr., 390 Mass. 419 , 422 (1983); Cmty. Nat'l Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550 , 553 (1976); Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

This court finds that the following facts are not in dispute:

1. Plaintiffs own property located at 445 Concord Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts (“Locus”). The Lyman family has owned Locus since the 1930s. Locus contains 98,078 square feet and was used formerly as an electronics manufacturing business from the 1930s through 1987; it is currently in use as a self-storage business. Locus was zoned Industry A-1 until the 2001 Zoning Amendment (the “Amendment”). [Note 1] Locus is bounded on one side by Fern Street, and directly across that portion of Fern Street is an area zoned Residence B.

2. In 1993, the Cambridge Planning Board and the CDD published a Growth Policy Document titled “Toward A Sustainable Future,” as a result of a request from the City to prepare a document articulating the City’s growth and planning policies. The document stated, in part, that “[e]very effort should be made to encourage an expansion of the city’s housing inventory,” and that “[t]he greatest and perhaps only opportunity for construction of new housing is to be found in those areas which have been traditionally used and developed for non-residential, principally industrial, uses.”

3. In 2001, the City undertook a substantial rezoning, which resulted in the Amendment. The Amendment included the creation of a new zoning classification, Residence C-1A. [Note 2] As part of the Amendment, Locus was rezoned from Industry A-1 to Residence C-1A. [Note 3]

4. In 2004, Plaintiffs hired a real estate broker to market Locus. In 2005, Plaintiffs executed a purchase and sale agreement with Abbott Real Estate Development LLC (“Abbott”) contingent upon Abbott’s ability to construct a 127-unit condominium complex on Locus (the “Project”). [Note 4]

5. On March 7, 2006, Abbott held a meeting with neighbors of Locus to explain the Project. A group of neighbors to Locus, including Eileen Woodford and Gina LaRoche (the “Woodford Group”), opposed the Project. Following the March 7 meeting, the Woodford Group met with Plaintiffs to try to reach a compromise but were unable to do so.

6. On March 13, 2006, the Woodford Group filed a petition (the “Petition”) with Defendant to rezone Locus (which was zoned Residence C-1A) and the surrounding area (which was zoned Residence B and Industry A-1) to Residence C. This rezoning would result in a reduction of the maximum number of units in the Project from 128 to 70. The Petition’s stated concerns included the following: increased threat to public safety, increased traffic congestion, increased air pollution, increased noise pollution, increased need for on-street parking, and decreased availability of natural light and air flow.

7. Defendant referred the Petition to the Cambridge Planning Board (the “Planning Board”) and to the Ordinance Committee of the City Council (the “Ordinance Committee”). The Planning Board held a public hearing on the Petition on May 16, 2006. [Note 5] At the hearing Plaintiffs indicated that rezoning Locus to Residence C would make the Project uneconomic. After the hearing, the Planning Board requested that the CDD prepare an analysis of the Petition. At a hearing on June 6, 2006, the Planning Board voted unanimously to recommend rejecting the Petition. In a letter from the Planning Board to Defendant dated June 26, 2006, the Planning Board stated:

. . . The Board finds that the proposed zoning change does not meet the objectives of the current ordinance provisions (to encourage housing over time in the area while allowing existing and new businesses to operate unencumbered), nor would it be an effective way to address the issues raised by the petitioners (adequate transition between the existing neighborhood and new development, improved pedestrian safety, retention of existing businesses). It is the Board’s view that the best outcome, for the neighborhood and for property owners, can be found through the careful review of proposed developments via the Article 19.000 Project Review Special Permit process already in place. . . . . The Petition area and adjacent commercial streets were reviewed during consideration of the citywide rezoning petition that was adopted by the City Council in 2001. . . . The objective of that change was to encourage the conversion of a light industrial activity immediately abutting the neighborhood to housing at a critical point of transition from the existing neighborhood to the more intense commercial activity of Alewife and Fresh Pond.

. . . .

The [Petition] is an attempt to address a number of concerns of residents related to potential impacts resulting from potential development in the existing Residence C-1A zone in particular (the self storage site): the safety of pedestrians and bicyclers as the move through the neighborhood to nearby parks and other amenities; additional automobile traffic; air and noise pollution and emissions from dense new housing; parking competition particularly on existing neighborhood streets; loss of light and air from excessively tall buildings; and general concern for quality of life.

. . . The Planning Board views new residential development in the area, through the conversion of existing non-residential activity to housing, as a good idea and one way to enhance the qualities that already exist in the neighborhood. Such housing conversion is also an objective embodied in the existing zoning provisions (most especially those applicable at the self-storage facility site.) This type of conversion, however, from non-residential uses to housing, often requires some amount of additional density or other incentives. The current C1-A district on the self storage site provides that incentive. The Residence C district proposed in the Petition would probably encourage the existing business to stay because the amount of development now on the site is greater than the Residence C district would allow . . . .

. . . .

The Board is concerned that the proposed zoning change would essentially freeze existing buildings and current uses in place, and that the change to Residence C would be counter to the objectives of the petitioners themselves. Certainly, at [Locus], a future as housing would provide the best physical transition to the existing neighborhood. The [Petition] might discourage that outcome. Moreover, some of the concerns of petitioners, like improvements to traffic and pedestrian safety, might be most easily accomplished as part of mitigation required from a new housing development.

. . . .

. . . The issues of concern expressed by neighbors during the hearing process, as well as the objectives outlined in the Petition documents, are appropriate ones, reflect community sentiment, and should be acknowledged and respected by all parties involved in the new development in the area and should guide its final physical manifestation. [Note 6]

8. After meeting with some business owners who were impacted by the Petition’s proposal to rezone Industry A-1 to Residence C, the Woodford Group proposed a compromise amendment (the “Compromise”) to the Petition that proposed to rezone Industry A-1 to base Residence C-1A with a Mixed Use Residential Overlay District, [Note 7] and rezone Locus from Residence C-1A to Residence C-1. The Compromise would increase the maximum number of units in the Project from 70 to 85. Plaintiffs were not a part of any discussions leading up to the Compromise, but Plaintiffs advised city officials that the Project would be economically unfeasible under the Compromise.

9. On July 11, 2006, the Ordinance Committee of the City Council held a public hearing on the Petition at which the Woodford Group proposed the Compromise. At that same meeting, Plaintiffs proposed their own alternative that would rezone a portion of Locus as Residence C-1A and a portion as Residence C-1, resulting in the allowed construction of a maximum of 104 units for the Project. At the conclusion of their July 11, 2006, meeting, the Ordinance Committee forwarded the Compromise to the full City Council with a favorable recommendation. [Note 8], [Note 9]

10. At a public hearing held on August 7, 2006, the City Council voted to adopt the Compromise. [Note 10] Eight members of the City Council voted in favor of the Compromise; zero members voted against it; and one member was absent. The transcript of this public hearing sets forth the City Council’s rationale for enacting the Compromise and reflects the City Council’s position that the Compromise considered the planning goals of the Amendment and refined those goals in context of Locus’ surrounding neighborhood. The City Council felt that the Compromise achieved a balance between business and neighborhood feel and was cognizant that the neighborhood served as a critical transition point from industrial to residential use. At the same time, the transcript indicates that the City Council acknowledged that the Compromise was not unanimous in its neighborhood support, but that it would benefit the majority of the neighborhood.

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The single issue before this court is the validity of the Compromise. Plaintiffs argue that the Compromise bore no substantial relationship to a legitimate zoning purpose and was arbitrary and unreasonable. Defendant contends that the Compromise was enacted for a legitimate public purpose and was not unreasonable. I shall examine each argument in turn.

The classic constitutional test for the validity of a zoning ordinance is “whether a zoning by-law ‘is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.’” Zuckerman v. Town of Hadley, 442 Mass. 511 , 516 (2004) (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)). [Note 11] “More specifically, due process requires that a zoning bylaw bear a rational relation to a legitimate zoning purpose.” Id. Plaintiffs face a substantial burden as “[e]very presumption is made in favor of the by-law, and, if its reasonableness is fairly debatable, it will be sustained.” Sturges v. Chilmark, 380 Mass. 246 , 256 (1980).

I. Whether the Compromise is Rationally Related to a Legitimate Zoning Purpose.

This court’s first step in determining the validity of the Compromise is to ask whether the Compromise was related to a legitimate zoning purpose.

Some of the objectives for which zoning may be established, as provided in St. 1975, c. 808, Section 2A, include lessening congestion in the streets, conservation of health, securing safety from fire and other dangers, provision of adequate light and air, prevention of overcrowding of land, and avoidance of undue concentration of population. A regulation that materially promotes one or more of these objectives substantially relates to public health, safety, and welfare.

MacNeil v. Avon, 386 Mass. 339 , 341 (1982). The primary rationale behind the Compromise, as stated in the City Council transcript of its August 7, 2006, public hearing, was related to concerns about the character of the neighborhood abutting Locus, as the Project was far more dense than the surrounding residential neighborhood. [Note 12] Moreover, in enacting the Compromise, the City Council was aware that Locus and the surrounding neighborhood were at a transition point from industrial to residential use. These concerns are legitimate zoning interests. See e.g., Trustees of Tufts College v. Medford, 415 Mass. 753 , 757-58 (1993) (referring, in context of G. L. c. 40A, § 3, to the preservation of the character of an adjacent neighborhood as a legitimate municipal purpose sought to be achieved by local zoning); Martin v. Rockland, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 167 , 169 (1973) (finding that where a parcel is located at a borderline between a business, an industrial, and a residential zoning district, “the town could properly determine that the classification was reasonably related to public convenience and welfare and constituted an appropriate use of the land.”).

In light of the above, I find that the Compromise was rationally related to a legitimate zoning purpose.

II. Whether the Compromise is Arbitrary and Unreasonable.

Despite the presumed legitimacy of the Compromise, “as a practical matter [courts] have never dealt with a zoning regulation in a vacuum.” Sturges, 380 Mass. at 257. Rather, “[t]he circumstances existing in a municipality have always been considered in the process of passing on the constitutionality of a zoning provision.” Id. As such, this court is tasked with reviewing the enactment of the Compromise in light of the facts in the summary judgment record to determine whether the Compromise is arbitrary and unreasonable.

Planning Goals.

Plaintiffs assert that the Compromise was arbitrary and unreasonable in that it ran counter to the longstanding planning goals of the City to encourage housing in industrial areas, and cite the Amendment which rezoned Locus from Industry A-1 to Residence C-1A. This goal, Plaintiffs contend, was offset by the whims of neighbors through the Petition and the Compromise. [Note 13] Plaintiffs also claim that the Compromise was unreasonable in light of the Planning Board’s opposition to the Petition, given that there was no change in circumstances since the Amendment in 2001 to justify either the Petition or the Compromise. Finally, Plaintiffs claim that Locus was the subject of discrimination because it was treated differently from the surrounding industrial area. Defendant argues that the Compromise was consistent with the City’s two long-standing planning goals of increasing housing in formerly industrial districts while also protecting the surrounding neighborhood from over-development, and point to the changes to the area surrounding Locus since 2001, including increased traffic, parking, and density.

The summary judgment record indicates that Defendant undertook extensive planning for the Amendment prior to 2001, including a major growth policy study (“Toward a Sustainable Future”) in 1993. Moreover, the Planning Board’s thorough recommendation concerning the Petition was a part of the City Council record. [Note 14] This analysis brought to the City Council’s attention all of the relevant facts despite the Planning Board’s differing in its conclusion. Additionally, the City Council, the Planning Board, and the Ordinance Committee of the City Council held numerous public hearings with respect to the Petition and Compromise, at which members of the public spoke out in favor of and in opposition to the Petition and Compromise. In light of the above, the record indicates that the City Council enacted the Compromise after adequate deliberation of the relevant issues.

It is a reasonable inference that the Compromise was consistent with the goals of adding housing and protecting adjacent neighborhoods against over-development, as Defendant claims. Barber, an agent of the City, states that even though he would have preferred the Amendment as compared to the Compromise, it was a reasonable choice for the City Council to come to a different conclusion than the Planning Board. It is not dispositive to whether the Compromise is reasonable that the Planning Board may have had a different approach. See W.R. Grace, 56 Mass. App. Ct. at 568 (“The decision regarding sensible zoning is for the planning board to recommend and for the city council to make. Considered views on the subject, even if in conflict, are plainly helpful to both.”). Additionally, despite Plaintiffs’ claims that the Compromise did nothing to address the Planning Board’s concerns about the Petition, the Compromise did include a Mixed Use Residential Overlay District that would allow for existing businesses to expand without having to apply for variances, and the Compromise increased the maximum number of units of the Project from 70 to 85, as opposed to the Petition.

With respect to whether land use patterns changed between the Amendment and the Compromise, Defendant claims that neighbors testified during various public meetings on the Compromise as to increases in traffic, parking problems, and neighborhood density. However, upon this court’s review of the meeting minutes and transcripts, such neighborhood testimony is prospective in nature and does not testify as to specific, observed increases in traffic, parking, or density between 2001 and 2006. Rather, the hearing transcript reveals mostly speculation by neighbors. Moreover, Plaintiffs cite to a different portion of the deposition testimony of Barber, in which he states that nothing had occurred in Locus’ neighborhood since 2001 that would require a rezoning. Given the above, this court cannot conclude that the purported changes in land use patterns in the neighborhood surrounding Locus between 2001 and 2006 are undisputed.

However, this absence of facts relative to purported changes in land use patterns in the summary judgment record does not determine whether the Compromise is unreasonable or arbitrary. [Note 15] In short, this court must uphold the validity of the Compromise if it the record shows “some substantial relation between the zoning code amendment and the general objectives of the enabling act.” National Amusements, Inc. v. Boston, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 305 , 309 (1990). Stated differently, “[d]ue process challenges to government action affecting economic activity call for an inquiry ‘whether the challenged measure bears a rational relation to any permissible public object which the legislative body may plausibly be said to have been pursuing.’” W.R. Grace, 56 Mass. App. Ct. at 566 (quoting Sturges, 380 Mass. at 256). As discussed, supra, the Compromise is reasonably related to the City’s planning goals.

While Plaintiffs claim that the Compromise unfairly discriminates against Locus, they admit that the Compromise is not an instance of reverse spot zoning, as Locus was zoned differently from the surrounding neighborhood prior to the Compromise. This is not a case, as Plaintiffs suggest, of a parcel being “set off from similar adjacent business lots at the instigation of citizens who objected to a particular proposed business use.” Schertzer v. Somerville, 345 Mass. 747 , 752 (1963). Locus is a unique parcel, as it is located at a transition between two zoning districts and is not adjacent to any similar lots. Nor is this an instance of “singling out of a particular parcel for different treatment from that of the surrounding area, producing, without rational planning objectives, zoning classifications that fail to treat like properties in a uniform manner.” National Amusements, 29 Mass. App. Ct. at 312. [Note 16] As previously discussed, the Compromise reasonably integrates legitimate zoning interests. Moreover, to the extent that the Compromise results in a greater economic impact on Plaintiffs, that alone is insufficient to invalidate the zoning amendment as zoning is “not designed for the preservation of the economic value of property, . . .” Tranfaglia v. Building Comm’r of Winchester, 306 Mass. 495 , 503-04 (1940).

Economic Detriment.

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the Compromise was economically detrimental to them, citing the loss of forty-two units in the Project. As a rationale for the inclusion of such assertion, Plaintiffs cite to Amberwood Dev. Corp. v. Bd. of Appeals of Boxford, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 205 , 210 (2005), in which the Appeals Court required a property owner to show “significant injury” (in addition to showing that an application of the by-law has no real or substantial relationship to public health, safety, or welfare) to successfully challenge a local by-law under G. L. c. 240, § 14A. However, the relevant question in Amberwood involved whether the by-law provision was valid as applied to the plaintiff. Id. at 205. Given that the case at bar involves Plaintiffs’ facial challenge to the Compromise, it is questionable whether this court need make a finding concerning whether the Compromise significantly harms Plaintiffs’ interest in Locus. Moreover, even if the Amberwood test applied to the case at bar, as this court has found a rational basis between the Compromise and a legitimate zoning purpose, there is no need to address the “second branch” of the Amberwood test.

Conclusion.

As a result of the foregoing, I find that the Compromise was not arbitrary and unreasonable. Thus, I DENY Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

Judgment to enter accordingly.

Alexander H. Sands, III

Justice

Dated: April 12, 2010