Home DENNIS P. VASSALOTTI, JR. v. CHESTER D. PEIRCE & DOROTHY S. PEIRCE, TRUSTEES OF LAND O’COTLEY TRUST, and NEW ENGLAND FORESTRY FOUNDATIONS, INC.

MISC 06-326127

November 30, 2010

BRISTOL, ss.

Trombly, J.

JUDGMENT [Note 1]

This case was filed on July 14, 2006 by Dennis Vassalotti (“Plaintiff”) claiming that he is the owner of the fee in a portion of property (“Property”) located in Taunton on County Road pursuant to G.L. c. 183, § 58, the so-called Derelict Fee Statute, or, in the alternative, by adverse possession. Plaintiff further requests from this court injunctive relief to enjoin the Defendants’ actions on the land determined to be owned by the Plaintiff.

On August 12, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to decide the issue of whether he holds fee title to the Property pursuant to the Derelict Fee Statute. On November 16, 2009, this court (Trombly, J.) issued an order denying the motion, finding the Plaintiff could not utilize the Derelict Fee Statute because the Property did not abut a way, as it is defined in the Derelict Fee Statute, at the time the Property was conveyed to him, and that the grantor, Ms. Bettinson, clearly expressed her intent to retain her fee in said Property.

A one day trial on the present case was held on July 29, 2010 and the matter was taken under advisement. A decision of today’s date (the “Decision”) has been issued. In accordance therewith, it is hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the complaint is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice, the Court finding and ruling that the Plaintiff does not hold title to the disputed property on land in Taunton located on County Street either by virtue of G.L. c. 183, § 58, the so-called Derelict Fee Statute, or, in the alternative, by adverse possession. The Plaintiff may continue his use and enjoyment of the Property in accordance with the broad terms of the easement but must do so in such a way as not to interfere with the rights of the owners of the fee in the property.

By the Court (Trombly, J.)


FOOTNOTES

[Note 1] All terms used in this Judgment carry the same definition as employed in the Decision.