KENNETH GRANGER and BEVERLY GRANGER vs. GARY A. LEBLOND

By virtue of the instant action, plaintiffs Kenneth Granger and Beverly Granger (plaintiffs) seek to establish title to a parcel of land (locus / disputed parcel) in Brookfield, Massachusetts. [Note 1] To this end, plaintiffs’ complaint, filed on December 21, 2006, sets out two counts. The first seeks to quiet title to locus, while the second sets out a claim for adverse possession.

On February 26, 2007, Gary A. LeBlond (defendant) filed an answer together with a counterclaim pursuant to G. L. c. 231 § 6F. [Note 2] Plaintiffs contend that they have either (a) taken title to the disputed parcel by deed granted them in 1976, or (b) satisfied the elements of adverse possession, thereby establishing title by operation of that doctrine. Defendant, in contrast, asserts that he holds title to the disputed property and that, in any event, the plaintiffs’ use of locus was permissive, so that a claim of adverse possession will not lie.

At a trial conducted on October 28, 2009, the court heard the testimony of Kenneth Granger, Bruce Clarke, Gary LeBlond, and Philip Pierce. This court allowed admission of nineteen exhibits into the trial record. Those exhibits are incorporated by reference into this decision for purposes of appeal. At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, the defendant verbally moved for a directed verdict or, in the alternative, to dismiss both counts of the complaint. The defendant’s motion was taken under advisement as to count one (quiet title), and denied as to count two (adverse possession). The parties filed their post-trial briefs on December 30, 2009, and January 31, 2010, respectively.

Findings Of Fact

On all testimony, exhibits and other evidence properly introduced at trial or otherwise before it, and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, this court find as follows:

1. Locus is a parcel of land consisting of 20,800 square feet, lying between 39 Rice Corner Road, the Granger residential parcel, [Note 3] and 43 Rice Corner Road, the LeBlond residential parcel, in Brookfield, Massachusetts. The disputed parcel is depicted on a plan recorded on August 11, 1976 with the Worcester South Registry of Deeds (Registry) at Plan Book 427, Page 113. [Note 4]

2. In 1970, William Clarke and Marilyn Clarke, husband and wife, purchased a 68 acre tract of land in Brookfield lying astride the easterly and westerly sides of Rice Corner Road. That tract included the properties currently at issue. [Note 5]

3. A portion of the 68 acre tract was conveyed to the plaintiffs, Kenneth and Beverly Granger. They acquired what is now 39 Rice Corner Road from William Clarke and Marilyn Clarke by deed dated September 3, 1971. [Note 6] William Clarke is Beverly Granger’s cousin. [Note 7] At the time of acquisition, the neighborhood was wholly rural in character. Plaintiffs’ one acre parcel was unimproved and overgrown with trees and shrubs. [Note 8] The lot was cleared and a dwelling erected thereon.

4. Thereafter, the William Clarke and Marilyn Clarke sold much of the remaining land, eventually conveying two parcels, Parcel I and Parcel II to their son, Bruce Clarke, by deed dated September 19, 1975. [Note 9] Parcel I, consisting of 17.62 acres, was subsequently conveyed to the defendant together with Parcel II. In 1978, William Clarke and Bruce Clarke had constructed a residential dwelling on Parcel I and Bruce Clarke resided there from 1978 through 1982. [Note 10] Parcel II, containing 20,800 square feet is the subject of the instant dispute.

5. In 1976, William Clarke and Marilyn Clarke “came to [Kenneth Granger and Beverly Granger] and said he was going to sell [locus or] possibly put a house on it [Note 11] for his daughter. [Note 12] Kenneth Granger expressed an interest in acquiring locus [Note 13] in order “to clear it and avoid another house being put on it. I didn’t want another house so close.” [Note 14]

For the sum of $1,500 [Note 15] the Grangers acquired what purported to be the disputed parcel by deed of Bruce W. Clarke. [Note 16] The deed, dated September 14, 1976, was recorded with the Registry on September 29, 1976 at Book 6035, Page 360. While the said deed references the earlier conveyance of Parcels I and II from William Clarke and Marilyn Clarke to Bruce Clarke, [Note 17] the legal description is of a 20,120 square foot parcel located on the opposite side of Rice Corner Road, i.e. a parcel which had been conveyed to one John H. Woodward more than four years earlier, on June 3, 1972. [Note 18]

6. In 1976, the time of its purported acquisition by the Grangers, the disputed parcel was unimproved, overgrown, with shrubs and some small tress. [Note 19] Over the next few years [Note 20] on weekends, Kenneth Granger cleared locus by hand, taking down small trees and at least a single shrub. [Note 21] He eventually “leveled it off as best [he] could and reseeded for grass to grow.” [Note 22]

7. Once the disputed parcel was cleared, the Grangers’ teenage son Bruce regularly rode his dirt bike there, and later drove his Camaro vehicle on it to such an extent that the lawn was torn up. [Note 23] By 1982, Bruce Granger had turned 19 years old and had graduated from high school. Thereafter, his motorized recreation on the disputed parcel essentially ceased. Consequently, Kenneth Granger reseeded locus once again. [Note 24]

8. Defendant Gary A. LeBlond holds title to the property at 43 Rice Corner Road, Brookfield. He acquired that property by deed of May 14, 1982 by from Bruce W. Clarke and Anna Marie Clarke. Said deed was recorded with the Registry at Book 7467, Page 299. [Note 25] The deed conveyed the same two parcels of land that had been conveyed from William Clarke and Marilyn Clarke to their son, Bruce by deed of September 19, 1975. While Parcel I is the site of defendant’s dwelling, Parcel II constitutes locus, the object of this litigation. [Note 26] Defendant, therefore, is the record owner of the disputed parcel.

9. Prior to the conveyance to the defendant, William Clarke had planted approximately three or four arborvitae along the left hand or southerly boundary of the locus telling Kenneth Granger “This is your line. We don’t go beyond it.” [Note 27] According to Kenneth Granger, “[t]he bushes were put in there to denote the property line.” [Note 28] For his part, Kenneth Granger planted three or four spruce seedlings “that [his]son got at school” along the Rice Corner Road side of the disputed parcel. [Note 29]

10. In 1984 or 1985 [Note 30] LeBlond undertook arborvitae plantings along the right of way so that such plantings extended along the full length of the disputed parcel’s left-hand boundary. These arborvitae were approximately three feet tall, costing the defendant “about $60 apiece.” [Note 31] In addition, the defendant planted approximately twenty-five, somewhat larger, arborvitae along the rear line of the locus. These arborvitae were somewhat taller at three and a half feet tall and costing “about $75” apiece.” [Note 32] By virtue of these plantings, the defendant effectively separated locus [Parcel II] from the remainder of LeBlond’s property [Parcel I].

11. The two rows of arborvitae were continuous, abutting one another, without significant gaps. [Note 33]

12. Every year thereafter, LeBlond maintained the said plantings by pruning them, fertilizing them, applying fungicide, and raking the resulting clippings. [Note 34]

13. After clearing the disputed parcel and seeding it, Kenneth Granger mowed the grass [Note 35] continuously on a weekly or bi-weekly basis up to the line of arborvitae. [Note 36] He would also trim the “all the way around the edges to make it look neat, clean.” [Note 37] He would, as well, rake the leaves that fell from the four oak trees located on the disputed parcel. [Note 38] The lawn mowing and related maintenance continued until the Grangers sold their residential parcel at 39 Rice Corner Road, in 2005.

14. The Granger family also made use of the disputed parcel for snowmobiling in the winter, [Note 39] in connection with an annual Fourth of July party, [Note 40] for playing handball and badminton, [Note 41] and for parking construction vehicles thereon during the installation of a swimming pool on their residential lot. [Note 42]

15. From 1976 through fiscal year 2005, Kenneth Granger and Beverly Granger paid the real estate taxes that were assessed to them as the purported owners of the disputed parcel. [Note 43]

16. In 2005, the plaintiffs, who currently reside in Sturbridge, Massachusetts, entered into a purchase and sale agreement to convey their house lot and the disputed parcel to Jeffery and Doreen Smith. However, a title search disclosed that the plaintiffs did not possess record title in the disputed parcel. [Note 44] Consequently, the deed conveying plaintiffs’ property to the Smiths, did not include title to locus.

***

The plaintiffs’ suit consists of two distinct causes of action. The first is an action to quiet title while the second seeks to establish title through adverse possession. As previously observed, this court has taken under advisement defendant’s motion for a directed verdict as to the first count. Accordingly, it will first consider plaintiffs’ claim to quiet title.

Under G. L. c. 240, §§ 6-10 one may bring an action to quiet title or to remove a cloud therefrom. In their first count, plaintiffs essentially argue that the 1976 deed, which they believed conveyed title to the disputed parcel, was sufficient to convey record title to same, and that the defendant’s claim of record ownership operates as a cloud. This court cannot agree that the 1976 deed to the Grangers was legally sufficient to convey record title to locus. An erroneous description in a deed conveys the property described, absent a court decree reforming the deed to correct the parties’ mutual mistake and to conform the deed to their true intent. See Lhu v. Dignotti, 431 Mass. 292 , 294 (2000). Plaintiffs have not included a count for reformation in their complaint, nor have they otherwise demonstrated an entitlement to such relief. Moreover, an action for reformation would not lie in any event, if such reformation were to prejudice the rights of a bona fide, third party purchaser. See ibid. In short, plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate that they possess record title to the disputed parcel.

Furthermore, a claim of adverse possession will not provide the basis for an action to quite title. “[M]ere possessory titles are not recognized by our statute, and in equity the general doctrine is well settled, that a bill to remove a cloud from the land affected cannot be maintained unless both actual possession and the legal title are united in the plaintiff.” First Baptist Church v. Harper, 191 Mass. 196 , 209 (1906) (emphasis added). Thus, where the plaintiffs do not possess legal title, and where litigants’ claim of title rests on a claim of adverse possession, the statute is inapplicable. Accordingly, this court will grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss that count of the complaint brought under G. L. c. 240, §§ 6-10.

Count II of the plaintiffs’ complaint in which they seek to establish title by adverse possession rests on an entirely different footing. “Title by adverse possession can be acquired only by proof of nonpermissive use which is actual, open, notorious, exclusive and adverse for twenty years,” Ryan v. Stavros, 348 Mass. 251 , 262 (1964). Such use must be continuous during the statutory period. See Mendonca v. Cities Service Oil Co., 354 Mass. 323 , 326 (1968) (use by owner of record during statutory period breaks continuity of adverse claimant’s possession and vitiates claim). “The guiding principle behind the elements of adverse possession is not to ascertain the intent or state of mind of the adverse claimant, but rather to provide notice to the true owner, allowing for the legal vindication of property rights.” Totman v. Molloy, 431 Mass. 143 , 145 (2000). See Proprietors of the Kennebeck Purchase v. Springer, 4 Mass. 415 , 418 (1808) (“[t]o constitute a disseisin of the owner of uncultivated land by the entry and occupation of a party not claiming title to the land, the occupation must be of that nature and notoriety, that the owner may be presumed to know that there is a possession of the land adverse to his title”).

To ensure that the purpose of the doctrine is met, the burden of proof rests upon “the one asserting the title [by adverse possession]. The burden of proof extends to all of the necessary elements of such possession and includes the obligation to show that it was actual, open, continuous, and under a claim of right or title.” Mendonca, supra, quoting from Holmes v. Johnson, 324 Mass. 450 , 453 (internal quotations omitted). “If any of these elements is left in doubt, the claimant cannot prevail.” Ibid. This court will consider whether plaintiffs have met their burden as to each element, seriatim.

Nonpermissive use, “which has been referred to interchangeably in the case law as ‘hostile,’ ‘adverse,’ or ‘under a claim of right,’” is in essence a “lack of consent from the true owner.” Totman, 431 Mass. at 145. “Whether a use is nonpermissive depends on many circumstances, including the character of the land, the identity of those who benefited from the use of the land, the manner in which the land was held and maintained, and the nature of the individual relationship between the parties claiming ownership.” Ibid. There is ample support in this court’s findings for the notion that plaintiffs’ use and occupation of the land was hostile to defendant’s legal title.

For example, the plaintiffs, as grantees under a deed having a faulty property description, believed they had taken title to the disputed parcel. Predicated upon that erroneous belief, they cleared locus; they made use of it; they maintained it; and they paid the real estate taxes assessed thereon. The belief that they were the record owners does not diminish or lessen the hostile or adverse nature of their occupation. Kendall v. Selvaggio, 413 Mass. 619 , 624 (1992).

The main thrust of the defendant’s theory of the case is that he, over the years, gave the plaintiffs, and especially their grandchildren, permission to use the disputed parcel. If this were true, it would vitiate plaintiffs’ claim of title based upon adverse possession. Ryan v. Stavros, 348 Mass. at 263. ( permissive use is inconsistent with adverse use). However, the only evidence supporting defendant’s theory is his own self-serving testimony which this court deems not credible and which is, in any event, largely contradicted by opposing evidence which this court chooses to credit. [Note 45]

At trial, the defendant testified that he granted permission in 1982 when Kenneth Granger asked if his children and grandchildren could make use of the disputed parcel. [Note 46] LeBlond further stated that Granger’s grandchildren used locus six or seven times a year for seven or eight years. [Note 47] When asked on direct examination if “other then the July Fourth party” the Grangers made use of the disputed parcel, LeBlond responded, “Just the grandkids.” [Note 48] And again, “Kenny used to mow part of the lawn over here [locus] for his grandkids.” [Note 49] On cross examination, LeBlond reaffirmed his statement that between 1982 and 1991 he saw the Granger children playing in at least part of the yard. [Note 50]

This LeBlond testimony regarding permission and usage by the Granger children and grandchildren was directly contradicted by Kenneth Granger. Granger testified that he neither sought nor received permission to use the subject property; and that, by 1982, his two children, then 19 and 22 years old respectively, did not use the subject property except for occasional dirt biking by his son. [Note 51]

The following exchange with Kenneth Granger on redirect examination regarding his purported grandchildren, is highly significant: [Note 52]

Q: You testified earlier that you have one son and one daughter, correct?

A: Yes. Yes.

Q: And in 1982, did your son have any grandchildren?

A: No.

Q: And in 1982, did your daughter have any grandchildren?

A: No.

On cross examination, Kenneth Granger testified as follows: [Note 53]

Q: Sir, after 1982, do you have any grandchildren?

A: No.

Q: Did you ever have any other children, other than your own children, play or recreate on the disputed parcel?

A: The Fourth of July, children that were related played on that parcel of property.

This court is satisfied that the defendant’s assertions that he gave the Granger children and grandchildren consent to use the disputed parcel finds no credible support in the record. Much of his testimony concerning such alleged permission, is contradicted by the evidence as to the ages of the Granger children and the non-existence of any grandchildren.

Furthermore, the permission that LeBlond purportedly gave the Grangers cannot readily be reconciled with his own actions vis a vis the locus. By way of example, the defendant effectively fenced off the land in question from his remaining property by means of an arborvitae hedgerow. [Note 54] The defendant claims that the hedgerow was intended merely to reduce headlight pollution. As evidence for this assertion, he contends that he always included a forty-foot gap in it for an intended driveway. The presence of such a gap however, is without credible support on the record. [Note 55] Moreover, if the intention behind the hedgerow were only to mitigate headlight pollution, then defendant’s extension of the hedgerow around the rear of the locus makes little sense. On the contrary, the placement of a hedgerow that goes up the side of the driveway and, then, runs along the rear lot line of locus, raises strong inferences which are plainly at odds with defendant’s theory of the case.

This fence-like configuration of arborvitae conveys the impression that LeBlond was unaware that he held legal title to locus, but believed rather that he did not own the subject property. One would be hard pressed to believe that a property owner would configure such a row of arborvitae in the midst of his or her yard. It seems evident that the placement of the arborvitae is illustrative of a desire to secure one’s privacy from the abutting property. It is reasonable to infer from this configuration that LeBlond placed and maintained the hedgerow intending to assure his privacy from land he believed to be owned by the plaintiffs, his next door neighbors.

This court concludes, based upon the evidence it deems credible and the permissible inferences it draws therefrom, that LeBlond did not give plaintiffs, their children and grandchildren permission to use his land. He would not have given permission to use locus inasmuch as the evidence tends to show he never believed the disputed parcel to be his in the first place, but believed rather that it belonged to the plaintiffs. [Note 56]

Based upon the foregoing evidence and analysis, this court credits Kenneth Granger’s testimony as to the nonpermissive nature of his family’s use, and finds that Gary LeBlond’s testimony is not credible to the extent it is inconsistent with that of Kenneth Granger. [Note 57] Accordingly, this court finds and rules that the plaintiffs’ use and occupation of locus was nonpermissive.

In the present context, the word actual refers to use and control of the land at issue, sometimes known as dominion, in derogation of the true owner’s rights. See Ottavia v. Savarese, 338 Mass. 330 , 334 (1959). The acts necessary to establish actual use and dominion will “vary with the character of the land, the purposes for which it is adapted, and the uses to which it has been put.” LaChance v. First Nat’l Bank, 301 Mass. 488 , 490 (1938). “[T]he possessor must use and enjoy the property . . . as the average owner would use it . . .” Ottavia, supra at 333, quoting from 3 American Law of Property, § 15.4, at 776-777 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). See Kendall v. Selvaggio, 413 Mass. at 624. In most cases, to fulfill this requirement, the possessor must “make ‘changes upon the land’ that constitute ‘such a control and dominion over the premises as to be readily considered acts similar to those which are usually and ordinarily associated with ownership.’” Peck v. Bigelow, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 551 , 556 (1993), quoting from LaChance, supra at 491.

In the instant case, the disputed parcel is essentially a side yard in a rural neighborhood where large yards are not uncommon. [Note 58] Plaintiff has produced credible evidence to show that in 1976, upon his purported acquisition of the disputed parcel, he gradually cleared what was then unimproved, overgrown land. This is the sort of “permanent improvement” associated in the case law, with actual possession. Peck, supra. Thereafter, he planted grass, and maintained the resulting lawn. See ibid. Subsequently, after his son’s recreational biking and off-road driving ceased, the plaintiff re-seeded the lot and maintained the lawn with weekly or bi-weekly mowing, as well as raking leaves and edge trimming as deemed necessary. Such actions are consistent with the usual and ordinary cultivation and maintenance of property commonly performed by landowners in such neighborhoods. [Note 59] See Collins v. Cabral, 348 Mass. 797 , 797-798 (1965); Soer v. Daffe, 337 Mass. 420 , 423 (1951); Sea Pines Condominium III v. Steffens, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 838 , 847-849 (2004); MacDonald v. McGillvary, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 902 , 904 (1993); Shaw v. Solari, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 151 , 157 (1979).

Plaintiffs additionally held an annual Fourth of July party, planted several spruce and played sports upon locus. They also used it during the construction of their pool to park various vehicles, and paid real estate taxes assessed to them upon locus to the for the entire period in question. While not in itself dispositive, “[t]he payment of taxes evidences a claim of ownership." Lawrence v. Concord, 439 Mass. 416 , 418 (2003), quoting from Bernard v. Nantucket Boys' Club, Inc., 391 Mass. 823 , 826 (1984). In sum, there is ample evidence that the plaintiffs actually possessed the subject property. Consequently, this court finds and rules that plaintiffs have met their burden in demonstrating their actual possession of locus.

The same evidence that has persuaded this court that plaintiffs’ possession was actual also convinces it of the continuous nature of their occupation. While acts of possession which are “few, intermittent or equivocal” will not suffice to prevail upon an adverse possession claim, Parker v. Parker, 1 Allen 245 , 247 (1861), the above described actions taken by the plaintiffs and their family members with regard to the subject property, extend, continuously, throughout a minimum twenty-year period. There is no evidence deemed credible by this court, of interruption by actions of dominion on the part of the defendant. [Note 60] As such, this court finds and rules that plaintiffs’ occupation of the disputed parcel was continuous.

The open and notorious element, the purpose of which is to place the true owner on constructive notice of the adverse claim, see Sea Pines Condominium III, 61 Mass. App. Ct. at 848, requires that the adverse possessor’s use and occupation of the property be of the sort that would be readily observable by the record owner. See ibid. In Foot v. Bauman, 333 Mass. 214 (1955), the Supreme Judicial Court adopted the “true rule” that “[t]o be open the use must be made without attempted concealment. To be notorious it must be known to some who might reasonably be expected to communicate their knowledge to the owner if he maintained a reasonable degree of supervision over his premises. It is not necessary that the use be actually known to the owner for it to meet the test of being notorious." Id. at 218. Here, plaintiffs’ use and occupation of the subject property was certainly of the type that would reasonably alert the true owner of plaintiffs’ possession. In fact, the defendant testified to having observed plaintiffs or their invitees using locus.

Moreover, to the extent that plaintiffs’ use and maintenance of locus was at all obscured, that result was due largely to the actions of the defendant himself in planting rows of arborvitae. Accordingly, this court finds and rules that plaintiffs’ occupation of locus was open and notorious.

As with the requirement that an adverse possessor’s use be actual, exclusivity requires a showing of "actual use and enjoyment of the property as the average owner of similar property would use and enjoy it, so that people residing in the neighborhood would be justified in regarding the possessor as exercising the exclusive dominion and control incident to ownership . . ." Shaw, 8 Mass. App. Ct. at 156-57, quoting from 3 Am. Law of Property, § 15.3, at 765-766 (1974). Thus, what constitutes exclusive possession depends upon the type of land at issue and usage in the surrounding area. Therefore, “[e]vidence insufficient to establish exclusive possession of a tract of vacant land in the country might be adequate proof of such possession of a lot in the center of a large city.” LaChance, 301 Mass. at 490. The application of this standard does not require that the adverse possessor actually expel third parties, but merely requires such expulsion "to the extent that the owner would have excluded them." Peck, 34 Mass. App. Ct. at 557.

In the instant case, the evidence supports the exclusivity of the plaintiffs’ possession. [Note 61] Plaintiffs acted towards the disputed parcel as would an average owner. It is undisputed that LeBlond entered upon the disputed parcel to maintain and trim the arborvitae that he himself had largely planted. [Note 62] However, there is nothing to suggest that this annual effort involved anything other than a minimal intrusion, or that it would derogate from the exclusivity of plaintiffs’ possession. Contrast Peck, supra (traffic upon rights of way on disputed property vitiated exclusivity of claimant’s possession). This court concludes therefore, that such an annual entry by the record owner to maintain his shrubbery, at the boundary line, does not constitute an act "of dominion [over the subject property] by the defendant consistent with its title of record." Mendonca v. Cities Service Oil, 354 Mass. at 326. Thus, LeBlond’s acts of maintenance concerning the hedgerow, did not require the Grangers to eject him from locus in order that their possession be considered exclusive. This court finds and rules, based upon the credible evidence presented, that plaintiffs have amply demonstrated their exclusivity of possession on the trial record.

Lastly, there is the matter of the requisite statutory period. General Laws, c. 260, §21 sets forth the statute of limitations in an “action for the recovery of land [which] shall be commenced . . . within twenty years after the right of action . . . accrued . .. .” “The theory is that there has been a disseisin by an adverse possessor, and that consequently an owner must bring an action to recover the land within twenty years.” [Note 63]

Thus, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that their adverse possession of locus has spanned twenty years or more. In the instant case, the prescriptive period began in 1976 when Kenneth Granger believed he purchased the disputed parcel. Thereafter, for an uninterrupted period until 2005, well beyond the twenty year period, the plaintiffs openly, notoriously, and under a claim of right, adversely held the disputed parcel in derogation of the true owner’s rights.

The defendant makes much of the fact that the Granger childrens’ heavy use of the disputed parcel occurred prior to LeBlond’s purchase in 1982. As Justice Holmes wrote, however, over a hundred years ago:

Adverse possession is a pure matter of fact, to be interrupted only by interrupting the possessor's exclusion of adverse claimants, an abandonment of his claim, or a change in his intent. In general also the effect of the adverse possession will not be abridged by a change of title. The adverse possessor ex hypothesi is a wrongdoer until the twenty years has elapsed. Commonly at least, if not necessarily, his claim is adverse to all the world, and probably any dealings among the excluded parties, even when a deed by a disseisee is valid, would not affect him. Probably the purchaser would only stand in his seller's shoes.

Harrison v. Dolan, 172 Mass. 395 , 396 (1899). Thus, even though record title of the disputed parcel passed from Bruce Clarke to LeBlond in 1982, this transfer had no effect on the prescriptive period. Moreover, as LeBlond’s own testimony establishes, the plaintiffs’ use of locus extended well beyond that of their children, throughout the statutory period. In short there is more than ample evidence that plaintiffs’ use of the disputed property continued beyond the requisite prescriptive period.

For the foregoing reasons, this court is satisfied that the plaintiffs have met their burden as to every element of their adverse possession claim. This court concludes, therefore, that the plaintiffs have established title to the disputed parcel predicated upon a successful showing of adverse possession.

Judgment to enter accordingly.

Harry M. Grossman

Justice

Dated: February 15, 2011.