On October 8, 1980, Chester F. Nicewicz filed two petitions in this court under G. L. c.60, §69A to vacate tax foreclosure decrees entered in favor of the City of Chelsea (the City) which foreclosed petitioner's right of redemption to premises at 74-76-78 Broadway in Chelsea, Suffolk County, Massachusetts (the premises).
The petitions came on for hearing on October 15, 1980. On that date petitioner advised the court that he did not have sufficient funds to redeem the property at that time but requested that the hearing be continued for a short period of time to enable him to attempt to acquire funds to redeem the premises. The hearing was continued until October 24, 1980.
On all the information furnished to the court, I find the uncontroverted facts to be as follows:
In Tax Lien Case No. 59319 involving the premises at 74 Broadway in Chelsea, a final decree foreclosing petitioner's right of redemption entered on August 7, 1980, following a general default which entered on July 30, 1980. In Tax Lien Case No. 59326 involving the premises at 76-78 Broadway in Chelsea, a final decree foreclosing petitioner's right of redemption entered on August 25, 1980, following a general default which entered on August 18, 1980.
The premises consist of an auto body repair shop conducted by petitioner. No payment oftaxes have been received by the City since 1973. On October 24, 1980, unpaid taxes together with interest on the parcel at 74 Broadway totalled $4,438.52. On that date unpaid taxes together with interest on the property at 76-78 Broadway totalled $44,571.80.
Petitioner duly received notice of the proceedings in each of the tax lien cases but filed no appearance or answer in either case.
The City has duly advertised the premises to be sold at public auction on October 27, 1980.
At the time of the hearing petitioner requested additional time to try to work out financing to pay off the tax delinquency. However, all that he could offer the City at that time was $5,000.00. He had no definite plans for obtaining the necessary financing.
Since petitioner seeks to vacate the decrees, not to raise any question of law or fact but to obtain additional time to redeem and since he had no present ability to redeem at the hearing nor did he have any definite plans to enable him to redeem, the court in the exercise of its discretion does not feel that it would be in the public interest to vacate the decrees of foreclosure, nor does it feel that such action is required to accomplish justice. Bucher v. Randolph, 307 Mass. 391 (1940). Russell v. Foley, 278 Mass. 145 (1932).
Accordingly, the court orders that the petitions be dismissed in each case.