PETER C. RAYMOND v. SM FINANCIAL SERVICES CORPORATION.

This action commenced in this court September 28, 2011 with the filing by plaintiff of a verified complaint seeking declaratory relief under G.L. c. 231A.

This case came on to be heard on cross motions for summary judgment on March 28, 2013. After hearing, the court (Piper, J.), from the bench, GRANTED the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and DENIED the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, for substantially the reasons set forth in the defendant’s moving papers, and for the reasons which were laid upon the record from the bench and given by the court in a docket entry of that date. Following the court’s ruling, the parties by counsel were given the opportunity to propose forms of judgment for the court to enter in this case.

Acting on a request for attorney’s fees and costs later filed by the defendant, the court today has issued an order on that request, making an award of attorney’s fees and costs to be paid by plaintiff’s counsel to defendant. In accordance with the court’s order of even date, its prior rulings on summary judgment, and taking into account the proposed forms of judgment submitted, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECLARED that the judgment (“Judgment”) issued on May 22, 1991 in the Concord District Court, Civil Action No. 9047CV0531, in favor of Gayle Carney and against Peter Raymond, in the amount of $154,096.19, plus costs of $104.65 and attorney’s fees of $941.00, had not been satisfied, and remained in force and effect as of the time of the death of Plaintiff Peter C. Raymond. [Note 1] It is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECLARED that the presumption of satisfaction of judgments set forth in G.L. c. 260, § 20 has been rebutted as to the subject Judgment, which remains unsatisfied and unpaid; the only payments against the amount of the Judgment, which were made to the original holder of the Judgment, Gayle Carney, total $7,200. By stipulation of the parties, these payments are credited against the Judgment amount effective May 22, 1991 (the date of the Judgment). It is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECLARED that as of the time of plaintiff’s death, the remainder of the balance due with respect to the Judgment, with statutory interest from May 21, 1991 pursuant to G.L. c. 231, § 6C, remained due and owing on the Judgment. It is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECLARED that the second or alias execution (“Alias Execution”), issued February 23, 2010 on the Judgment, and recorded with the Middlesex (South District) Registry of Deeds (“Registry”) at Book 54373, Page 20, was not, as of the time of plaintiff’s death, invalid, unenforceable, or deemed satisfied by reason of the statutory presumption in G.L. c. 260, § 20, and did not and has not become invalid, unenforceable, or deemed satisfied or paid based on any such presumption, the presumption being rebuttable and having been rebutted by the defendant in this case in this court. It is further

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 11 (a) has been GRANTED by the court in its Order of even date. In accordance with that Order, the attorney of record for plaintiff, Robert F. Casey, Esquire is hereby ORDERED to pay defendant within 60 days of this Judgment good funds in the amount of $9,726.00, representing the defendant’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. It is further

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that no other fees, costs, or other amounts are awarded.