LINDA M. NEILY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of JAMES F. ANTOSCA, ANGELA L. DIDIER, as Trustee of HANOVER STREET REALTY TRUST and Trustee of SALEM STREET REALTY TRUST, MARK J. LANZA, as Trustee of HANOVER STREET REALTY TRUST, HELEN M. KELLY, and CHARLES P. VILINIS, JR. v. SCOTT WHITNEY GRAY, MARGARET C. HALLETT GRAY, DANIEL S. DECOURCY, CHRISTINE A. DECOURCY, SCHWARTZ REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT, LLC, JOSEPH D. WARSHAUER and JULIANNE WARSHAUER, as Trustees of the JOSEPH AND JULIANNE WARSHAUER FAMILY TRUST, and FRANK E. O'BRIEN and MARJORIE M. O'BRIEN, as Trustees of the FRANMAR LIVING TRUST

Introduction

All along the coast of Massachusetts are developments of coastal lots created in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These developments were generally created by a combination of deed descriptions and recorded plans. Today, these developments consist of lots along what are often private ways. Because of the vagaries of these plans and deeds, it is often difficult to determine the property owners' respective rights in these ways.

So it is with the lots at issue here, properties along a private way in Wareham known as Lydia's Island Road. Lydia's Island Road runs from Great Neck Road, a public way, toward Onset Bay. The parties - all property owners along Lydia's Island Road - dispute the extent to which the plaintiffs have rights to use Lydia's Island Road as it runs easterly from their properties toward Onset Bay. The case was presented to me as a case stated; I also took a view. As set forth below, after considering the history of the conveyances from the original owner, one Joseph Henry Burgess, and the various plans, I find that the plaintiffs do have rights to use Lydia's Island Road to a greater or lesser degree.

Procedural History

The Plaintiffs filed the complaint on November 16, 2017. The Complaint contains two counts: Count I) Declaratory Relief; and Count II) Injunctive Relief. On January 3, 2018, the Defendants filed their Answer. The case management conference was held on January 12, 2018. A suggestion of death of James F. Antosca was made at a status conference on July 13, 2018. The Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Brief in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment on February 11, 2019. Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Substitute Plaintiff James F. Antosca on February 12, 2019, which was allowed that day; Linda M. Neily, the personal representative of the Estate of James F. Antosca, was substituted for James F. Antosca as plaintiff. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment on March 12, 2019. On March 26, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. A view was taken on March 29, 2019. Hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment was held on May 3, 2019. At the hearing, the cross-motions for summary judgment were converted to a case stated, by agreement of the parties and by suggestion of the court. The case was thereafter taken under advisement. This decision follows.

Findings of Fact

Based on the submissions of the parties and the view, I find the following facts as stated, after drawing appropriate inferences.

Plaintiffs:

1. Angela L. Didier is Trustee of Salem Street Realty Trust u/d/t recorded with the Plymouth County Registry of Deeds (registry) at Book 12119, Page 219 (Salem Trust). The Salem Trust owns the property at 8 Lydia's Island Road, Wareham, Massachusetts 02571 (Salem Trust property) by a deed from James F. Antosca dated October 7, 2004 and recorded with the registry at Book 29860, Page 181 (Salem Trust deed). Pls.' Comp. ¶ 4; Pls.' SOF ¶ 11, Pls.' Ex. 14; Defs.' SOF ¶ 9, Ex. 18.

2. James F. Antosca (Antosca) was a beneficiary of the Salem Trust. Pls.' Comp. ¶ 3. After his death, Linda M. Neily, in her capacity as the personal representative of the estate of James F. Antosca, was substituted for Antosca as plaintiff.

3. Mark J. Lanza and Angela L. Didier are Trustees of Hanover Street Realty Trust u/d/t dated February 21, 1997 and recorded with the Bristol County North District Registry of Deeds at Book 7051, Page 36 (Hanover Trust). As discussed below, the Hanover Trust owns the property known and numbered as 0 Lydia's Island Road, Wareham, Massachusetts 02571 (Hanover Trust property). The Hanover Trust property is shown as Lot No. 1004-F on the plan entitled "Plan of Land Prepared for John C. Decas Burgess Point Road Wareham, MA" dated November 7, 2001, endorsed by the Wareham Planning Board as "approval under the subdivision control law not required" on December 10, 2001, recorded with the registry at Plan Book 45, Page 163 (Hanover Trust ANR plan). Pls.' Comp. ¶¶ 4, 5; Pls.' Ex. 4.

4. Helen M. Kelly (Kelly) and Charles P. Vilnis, Jr. (Vilnis) have a principal place of residence at 27 Mendum Street, Roslindale, Massachusetts 02131, and also reside at 196 Great Neck Road, Wareham, Massachusetts 02571 (Kelly/Vilnis property). Pls.' Comp. ¶ 6.

Defendants:

5. Scott Whitney Gray and Margaret C. Hallett Gray (Grays) reside at 17 Lydia's Island Road, Wareham, Massachusetts 02571 (Gray property). Pls.' Comp. ¶¶ 7, 8; Defs.' Ans. ¶¶ 7, 8.

6. Daniel S. DeCourcy and Christine A. DeCourcy (DeCourcys) reside at 26 Lydia's Island Road, Wareham, Massachusetts 02571 (DeCourcy property). Pls.' Comp. ¶¶ 9, 10; Defs.' Ans. ¶¶ 9, 10.

7. Schwartz Real Estate Investment, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company having an address of 33 North Avenue, Providence, Rhode Island 02906 (Schwartz REI). Schwartz REI owns the property at 29 Lydia's Island Road, Wareham, Massachusetts 02571 (Schwartz REI property) by a deed from Robert Schwartz, as Trustee of The Robert Schwartz Trust - 1993, dated February 2, 2006 and recorded with the registry in Book 32303, Page 128 (Schwartz REI deed). Pls.' Ex. 31; Pls.' Comp. ¶ 11; Defs.' Ans. ¶ 11.

8. Joseph D. Warshauer and Julianne Warshauer, Trustees of the Joseph and Julianne Warshauer Family Trust (Warshauers), own the property at 30 Lydia's Island Road, Wareham, Massachusetts 02571 (Warshauer property) by a deed from Mark E. Warshauer dated May 11, 2012, and recorded with the registry in Book 41371, Page 145 (Warshauer deed). Pls.' Comp. ¶¶ 12, 13; Defs.' Ans. ¶¶ 12, 13; Pls.' Ex. 36.

9. Frank E. O'Brien and Marjorie M. O'Brien, Trustees of the FranMar Living Trust (O'Briens), own the property at 35 Lydia's Island Road, Wareham, Massachusetts 02571 (O'Brien property) by a deed from Marjorie M. O'Brien and Frank E. O'Brien, as joint tenants, dated July 2, 2008, and deed recorded with the registry in Book 36332, Page 57 (FranMar deed). Pls.' Ex. 39. Pls.' Comp. ¶¶ 14, 15; Defs.' Ans. ¶¶ 14, 15.

10. The properties of the plaintiffs and defendants are shown on the plan attached as Exhibit A. The Hanover Trust ANR plan is attached as Exhibit B. Lydia's Island Road -- Background:

11. Lydia's Island Road is an unpaved private way in Wareham, Massachusetts, extending from Great Neck Road, a public way, to its easterly terminus approximately 250 feet west of Onset Bay. Pls.' SOF ¶ 1; Pls.' Exs. 1, 2, 47.

12. The westerly part of Lydia's Island Road, running east from Great Neck Road and abutting the Salem Trust, Hanover Trust, and Kelly/Vilnis properties, is approximately 30 feet wide. Pls.' SOF ¶ 2; Pls.' Exs. 1, 3, 4; View.

13. The easterly part of Lydia's Island Road, running for the rest of its length from the edge of the Hanover Trust property, is approximately 15 feet wide. Pls.' SOF ¶ 3; Pls.' Exs. 1, 6; View.

14. Lydia's Island Road has existed in its current location for at least 75 years, as shown on the plan recorded with the registry as Plan No. 151 of 1989 and Plan No. 908 of 2003 (all 5 sheets), including the part shown with broken or hyphenated sidelines. Pls.' SOF ¶ 4; Pls.' Ex. 7, Ans. No. 15.

15. Lydia's Island Road, and the parcels of land abutting Lydia's Island Road or through which Lydia's Island Road runs, which are currently owned by the plaintiffs, the defendants, and others, were once owned by Joseph Henry Burgess (Burgess), who was born in Wareham, Massachusetts in 1844 and died there in 1938. Pls.' SOF ¶ 5; Pls.' Ex. 7, Ans. No. 55; Defs.' SOF ¶ 1.

16. As set forth below, Burgess conveyed portions of this land during his lifetime and retained other portions at his death.

17. Burgess's son, Henry S. Burgess, inherited Burgess's remaining land, as reflected in Plymouth Probate #49351. Defs.' SOF ¶ 12; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 12.

18. Henry S. Burgess died testate on October 28, 1953, Plymouth Probate #70344, and bequeathed property to his daughters, Lottie Burgess Hewitt and Hester Burgess Cameron. Defs.' SOF ¶ 12; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 12.

19. Hester Burgess Cameron died testate on December 4, 1980, and bequeathed all real estate inherited from her father Henry S. Burgess to her sister, Lottie Burgess Hewitt. Defs.' SOF ¶ 12; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 12.

20. Lottie Burgess Hewitt died testate on September 2, 1987, and bequeathed her property to the children of Allen B. Cameron. Lisen Cameron was appointed executrix of the will, which granted her the power to sell without obtaining a license. Defs.' SOF ¶ 12; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 12.

21. A plan entitled "Plan of Land Prepared for John C. Decas Burgess Point & Lydia's Island Wareham, MA," dated March 19, 1982, and recorded with the registry in Plan Book 22, Page 1108 (Lot 1016A plan), shows as Lot 1016A a 95.9 acre parcel bounded on the north by Lydia's Island Road and the O'Brien property and on the east by Onset Bay (Lot 1016A). The Lot 1016A plan also shows Lot 1016A as burdened by a "10' WIDE PEDESTRIAN EASEMENT" along its northern bound running from Lydia's Island Road to Onset Bay (pedestrian easement). The pedestrian easement consists of a walking path leading from Lydia's Island Road to Onset Bay. Defs.' Ex. 29; View. The pedestrian easement is shown on the plan attached as Exhibit A as "10' WIDE PEDESTRIAN EASEMENT."

22. Lot 1016A was divided into several separate lots, including Lot D, by a plan entitled "Approval Not Required Plan in Wareham, Massachusetts Drawn for John C. Decas," dated July 22, 2004, endorsed by the Wareham Planning Board as "approval under the subdivision control law not required" on September 12, 2004, recorded with the registry at Plan Book 48, Page 748 (Decas ANR plan). Lot D is 22.9 acres, is bounded on the east by Onset Bay, and includes the pedestrian easement. Pls.' Ex. 32.

23. John C. Decas (Decas) conveyed Lot D to the Buzzards Bay Coalition, Inc. (BBC) by a deed dated August 18, 2016, and recorded with the registry in Book 47338, Page 222. Lot D was conveyed "subject to all easement[s], conditions and restrictions of record." BBC is a nonprofit organization dedicated to the restoration, protection, and sustainable use and enjoyment of Buzzards Bay, to which Onset Bay connects. Pls.' Ex. 46, Ex. 7, Ans. Nos. 52, 53.

24. The parties' respective chains of title all derive from land owned at one time by Burgess. I set forth each party's chain of title in the order in which the respective properties were first conveyed by Burgess or his heirs and successors.

O'Brien Property:

25. By a deed dated April 27, 1911, and recorded with the registry in Book 1090, Page 498, Burgess conveyed a portion of the O'Brien property to Frank H. Page of Springfield, Massachusetts (the first parcel). The first parcel was conveyed "with the right of way from the granted premises over remaining land of said Burgess to the public road." Defs.' SOF ¶ 1, Ex. 1; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 1.

26. On June 30, 1930, Burgess conveyed the remaining portion of what is now the O'Brien property to Frank P. O'Brien (the second parcel), with a proposed 15-foot-wide right of way abutting the remaining land of Burgess below the mean high water mark to be used by the grantee in common with Burgess and the owner of the first parcel. Defs.' SOF ¶ 2.

27. Bertha Page conveyed the first parcel to George Seeley by a deed dated April 24, 1939, and recorded with the registry in Book 1767, Page 94. Defs.' SOF ¶ 1; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 1.

28. George H. Seeley conveyed the first parcel to Margaret T. O'Brien by a deed dated February 24, 1941, and recorded with the registry in Book 1890, Page 511. Then, by two deeds dated August 23, 1945 and recorded successively with the registry in Book 1890, Page 512, the first and second parcel were conveyed to Frank P. O'Brien and Margaret T. O'Brien, thus forming the O'Brien property. These conveyances were made "[t]ogether with the right of way from the granted premises over remaining land formerly of said Burgess to the public road." Defs.' SOF ¶ 2, Ex. 2; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 2.

29. After mesne conveyances, on July 2, 2008, Marjorie M. O'Brien and Frank E. O'Brien conveyed the O'Brien property to the O'Briens by the FranMar deed. Defs.' Ex. 3.

Salem Trust Property:

30. The chain of title for the Salem Trust property begins with a deed from Burgess to Bertha Lays dated May 17, 1923, and recorded with the registry in Book 1436, and Page 399 (Lays deed). Defs.' SOF ¶ 9, Ex. 16; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 9.

31. The Lays deed describes one of the courses of the Salem Trust property as running "to a stone bound near the Westerly line of a roadway" and describes the "roadway" as running "along the easterly side of said premises." The Lays deed conveyed the parcel "with the right of way over the road along the easterly side of said premises to and from the public highway and the beach." Defs.' SOF ¶ 9, Ex. 16; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 9.

32. The parties agree that, after mesne conveyances, the Salem Trust property was conveyed by Mary Kay Reidy to Frances Antosca by a deed dated June 26, 1969, and recorded with the registry in Book 3529, Page 530. Defs.' SOF ¶ 9; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 9.

33. This deed contained the same language as the Lays deed, in that the conveyance was made "together with a right of way over the road way along the easterly side of said premises to and from the public highway and the beach." Defs.' SOF ¶ 9; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 9; Pls.' Ex. 9.

34. By a deed June 9, 1971, and recorded with the registry in Book 3678, Page 795, Frances Antosca conveyed the Salem Trust property to Antosca and his former wife, Dorothy A. Antosca. Pls.' SOF ¶ 6, Ex. 9; Defs.' SOF ¶ 9.

35. The Salem Trust property was conveyed to Antosca and his wife "with a right of way over the roadway along the easterly side of the premises to and from the public highway and the beach," language identical to that in the Lays deed. Pls.' SOF ¶ 8, Ex. 9, Ex. 7 Ans. No. 18; Defs.' SOF ¶ 9.

36. By a deed dated April 1, 1993, and recorded with the registry in Book 12119, Page 216, Dorothy A. Antosca conveyed her interest in the Salem Trust property to Antosca, "with a right of way over the road way along the Easterly side of said premises to and from the public highway and the beach." Pls.' SOF ¶ 10; Pls.' Ex. 13.

37. By a "Grant of Pedestrian Easement" dated December 21, 2001, and recorded with the registry in Book 21271, Page 292, Decas granted Antosca a perpetual and non-exclusive easement "to pass and repass on foot," and, if permissible under the applicable laws, in "a golf cart, to and from Onset Bay, via Lydia's Island Road, . . . in, on, over, across, and through" the pedestrian easement. Pls.' Ex. 21; Defs.' Ex. 29.

38. By the Salem Trust deed, dated October 7, 2004, Antosca conveyed the Salem Trust property to the Salem Trust "with a right of way over the road way along the Easterly side of said premises to and from the public highway and the beach." Pls.' SOF ¶ 11, Pls.' Ex. 14; Defs.' SOF ¶ 9, Ex. 18.

DeCourcy Property:

39. The DeCourcy property consists of three parcels conveyed by Burgess to members of the Pratt family, by three separate deeds. Defs. SOF ¶9; Pls. Opp. ¶9.

40. The first parcel was conveyed from Burgess to William T. Pratt and Anna Pratt, by a deed dated June 13, 1933, and recorded with the registry in Book 1562, Page 243. Defs.' SOF Ex. 9; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 5.

41. This parcel was conveyed "subject to a right of way across said lot . . ." Defs.' Ex. 9.

42. The second parcel was conveyed from Burgess to Eugene S. Pratt and Kenneth S. Pratt by a deed dated September 22, 1933, and recorded with the registry in Book 1562, Page 243. Defs.' Ex. 9; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 5.

43. This parcel was conveyed "subject to any roads and pole rights affecting said land." Defs.' Ex. 9.

44. The third parcel was conveyed from Burgess to Eugene S. Pratt by a deed dated October 10, 1936, and recorded with the registry in Book 1732, Page 381. Defs.' Ex. 10; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 5.

45. This parcel was conveyed "subject to a right of way across said lot . . ." Defs.' Ex. 10.

46. Ownership of the DeCourcy property was consolidated in Eugene S. Pratt by a deed from Kenneth S. Pratt September 18, 1959, and recorded with the registry in Book 2731, Page 300. Defs.' SOF ¶ 5; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 5.

47. The DeCourcy property was then conveyed by Eugene S. Pratt to Pasquale Tosches and Christina Tosches by a deed dated December 9, 1967, and recorded with the registry in Book 3416, Page 198. Defs.' SOF ¶ 6; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 6.

48. The Tosches family conveyed the DeCourcy property to Judith Sommer Snow by a deed dated April 21, 2000, and recorded with the registry in Book 18451, Page 28. Defs.' SOF ¶ 6; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 6.

49. Judith Sommer Snow conveyed the DeCourcy property to the DeCourcys by a deed dated October 10, 2012, and recorded with the registry in Book 42075, Page 150. Defs.' SOF ¶ 6, Ex. 11; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 6.

50. The lots were conveyed "subject to a right of way across said lot[s] . . ." Defs.' Ex. 11; Pls.' Ex. 27.

Gray Property:

51. The Gray property's chain of title begins with a deed from Burgess's son, Henry S. Burgess, to Kenneth A. Cameron dated December 13, 1947, and recorded with the registry in Book 1995, Page 573. Defs.' SOF ¶ 8, Ex. 12; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 8. This conveyance included "a right of way from the premises herein conveyed over the land of Ernest A. Nokes and other land of the grantor to the Town Road as said right of way is delineated on said plan." Additionally, the conveyance was made "subject to the rights of those others who have a legal right to use said right of way as it passes over the granted premises and is also subject to the rights of those who have a legal right to erect and maintain utility poles and services on the granted premises." Defs.' Ex. 12.

52. Kenneth A. Cameron died testate. Audrey J. Cameron, his widow, inherited the Gray property. She conveyed the Gray property to Bruce H. MacLeod, Wilfred A. MacLeod, Jr. and Anne MacRae MacLeod as tenants in common, by a deed dated December 8, 1989, and recorded with the registry in Book 9501, Page 60. Defs.' SOF ¶ 8, Ex. 13; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 8. 53. The Gray property was conveyed with "a right of way from the premises herein conveyed over the land of Ernest A. Nokes and other land of Henry S. Burgess to the Town Road as said right of way is delineated on said plan." The conveyance was also "made subject to the rights of those others who have a legal right to use said right of way as it passes over the granted premises and is also subject to the rights of those who have a legal right to erect and maintain utility poles and services on the granted premises." Defs.' Ex. 13; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 8.

54. The Gray property was then conveyed to Wilfred A. MacLeod and Anne C. MacLeod as Trustees of the MacLeod Realty Trust by a deed dated December 21, 1994, and recorded with the registry in 13347, Page 260. Defs.' ¶ 8; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 8.

55. The MacLeod Realty Trust conveyed the Gray property to Wilfred A. MacLeod, Jr. and Anne C. MacLeod (husband and wife), as tenants by the entirety, by a deed dated November 20, 2001, and recorded with the registry in Book 20965, Page 235. Defs.' ¶ 8; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 8.

56. Through a series of inter-family conveyances, Anne C. MacLeod became the sole owner of the Gray property by a deed dated February 23, 2015, recorded with the registry in Book 45316, Page 202. Defs.' ¶ 8; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 8.

57. Anne C. MacLeod conveyed the Gray property to the Grays by a deed dated March 20, 2015, and recorded with the registry in Book 45369, Page 331. The Gray property was conveyed "together with a right of way from said parcel over land of Ernest A. Nokes and other land of Henry S. Burgess to the Town Road as said right of way is delineated on said plan but subject to the rights of those others who have the legal right to use said right of way as it passes over said parcel and is also subject to the rights of those who have a legal right to erect and maintain utility poles and services on said parcel." Pls.' Ex. 23; Defs.' Ex. 15; SOF ¶ 8; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 8.

Warshauer property:

58. The Warshauer property is made up of two parcels: a parcel shown on a plan entitled "Plan of Land Prepared for Lottie B. Hewitt and Hester B. Cameron Burgess Point Wareham, Mass.," dated May 19, 1971 and recorded with the registry in Book 3678, Page 188 (Hewitt plan); and a parcel shown on a plan entitled "Approval Not Required Plan in Wareham, MA belonging to Lisen Cameron," dated May 1, 1996, endorsed by the Wareham Planning Board as Approval Under Subdivision Control Law Not Required on July 22, 1996, and recorded with the registry in Plan Book 39, Page 779 (Cameron ANR plan). Defs.' Exs. 5, 6

59. The first parcel was conveyed by Joseph H. Burgess to Hester Burgess Cameron by a deed dated September 29, 1937, and recorded with the registry in Book 1735, page 541, and a deed of Henry S. Burgess to Hester B. Cameron dated August 24, 1942, recorded with the registry in Book 1837, Page 415. Defs.' Ex. 7. Hester B. Cameron appears to have been a member of the Burgess family. 60. Hester Burgess Cameron conveyed this parcel, shown on the Hewitt plan as the parcel labeled "Hester B. Cameron" abutting Shell Point Bay, to the Lloyd B. Warshauer and Esther E. Warshauer by a deed dated August 23, 1971 and recorded in Book 3704, Page 135. Lydia's Island Road is shown as a dotted line crossing this parcel. Defs.' Ex. 6, 7. 61. This parcel was conveyed with "a right of way from the premises herein conveyed over land now or formerly of Joseph H. Burgess and Henry S. Burgess to the Town Road . . . subject to the rights of others who have a legal right to use said road as they pass over the granted premises and is also subject to the rights of those who have a legal right to erect and maintain utility poles and services." Defs.' Ex. 7.

62. Lloyd and Esther Warshauer also owned Parcel "B" on the Cameron ANR plan. Defs.' SOF ¶ 4, Ex. 5; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 4.

63. After mesne conveyances, Mark E. Warshauer granted the Warshauer property to the Warshauers by a deed dated May 11, 2012, and recorded with the registry in Book 41371, Page 145. The Warshauer property was granted subject to "a right of way from the premises herein conveyed over land now or formerly of Joseph H. Burgess and Henry S. Burgess to the Town Road . . . subject to the rights of others who have a legal right to use said road as they pass over the granted premises, and is also subject to the rights of those who have a legal right to erect and maintain utility poles and services." Pls.' Ex. 36.

Schwartz REI Property:

64. The Schwartz REI property consists of lots 1015 and 3 as shown on the Hewitt plan, Parcel "A" as shown on the Cameron ANR plan, and Lot A and Parcel B as shown on the Decas ANR plan. Pls.' Ex. 31, 32; Defs.' Ex. 5, 6.

65. As discussed, Schwartz REI took title to the Schwartz REI property by the Schwartz REI deed. The Schwartz REI deed conveyed the Schwartz REI property with "a right of way from the premises herein conveyed over land now or formerly of Joseph H. Burgess and Henry S. Burgess to the Town Road as shown by broken lines on said plan," and made the Schwartz REI property "subject to the rights of others who have a legal right to use said road as they pass over the granted premises and is also subject to the rights of those who have a legal right to erect and maintain utility poles and services on the granted premises." Pls.' Ex. 31.

66. The Schwartz REI deed also granted the Schwartz REI property "with the perpetual right and non-exclusive easement to pass and repass on foot and, provided that such mode of transportation is deemed permissible . . . a golf cart, to and from Onset Bay via Lydia's Island Road . . . in, on, over, across and through" the pedestrian easement, and "[s]ubject to the right to pass and repass over the premises to other land of John C. Decas over Lydia's Island Road." Pls.' Ex. 31.

Hanover Trust Property:

67. The Hanover Trust property was created by the Hanover Trust ANR plan. The Hanover Trust ANR plan combined two lots with separate chains of title: a portion of one lot known as Lot 1004-C, and a triangular portion of another lot known as Lot 1000 which is referred to here as the "triangular parcel." Pls.' SOF ¶ 13, Ex. 4.

Lot 1004-C:

68. The chain of title for the larger, southern portion of the Hanover Trust property that was carved out of Lot 1004-C begins with the deed from Howard Stockton, et al., to John F. Keenan, dated February 6, 1890 and recorded with the registry in Book 598, Page 150. Defs.' SOF ¶ 11, Ex. 19; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 11. This parcel comes from a chain of title not associated with the Burgess family and has no frontage on Lydia's Island Road. Defs.' SOF ¶ 10; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 10.

69. That portion of the property passed through various members of the Keenan family and through several Keenan Family probates: estate of John F. Keenan, Plymouth Probate #104289; estate of George Henry William Keenan, Plymouth Probate #104290; deed of Margaret A. Ellams, et al., to Joseph L. Keenan, recorded with the registry in Book 3610, Page 276; and deed of John Bernard Keenan to Joseph L. Keenan, recorded with the registry in Book 3611, Page 140. Defs.' Ex. 20.

70. Joseph L. Keenan conveyed this property to Frances Antosca by a deed dated October 6, 1970, and recorded with the registry in Book 3637, Page 227. Defs.' SOF ¶ 11, Ex. 20; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 11.

71. A portion of this property was taken by the Town of Wareham for taxes by a taking dated July 10, 1975, and recorded with the registry in Book 4086, Page 169. A decree foreclosing the right of redemption was entered by the Land Court in Tax Lien Case #56423 on February 23, 1984, and recorded with the registry in Book 5586, Page 82. Defs.' SOF ¶ 11, Ex. 21; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 11.

72. By a Treasurer's Deed dated June 25, 2001, and recorded with the registry in Book 20066, Page 335, the Town of Wareham conveyed to the Hanover Trust Lot 1004-C as shown on a plan entitled "Plan of Land Prepared for Town of Wareham Burgess Point Road Wareham, MA" dated January 7, 2000, and recorded in the registry as Plan #421 of 2000 (Plan #421). Defs.' SOF ¶ 11, Exs. 22, 23; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 11. The lot was conveyed "[t]ogether with the benefit of a future roadway easement over Lot 1004-D." Defs.' Ex. 22.

73. Plan #421 shows that Lot 1004-C has no frontage on Lydia's Island Road. Defs.' SOF ¶ 11, Ex. 23; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 11.

The triangular parcel:

74. The so-called "triangular parcel," consisting of a 4,350 square-foot parcel bounded on its northerly sideline by Lydia's Island Road for a distance of approximately 175 feet, and on its southerly sideline by Lot 1004-C, was originally part of 2.286-acre parcel shown as Lot 1000 (Lot 1000) on a plan entitled "Plan of Land in Wareham, MA. Drawn for Lottie Burgess Hewitt," dated February 6, 1989 and recorded with the registry in Plan Book 89, Page 151. Pls.' Ex. 17, 18; Defs.' Ex. 27.

75. Lisen B. Cameron, Executrix under the will of Lottie B. Hewitt, conveyed Lot 1000 to Decas by a deed dated February 23, 1989 and recorded in the registry in Book 9003, Page 85 (the Cameron/Decas deed). Pls.' SOF ¶ 13, Ex. 18; Defs.' Ex. 26.

76. The Cameron/Decas deed does not contain an express grant of right of way in Lydia's Island Road. Pls. Ex. 18; Defs.' SOF ¶ 12, Ex. 26; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 12.

77. By the Hanover Trust ANR plan, the triangular parcel was divided from Lot 1000 and combined with a northerly portion of Lot 1004-C to create the Hanover Trust property, consisting of 60,010 square feet and abutting Lydia's Island Road. Pls.' Ex. 4.

78. After the Hanover Trust ANR plan was endorsed and recorded, Decas conveyed the triangular parcel to Hanover Trust by a deed dated December 21, 2001, and recorded with the registry in Book 21271, Page 287 (the triangular parcel deed). Defs.' SOF ¶ 11, Ex. 24; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 11; Ex. 17. The triangular parcel was conveyed "with the right to pass and repass over Lydia's Island Road insofar as those rights exist." Defs.' Ex. 24; Pls.' Ex. 17.

Kelly/Vilnis Property:

79. The Kelly/Vilnis property is the remainder of Lot 1000 after the triangular parcel was divided from it. Thus, its chain of title begins with the Cameron/Decas deed in 1989. Lot 1000 has frontage on Great Neck Road and is described as bounded by the line of Lydia's Island Road. Defs.' SOF ¶ 12; Defs.' Ex. 26; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 12.

80. As discussed, the Cameron/Decas deed does not contain an express grant of right of way in Lydia's Island Road. Pls.' Ex. 18; Defs.' SOF ¶ 12, Ex. 26; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 12. 81. The Hanover Trust ANR plan not only divided out the triangular parcel; it created what is now the Kelly/Vilnis property, showing it on the plan as the 2.19-acre Lot 1000. Defs.' Ex. 25.

82. Decas conveyed the Kelly/Vilnis property to Kelly and Vilnis by a deed dated June 13, 2002, recorded with the registry in Book 22251, Page 247 (the Kelly/Vilnis deed). Defs.' Ex. 28, 25; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 12; Pls.' Ex. 22.

83. The Kelly/Vilnis deed included two grants of rights. The first is a grant of a non-exclusive right of way in Lydia's Island Road: "[t]ogether with the right to pass and repass over Lydia's Island Road in common with others entitled thereto. It is understood that any such rights are non-exclusive." The second is "an easement to use [the pedestrian easement] to be used as a pedestrian easement." Pls.' Ex. 22; Defs.' Ex. 28.

Discussion

This case involves the interpretation of conveyances made between 1923 and 1989, many by persons who are no longer living, thus requiring me to draw appropriate factual inferences from the available record evidence and then make appropriate rulings of law. For that reason, with the assent of the parties, this matter was converted from cross-motions for summary judgment to cross-motions for judgment on a case stated. See Town of Ware v. Town of Hardwick, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 325 , 326 (2006); W. Mass. Theatres Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 354 Mass. 655 , 657 (1968). A case-stated arises when the parties agree on all the "material ultimate facts, on which the rights of the parties are to be determined by the law." Pequod Realty Corp. v. Jeffries, 314 Mass. 713 , 715 (1943); see also Frati v. Jannini, 226 Mass. 430 , 431 (1917). A case-stated presents all pertinent facts from which the judge might draw inferences. Reilly v. Local Amalgamated Transit Union, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 558 , 568 (1986). Once the parties have submitted a case stated, it is up to the judge to apply the law to the facts stated. Caissie v. City of Cambridge, 317 Mass. 346 , 347 (1944). Decisions, therefore, are made upon the stated facts, all inferences warranted by the facts, and the applicable law as applied to the stated facts and inferences. See Godfrey v. Mutual Fin. Corp., 242 Mass. 197 , 199 (1922); see also Town of Ware, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 326 ("any court before which the case or [a case-stated] may come, either in the first instance or upon review, is at liberty to draw from the facts and documents stated in the case any inferences of fact which might have been drawn therefrom at a trial, unless the parties expressly agree that no inferences shall be drawn").

As discussed, Lydia's Island Road is an unpaved private way extending from Great Neck Road, a public way, to its easterly terminus west of Onset Bay. Lydia's Island Road and the land along Lydia's Island Road that later became the plaintiffs' and defendants' properties was owned by Joseph H. Burgess prior to April 27, 1911. On that date, Burgess conveyed a portion of the O'Brien property along with the portion of Lydia's Island Road running north and east of the pedestrian easement. That portion of Lydia's Island Road is not at issue in this case. While Burgess conveyed an easement to pass over Lydia's Island Road to Great Neck Road, he did not reserve rights over the portion of Lydia's Island Road lying within the O'Brien property. For the purposes of this case, the relevant portion of Lydia's Island Road is that running from Great Neck Road to the western end of the pedestrian easement as shown on the plan attached as Exhibit A.

The plaintiffs seek a judgment that they have the right and easement, either by record or by estoppel, to use this portion of Lydia's Island Road for roadway purposes. Additionally, they assert that each plaintiff has an easement by express grant over the pedestrian easement, extending from the easterly end of Lydia's Island road over land now owned by BBC to the shoreline of Onset Bay, and that their easement over Lydia's Island Road includes the right to pass to and from their beach access easements. I discuss in turn the questions of easement by deed, easement by estoppel, implied easement, and the pedestrian easement.

I. Easement by Deed

The first issue is whether, as the plaintiffs argue, the grants of easements in the deeds to the plaintiffs and their predecessors give each of the plaintiffs a record easement over Lydia's Island Road between Great Neck Road and the pedestrian easement. This question turns on whether Burgess and his heirs made such a grant and, if so, had title in Lydia's Island Road sufficient to grant an easement for the benefit of the plaintiffs' lots. If Burgess or his heirs had no such title, then the plaintiffs do not have a record easement, no matter what their deeds say. "Where . . . the grantor has nothing to convey, [t]he purported conveyance is a nullity, notwithstanding the parties' intent." Bongaards v. Millen, 440 Mass. 10 , 15 (2003).

The chain of title for the Salem Trust property originates with the Lays deed in 1923. Defs.' SOF ¶ 9, Ex. 16; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 9. The Lays deed conveys the Salem Trust property "with the right of way over the road along the easterly side of said premises to and from the public highway and the beach." Defs.' SOF ¶ 9, Ex. 16; Pls.' Opp. ¶ 9. This "road" is Lydia's Island Road. At the time Burgess made this 1923 conveyance, he still held title in Lydia's Island Road and the land between Great Neck Road and the pedestrian easement. It was only after he conveyed the Salem Trust property with the benefit of an easement over Lydia's Island Road that he or his heirs conveyed lots that included portions of the DeCourcy property (in 1933 and 1936), the Warshauer property (in 1937), and the Gray property (in 1947). Defs.' Ex. 9, 10, 7. Successive deeds for the Salem Trust property included the same language from the Lays deed conveying the property "together with the right of way over the road along the easterly side of said premises to and from the public highway and the beach." Defs.' Exs. 16, 18; Pls.' Exs. 9, 13, 14. In any event, once the easement was created, it passed to succeeding grantees of the Salem Trust property, whether set forth in successive deeds or not. G.L. c. 183, §15; Murphy v. Mart Realty of Brockton, Inc., 348 Mass. 675 , 678 (1965). Since Burgess had title in Lydia's Island Road sufficient to grant an easement for the benefit of the Salem Trust property, the Salem Trust has the benefit of a valid express grant of easement to use Lydia's Island Road from Great Neck Road to the pedestrian easement.

The Hanover Trust and Kelly/Vilnis properties do not have record easements over Lydia's Island Road. The Kelly/Vilnis property and the triangular parcel of the Hanover Trust property were held by the heirs of Burgess in 1989, when they were conveyed to Decas by the Cameron/Decas deed. The Cameron/Decas deed did not convey an express easement over Lydia's Island Road. That Decas in the Kelly/Vilnis deed and the triangular parcel deed purported to grant easements over Lydia's Island Road is of no force and effect. Decas had no record rights in Lydia's Island Road from the Cameron/Decas deed that would have allowed him to grant such easements. Bongaards, 440 Mass. at 15..

II. Easement by Estoppel

The plaintiffs also claim that each of the Salem Trust, Hanover Trust, and Kelly/Vilnis properties has the benefit of an easement by estoppel to use Lydia's Island Road. The defendants do not challenge the plaintiffs' rights to use Lydia's Island Road for access to Great Neck Road, the nearest public way. Rather, they argue that none of the plaintiffs' properties has an easement by estoppel to use Lydia's Island Road from their properties to the pedestrian easement.

Massachusetts recognizes two forms of easement by estoppel. Estes v. DeMello, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 638 , 643-644 (2004); Patel v. Planning Bd. Of North Andover, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 477 , 481-482 (1989). The first form of easement by estoppel arises when land is conveyed according to a recorded plan. Goldstein v. Beal, 317 Mass. 750 , 755 (1945). Under this classification, when a grantor conveys land located on a street according to a recorded plan on which the street is shown, the grantor is "estopped to deny the existence of the street for the entire distance as shown on the plan." Id. In the second classification, an easement by estoppel is created when land bounded by a street or land bounded on or by the side line of a street is conveyed. Murphy, 348 Mass. at 677-678; Casella v. Sneierson, 325 Mass. 85 , 89-90 (1949). Under this second classification, the grantor is "estopped to deny the existence of such street or way, and the right thus acquired by the grantee (an easement of way) . . . embraces the entire length of the way, as it is then laid out or clearly indicated and prescribed." Id. at 89; Estes, 61 Mass. App. Ct. at 643.

In both categories, "the rights of grantees or their successors in title against their grantors and their successors in title" are at issue. Patel, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 482. Massachusetts has not expanded the doctrine of easement by estoppel to estop a grantee from denying the existence of an easement. Id.; Rivera v. Montgomery, 26 LCR 420 , 425 (2018), appeal pending, no. 2018-P-1470; Waldron v. Tofino Assocs., Inc., 20 LCR 480 , 485 (2012). Accordingly, a grantor or a successor to a grantor cannot claim an easement by estoppel.

The Salem Trust property has the benefit of an easement by estoppel to use Lydia's Island Road for its length to the pedestrian easement. The Lays deed describes one of the courses of the Salem Trust property as running "to a stone bound near the Westerly line of a roadway" and describes the "roadway" as running "along the easterly side of said premises." Defs.' Ex. 18; Pls.' Ex. 14. That is sufficient to describe the Salem Trust property as bound by the roadway, which is Lydia's Island Road. As the Salem Trust property was conveyed out by Burgess before he or his heirs conveyed any of the DeCourcy, Gray, Warshauer, or Schwartz REI properties, the Salem Trust is a successor to the grantee as compared to those defendants, who are successors to the grantors.

The Hanover Trust property and the Kelly/Vilnis properties, while also bounded on Lydia's Island Road, stand on a different footing. The triangular parcel and the Kelly/Vilnis property were both owned by the heirs of Burgess until 1989, when the parcels were conveyed to Decas by the Cameron/Decas deed. Because the Cameron/Decas deed came out of Burgess or his heirs after the original deeds conveying the DeCourcy, Gray, Warshauer, and Schwartz REI properties, the current owners, the Hanover Trust and Kelly and Vilnis, are successors to the grantor, Burgess. Thus, they are not entitled to an easement by estoppel over Lydia's Island Road as it runs through or past the DeCourcy, Gray, Warshauer, and Schwartz REI properties. Patel, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 482; Waldron, 20 LCR 480 , 485 (2012); Rivera, 26 LCR 420 , 425 (2018). Accordingly, the Hanover Trust and Kelly and Vilnis cannot claim an easement by estoppel. [Note 1]

III. Implied Easement

While the plaintiffs have not claimed an implied easement to use Lydia's Island Road, I find that the evidence in the record compels me to determine whether there is such an easement. In contrast to an easement by estoppel, "an easement by implication is a term more commonly applied to an implied grant derived from an established pattern of prior use rather than from the necessity to access a newly landlocked parcel." Town of Bedford v. Cerasuolo, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 73 , 78 (2004). An implied easement arises when no easement appears in the record of a conveyance, but "there is evidence tending to show an intent of the parties at the time of the conveyance that such an easement be then created." Mt. Holyoke Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Realty Corp., 284 Mass. 102 , 104 (1933). Thus, an implied easement "must be found in a presumed intention of the parties, to be gathered from the language of the instruments when read in the light of the circumstances attending their execution, the physical condition of the premises, and the knowledge which the parties had or with which they are chargeable." Reagan v. Brissey, 446 Mass. 452 , 458 (2006), quoting Labounty v. Vickers, 352 Mass. 337 , 344 (1967); Zotos v. Armstrong, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 654 , 657 (2005). A "single circumstance may be so compelling as to require the finding of an intent to create an easement." Mt. Holyoke, 284 Mass. at 104. The party claiming the easement bears the burden and must prove the grantor intended create an easement at the time of conveyance. Id. at 105; Boudreau v. Coleman, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 621 , 629 (1990). Because a deed is construed against the grantor, an implied easement is more readily found when claimed by a grantee. Krinsky v. Hoffman, 326 Mass. 683 , 688 (1951); Boudreau, 29 Mass. App. Ct. at 629 ("The burden is heavier for a grantor asserting the right to an easement by implied reservation for his benefit than for a grantee asserting such an easement by implied grant.").

Prior use which is open and obvious and consistent with the claimed easement is evidence of an intent to create an easement. Mount Holyoke, 284 Mass. at 108; Boudreau, 29 Mass. App. Ct. at 630; Puner v. Sierputoski, 21 LCR 367 , 371 (2013); Black v. Klaetke, 20 LCR 120 , 124 (2012). This type of prior use establishes an implied easement when there was (1) common ownership of the dominant and servient estates, (2) apparent use of one part of the land for the benefit of another part, (3) severance of the dominant and servient estates, and (4) reasonable necessity to continue the prior use. Mt. Holyoke, 284 Mass. at 108; Zotos, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 656-657.

Reasonable necessity for the implied easement is also evidence that the grantor intended to create an easement. Boudreau, 29 Mass. App. Ct. at 630. The easement need not be of absolute or physical necessity, just of reasonable necessity. Mount Holyoke, 284 Mass. at 105; see Cummings v. Franco, 335 Mass. 639 , 642-44 (1957) (finding easements for lights, the maintenance of electric fixtures and the supply of water and electricity were reasonably necessary); Overlock v. Leary, 19 LCR 262 , 266 (2011) (noting safety concerns made the use of an avenue reasonably necessary).

If the intent of the grantor is not clear, the subsequent use of the land may be evidence of an intent to create an easement. Bacon v. Onset Bay Grove Ass'n, 241 Mass. 417 , 423 (1922); Boudreau, 29 Mass. App. Ct. at 632. Subsequent use of the land establishes intent when such use can "explain or characterize the deed" and "the acts relied upon are not so remote in time or so disconnected with the deed." Bacon, 241 Mass. at 423; Boudreau, 29 Mass. App. Ct. at 632-633 (subsequent actions should not be unilateral and removed in time). Only conduct that is logically connected to the original conveyance should be considered to reflect the intent of the grantor. Bacon, 241 Mass. at 423.

I find that, based on the language of the various deeds granted by Burgess and his heirs, viewed in light of the circumstances of their execution, the physical condition of the various granted parcels and Lydia's Island Road, the reasonable necessity to use Lydia's Island Road, and the knowledge of the parties as reflected in the deeds, Burgess and his heirs intended to and did create an implied easement in all of the property owners along Lydia's Island Road to use Lydia's Island Road in common for its entire length from Great Neck Road to the pedestrian easement. I start with the fact that Burgess owned all of the land now comprising the parties' properties, with the exception of a portion of the Hanover Trust property. At the time he began conveying smaller lots from this property, Lydia's Island Road existed on the ground, as evidenced by the reference in the Lays deed. He created an easement over Lydia's Island Road for the benefit of the Salem Trust property in the Lays deed. While it is unclear from the language of the Lays deed or subsequent conveyances if he reserved a fee or other rights in Lydia's Island Road, in subsequent grants of lots, he and his successors made clear that they intended to grant the right to use Lydia's Island Road to all the lot owners. In his grants of the three lots that make up the DeCourcy property in 1933 and 1936, he conveyed the parcels "subject to a right of way across said lot," Defs.' Ex. 9, 10, and "subject to any roads . . . affecting such land," Defs.' Ex. 9. The Gray property was conveyed by Burgess's son in 1947 "subject to the rights of those others who have a legal right to use said right of way as it passes over the granted premises." Defs.' Ex. 12. As late as 1971, a parcel of the Warshauer property was conveyed by a member of the Burgess family, Hester Burgess Cameron, "subject to the rights of others who have a legal right to use said road as they pass over the granted premises." Defs. Ex. 7. This is evidence that Burgess and his heirs intended that Lydia's Island Road by used in common by all the property owners along the abutting the road and made that intent clear to all grantees.

The record and the conditions on the ground support a conclusion that Burgess intended to give everyone along Lydia's Island Road the rights to use it for its entire length. Lydia's Island Road is consistently shown on the many plans associated with the parties' lots and conveyances. Based on the view, Lydia's Island Road is a way on the ground that can and is used by the owners of the parcels abutting it or through which it runs. In short, by his conveyances and the existence of the way on the ground, Burgess intended to create a de facto subdivision in which all the lot holders had the right to use the way known as Lydia's Island Road for its entire length, from the public way to where it roughly terminates at the pedestrian easement. Based on the grants and reservations in the various deeds, the property owners have the right to travel on Lydia's Island Road on foot or by vehicle. They do not, however, have any right to park on Lydia's Island Road where it runs east of the Hanover Trust property. That portion of the way is too narrow to accommodate any parking of vehicles.

A final question is the extent of the Hanover Trust property's implied easement to use Lydia's Island Road. As discussed, the Hanover Trust property is a single lot created by the Hanover Trust ANR plan. The Hanover Trust ANR plan combined two different parcels: the triangular parcel and a portion of Lot 1004-C. The triangular parcel has the benefit of an implied easement to use Lydia's Island Road. It abuts the way, was part of the land owned by Burgess, and was part of Lot 1000 that was conveyed in the Cameron/Decas deed. Lot 1004-C, on the other hand, was never part of Burgess's land; it comes from a separate chain of title. Thus, Lot 1004-C never had any rights to use Lydia's Island Road.

"We have long held that a 'right of way appurtenant to [a particular piece of] land . . . cannot be used by the owner of the dominant tenement to pass to or from other land adjacent to or beyond that to which the easement is appurtenant.'" Taylor v. Martha's Vineyard Land Bank Comm'n, 475 Mass. 682 , 686 (2016), quoting Murphy, 348 Mass. at 678-679. Thus, it is a "bright-line rule" that the owner of two adjoining lots, one of which has an easement to use the way on which it abuts, cannot use that easement to give the adjoining lot access to the way. Id. This is true whether the right to use the way arises from an express easement or an easement by estoppel or other implied easement. See id. at 684 (express record easements); Murphy, 348 Mass. at 678-679 (easement by estoppel).

Here, only the triangular parcel, abutting Lydia's Island Road, has the benefit of the implied easement to use Lydia's Island Road. Lot 1004-C never had such rights. If the two parcels were separate lots, then the Hanover Trust would have no right to cross over the triangular parcel to gain access to Lydia's Island Road from Lot 1004-C. That the two parcels have been combined into one by the Hanover Trust ANR plan does not change the application of the bright-line rule of Murphy and Taylor. The point of the bright-line rule is to prevent the use of an easement by properties which were not intended to be benefited by the easement, and to provide certainty to all property owners about the extent of these easement rights by avoiding litigation of difficult questions of damage from such overuse. See Taylor, 475 Mass. at 688-691. A person should not be able to evade the bright-line rule by the simple expedient of using an ANR plan to combine the parcel without the easement rights and the parcel with the easement right into one parcel. The use of the subdivision control law to avoid the effects of the Murphy and Taylor decisions is disfavored. See Southwick v. Planning Bd. of Plymouth, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 315 , 318-320 (2005) (town could not extend easement beyond benefited parcel as part of approved subdivision plan).

In short, only the triangular parcel has the benefit of the implied easement to use Lydia's Island Road to travel easterly toward the pedestrian easement and Onset Bay. The Hanover Trust cannot travel from Lot 1004-C across the triangular parcel to reach Lydia's Island Road and head east. As all parties agree, the Hanover Trust may access Lydia's Island Road from the entire property for the purposes of traveling to and from Great Neck Road, the public way.

IV. The Pedestrian Easement

The Salem Trust property and the Kelly/Vilnis property each were granted an easement to use the pedestrian easement by Decas - the Salem Trust property by foot or golf cart, and the Kelly/Vilnis property by foot. The pedestrian easement runs over Lot D as shown on the Decas ANR plan. The easement was granted to the Salem Trust property in 2001 and to the Kelly/Vilnis property in the 2002 Kelly/Vilnis deed. At the time Decas granted the pedestrian easements, he owned Lot D; he did not convey Lot D to BBC until 2016, and he made that conveyance "subject to all easement[s], conditions and restrictions of record." Pls.' Ex. 46. The Salem Trust has the right to use the pedestrian easement to travel by foot or golf cart to Onset Bay, and Kelly and Vilnis have the right to use the pedestrian easement to travel to Onset Bay.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, judgment shall enter declaring that (a) the Salem Trust holds a record easement and an implied easement appurtenant to the Salem Trust property to travel by foot or vehicle along the entire length of Lydia's Island Road from Great Neck Road to the pedestrian easement; (b) Kelly and Vilnis hold an implied easement appurtenant to the Kelly/Vilnis property to travel by foot or vehicle along the entire length of Lydia's Island Road from Great Neck Road to the pedestrian easement; (c) Hanover Trust holds an implied easement appurtenant to the Hanover Trust property to travel by foot or vehicle on Lydia's Island Road westerly from the property to Great Neck Road; (d) Hanover Trust holds an implied easement appurtenant only to the portion of the Hanover Trust property shown as the triangular parcel on the Hanover Trust ANR plan to travel by foot or vehicle on Lydia's Island Road easterly from the property to the pedestrian easement; (e) the foregoing easement rights do not include the right to park on Lydia's Island Road east of the Hanover Trust property; (f) Salem Trust holds a record easement appurtenant to the Salem Trust property to travel by foot and golf cart on the pedestrian easement and (g) Kelly and Vilnis hold a record easement appurtenant to the Kelly/Vilnis property to travel by foot on the pedestrian easement.

Judgment accordingly.