Home TIDEWOOD, LLC v. JOHN APPEL, KATHERINE RIVE, and CURTIS HOLLINGSWORTH, TRUSTEES OF SHELVING ROCK TRUST; JOHN APPEL, KATHERINE RIVE, and CURTIS HOLLINGSWORTH, TRUSTEES OF SHELVING ROCK TRUST v. SCOTT BORGESON and GHISLAINE MAXWELL

MISC 19-000196

March 11, 2020

Essex, ss.

SPEICHER, J.

JUDGMENT

This action commenced April 25, 2019 with the filing of a complaint by Tidewood, LLC, asserting claims that certain restrictions have expired with respect to its property at 301 Summer Street, Manchester by the Sea, further described as "Lot B" on a plan of land entitled "Plan of Land in Manchester, MA. Property of Shelving Rock Trust," dated April 22, 1981, prepared by Hancock Survey Associates, Inc., and recorded with the Essex South District Registry of Deeds ("Registry") in Plan Book 173, Plan 2. ("Lot B") The defendant trustees of Shelving Rock Trust counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that the same restrictions remained in effect, that a shore and path easement was personal to the plaintiff's predecessors in title and did not inure to the benefit of the plaintiff, and making claims of trespass against the plaintiff, and against two individuals in a third-party complaint.

This case came on for hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment and the third-party defendants' motion to dismiss. In a decision dated March 11, 2020, the court (Speicher, J.) has determined that judgment shall enter as follows.

In accordance with the court's decision, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECLARED, on the sole count of the complaint, that the restrictions contained in a deed from Thomas A. Halsted, Charles Shurcliff and Harriot Appel, as trustees of Shelving Rock Trust, to B. Devereux Barker, III, and Jilda B. Barker, dated July 20, 1982, and recorded with said Registry in Book 6958, Page 595, ("Barker deed") meaning specifically, those restrictions pertaining to Lot B, listed in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 on pages 6 and 7 of the deed, and those restrictions pertaining to Lot A, listed in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 on page 7 of the deed, expired on or about July 20, 2012, and are of no further force or effect.

It is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECLARED, on Count I of the counterclaim for declaratory judgment, that the restrictions in the Barker deed listed in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 on pages 6 and 7 of the deed, expired on or about July 20, 2012, and are of no further force or effect; and that the shore and path easement granted on page 3, paragraph 2 of the Barker deed, is an appurtenant easement running with the land, and thus remains in effect, and is not an easement in gross that was personal to the Barkers.

It is further

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that Counts II and III of the counterclaim, and the third-party complaint, seeking a determination that the plaintiff and the third-party defendants were trespassing by use of the shore and path easement, and seeking injunctive relief with respect to the alleged trespass, are DISMISSED.

It is further

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that this Judgment is a full adjudication of all the parties' claims in this case, and all prayers for relief by any party in this action which are not granted in the preceding paragraphs are DENIED.