SHARON OSGOOD-PRICE Plaintiff, v. SARA OSGOOD REVOCABLE TRUST, ESTATE OF SARA OSGOOD, LEONER WOODSON, and ESTATE OF LELIA JACKSON Defendants

Sharon Osgood-Price filed the Complaint in this action on September 4, 2020, naming as defendants Leoner Woodson, as well as the Estate of Sara Osgood, the Estate of Lelia Jackson, and the Sara Osgood Revocable Trust (the Trust). Plaintiff brought the action pursuant to G.L. c. 184 and c. 35 to quiet title to 16-22 Dunreath Street, Boston, MA (the Property), which was sold to Ms. Woodson pursuant to a decree issued by the Middlesex Probate and Family Court on July 5, 2018 in Case No. MI15P0953EA.

On October 15, 2020, Ms. Woodson, pro se, filed a Motion to Dismiss. On October 20, 2020, The Sara Osgood Revocable Trust, the Estate of Sara Osgood, and the Estate of Lelia Jackson also filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b). The two motions are considered together as the "Motions to Dismiss." John M. Smoot, Personal Representative of the Estate of Lelia Jackson, also filed a Motion for Counsel Fees Pursuant to G.L. c. 231 § 6F (Motion for Counsel Fees) on October 20, 2020. Ms. Osgood-Price filed her Opposition Motion to Dismiss on November 9, 2020, and a Motion titled "Allow Sharon Osgood Price and Denied John M. Smoot Motion for the Following Reason" on November 13, 2020. After a hearing on November 20, 2020, the court took the Motions to Dismiss and Motion for Counsel Fees under advisement. This Memorandum and Order follows.

Motion to Dismiss

The Trust, the Estate of Lelia Jackson, and the Estate of Sara Osgood filed their Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficient process, insufficient service of process, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, misnomer of a party, and res judicata. Ms. Woodson's Motion to Dismiss, while less specific, avers generally that Ms. Osgood-Price failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Notwithstanding the other possible grounds for dismissal presented by the defendants, because Ms. Osgood-Price's claim is barred by res judicata, as set forth below, the Motions to Dismiss are allowed.

"Res judicata includes both claim preclusion and issue preclusion." Harris v. City of Amesbury Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 28 LCR 355 , 360 (18 Misc. Case No. 000399) (2020) (Foster, J.), citing Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21 , 23 n. 2 (1988). "Claim preclusion makes a valid, final judgment conclusive on the parties and their privies, and prevents relitigation of all matters that were or could have been adjudicated in the action." O'Neill v. City Manager of Cambridge, 428 Mass. 257 , 259 (1998) quoting Blanchette v. School Comm. of Westwood, 427 Mass. 176 , 179 n.3 (1998). The purpose of claim preclusion "is 'based on the idea that the party to be precluded has had the incentive and opportunity to litigate the matter fully in the first lawsuit.'" O'Neill, 428 Mass. at 259 quoting Heacock, 402 Mass. at 24. Three elements are required for claim preclusion: "(1) the identity or privity of the parties to the present and prior actions, (2) identity of the cause of action, and (3) prior final judgment on the merits." DaLuz v. Dep't of Correction, 434 Mass. 40 , 45 (2001) quoting Franklin v. North Weymouth Coop. Bank, 283 Mass. 275 , 280 (1933).

Issue preclusion "prevents relitigation of an issue determined in an earlier action where the same issue arises in a later action, based on a different claim, between the same parties or their privies." Heacock, 402 Mass. at 23 n. 2. Before denying a party the opportunity to relitigate an issue, "a court must determine that (1) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication; (2) the party against whom preclusion is asserted was a party (or in privity with a party) to the prior adjudication; and (3) the issue in the prior adjudication was identical to the issue in the current adjudication." Tuper v. North Adams Ambulance Serv., Inc., 428 Mass. 132 , 134 (1998). "Additionally, the issue decided in the prior adjudication must have been essential to the earlier judgment." Id. at 134-135. "Issue preclusion can be used only to prevent relitigation of issues actually litigated in the prior action." Kobrin v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 444 Mass. 837 , 844 (2005). The prior adjudication does not have to be before a court; "[a] final order of an administrative agency in an adjudicatory proceeding . . . precludes relitigation of the same issues between the same parties, just as would a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction." Tuper, 428 Mass. at 135 quoting Stowe v. Bologna, 415 Mass. 20 , 22 (1993).

The matter raised by the Complaint was addressed by the Middlesex Probate and Family Court in Case No. MIP0953EA, In the matter of Lelia E. Jackson. By a decree dated July 5, 2018 (Decree), the Probate and Family Court made the following relevant findings:

1. The Estate of Lelia Jackson held a one-half beneficial interest in the Sara Osgood Revocable Trust.

2. Ms. Woodson individually held the other one-half beneficial interest in the trust.

3. The Sara Osgood Trust held title to 16-18-20-22 Dunreath Street, Boston, MA (the Property).

4. To purchase the Property, Ms. Woodson only needed to pay one-half the purchase price to the Estate of Lelia Jackson to do so.

5. The Estate of Lelia Jackson had two heirs: Adell Coren and the Plaintiff, Sharon Osgood-Price. Ms. Coren had a 60 percent interest and the Plaintiff had a 40 percent interest.

6. Ms. Coren agreed to the proposed sale to Ms. Woodson, but the Plaintiff objected.

7. The proposed sale was advantageous to the Estate of Lelia Jackson.

As a result of those findings, the Middlesex Probate and Family Court decreed that the Property be sold from the Sara Osgood Trust to Leoner Woodson individually, and that the assent to the sale by the Personal Representative of the Estate of Lelia Jackson, Attorney Smoot, would be binding on "the heirs of the Estate of Lelia Jackson and anyone else interested in the Estate of Lelia Jackson."

The Complaint is an action to quiet title to the Property. In the Complaint, Ms. Osgood Price has represented that she wants to "undo" the transaction as ordered by the Middlesex Probate and Family Court in its Decree. This claim is precluded by the final order by the Middlesex Probate and Family Court by the doctrine of res judicata. At the very least, Ms. Osgood-Price's claim is barred by claim preclusion: first, the relevant parties this action (Ms. Osgood-Price, the Estate of Lelia Jackson, and the Trust) were all involved in the prior action, satisfying the first element. Second, Ms. Osgood-Price's claim, that the sale of the Property was unfair to her share of the Estate of Lelia Jackson, was already presented to the Middlesex Probate and Family Court in Case No. MIP0953EA when the sale was proposed. Third, there was a prior final judgment on the merits: the Decree explicitly determined that the sale of the Property was advantageous to the Estate of Lelia Jackson. Because Ms. Osgood-Price had the incentive and opportunity to litigate this matter fully in the Middlesex Probate and Family Court, she cannot now relitigate her claim in this court. See Heacock, 402 Mass. at 24.

Even if the Complaint's claim were not precluded, the issue raised in the Complaint is likely precluded as well. First, there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication, that is, the Decree clearly decided that the challenged transaction was advantageous to the Estate of Lelia Jackson, and approved all the distributions out of the sale of the Property. Second, Ms. Osgood-Price, the plaintiff here against whom preclusion is asserted, was also a party to the prior adjudication. Third, and finally, the issue in the prior adjudication was identical to and essential to the earlier judgment: whether or not the transaction was proper or fair was decided by the Decree. Without a finding that the sale was advantageous to the Estate of Lelia Jackson, the Decree could not have been issued.

Simply put, the same claim and the same issues were already litigated in the Probate and Family Court. The same arguments and objections were brought before a judge, and a final judgment was made and entered. The Property was sold, and disbursements from the sale were made and approved. The Motions to Dismiss are allowed.

Motion for Counsel Fees

Under G.L. c. 231, § 6F, on a motion by any party the court may find after a hearing that "all or substantially all of the claims, defenses, setoffs or counterclaims... made by any party who was represented by counsel during most or all of the proceeding, were wholly insubstantial, frivolous and not advanced in good faith." Id., first par. (emphasis added). If such a finding is made, the party who advanced the frivolous claim may be required to pay the reasonable costs of defending the claim. See id., second par. John M. Smoot, Personal Representative, made strong arguments that the claims in this action were "wholly insubstantial, frivolous" and potentially motivated by bad faith. However, the statute requires that such claims be made by a party who was represented by counsel. Because Ms. Osgood-Price, proceeded pro se in this matter, the motion is denied.

Conclusion

For the forgoing reasons, the Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED, and the Motion for Counsel Fees is DENIED. Judgment shall enter dismissing the Complaint with prejudice.

SO ORDERED.