EDITH C. CLUITERBUCK vs. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD.
Way, Public: defect.
Conflicting evidence at the trial of an action against a city under G. L. c. 84, § 15, for personal injuries caused when the plaintiff fell as she was walking from a public street to a sidewalk and stepped into a hole in the curbstone, which, she testified, was where two curbing blocks came together and the end of one of them was broken off, and was four inches deep and four inches long, was held to warrant the submission of the action to the jury.
TORT, under G. L. c. 84, § 15, for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by a defect in Central Street in Springfield. Writ dated July 16, 1925.
In the Superior Court, the action was tried before Irwin, J. The statement in the record as to the plaintiff's testimony relating to her fall and to the alleged defect was as follows: "She went to step up onto the sidewalk when her foot went into a hole and it threw her to the ground. When she got up she saw that there was a hole in the curbing into which she had stepped. She looked to see what had caused her to fall and she saw the hole in the curbing. It was near where two curbing blocks came together; where they joined. One of the curbstones at one end was broken off. It was broken off so that one projected about four inches higher than the other, making a hole there. The hole was approximately four inches deep and four inches in length. Her foot went down into that."
A motion by the defendant that a verdict be ordered in its favor was denied. There was a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $500. The defendant alleged exceptions.
The case was submitted on briefs.
C.H. Beckwith, City Solicitor, & D. M. Macaulay, Assistant City Solicitor, for the defendant.
G. F. Leary & N. J. Saltzman, for the plaintiff.
Page 65
WAIT, J. No new or important question of law arises on this bill of exceptions. Whether the broken edgestone which caused injury to the plaintiff constituted a defect in the highway for which the city of Springfield was liable under G. L. c. 84, §§ 1, 15, was a question of fact for a jury and not one of law for the court. There was testimony from witnesses and evidence from photographs which made necessary weighing credibility and deciding between different conclusions of fact in ascertaining the state of the curbing. In such a situation, the judge was right in denying the motion that a verdict be directed for the defendant.
Exceptions overruled.