Home TOWN OF FRANKLIN vs. HERBERT L. METCALFE & others.

310 Mass. 831

January 7, 1942

Decision affirmed, with double costs. A decision was entered in the Land Court in this case that the tax title here involved is valid and ordering the case to "stand for further hearing on the matter of redemption." On appeal to this court the decision was affirmed. Franklin v. Metcalfe, 307 Mass. 386 . Thereafter proceedings were had in the Land Court relating to the matter of redemption and foreclosure, certain orders were made, and a decision was rendered that a decree of foreclosure enter. Certain respondents claimed appeals. Without discussing procedural questions involved it is enough to say that no error is disclosed by the record.

Home MARY NEIMAN vs. CITY OF CHELSEA.

310 Mass. 831

January 28, 1942

Exceptions overruled. This is an action of tort under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 84, Sections 1, 15, to recover for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff when she stepped into a small depression two inches deep, at the most, in the sidewalk of Chestnut Street, a public way in Chelsea. The judge, sitting without a jury, found "as a fact" that the condition described did not constitute a defect, and the plaintiff alleged exceptions. This finding was permissible on the evidence and was not vitiated by the manner in which the judge dealt with the defendant's so called "request for ruling #1."

Home ATTORNEY GENERAL vs. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.

310 Mass. 831

January 30, 1942

A final decree is to be entered in the Superior Court permanently enjoining the respondent from enforcing its "Rule 251," incorporated in its contracts with its agents, by denying credit to its agents in computing their commissions or salaries by reason of the surrender to the company for cash surrender value or paid-up insurance or extended term insurance or by reason of the lapse for nonpayment of premiums of any policy of "industrial" life insurance upon which premiums have been paid for three years or more, and from making deductions from its agents' commissions or salaries because of such surrenders or lapses, and ordering the respondent to pay to its agents such sums as it has refused to credit to them or has deducted from their commissions or salaries because of such surrenders or lapses occurring on or after July 21, 1938. There is no substantial or material difference between the determinative facts shown on this record and those shown on the record in Attorney General v. Prudential Ins. Co. decided this day. (See ante, 762.) All arguments of all parties have been carefully

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examined and considered. A separate opinion in this case would serve no useful purpose. This case is controlled in all its aspects by the decision in Attorney General v. Prudential Ins. Co.