Decree affirmed. This is an appeal by the widow of Andritsos A. Corcorou, late of Lynn, from a decree of the Probate Court allowing the second and final account of the administrator of the estate of the deceased. The only objection made to the account as allowed by the decree is to a payment of $350 by the administrator for attorney's fees for services rendered to him. The evidence is reported. And there is a report of the material facts found by the judge. That report contains a finding, not inconsistent with other findings, that "a great part of the services performed" by the attorney "were beneficial to the estate, and that a reasonable charge therefor is $350." This finding was not plainly wrong on the evidence reported. No useful purpose will be served by stating or discussing the evidence. Reed v. Reed, 114 Mass. 372 , 373. Ecklund v. Ecklund, 288 Mass. 517 , 518. This finding supports the decree which must be affirmed.
Exceptions overruled. In this action arising out of the collision of two automobiles there was no error in admitting the evidence of a "skid mark" fifty-one feet long observed on the surface of the roadway shortly (as could be found) after the accident and leading to "the right side" of the automobile in which the plaintiff had been riding. A finding that this mark had been caused by that automobile at the time of the accident would be supported by other evidence in the case and would be warranted not withstanding evidence that the automobile had been moved before the marks were observed in a manner and to an extent which could be found to have been "straight back about one foot." The evidence as to this mark had some tendency to show what actually happened at the time of the collision. Monaghan v. Keith Oil Corp. 281 Mass. 129 , 137. Jackson v. Anthony, 282 Mass. 540 . Hall v. Shain, 291 Mass. 506 . Curtin v. Benjamin, 305 Mass. 489 , 492. Wade v. Buchanan, 306 Mass. 318 , 321, 323. We find no error in the way in which it was presented and admitted. It is plain that there was evidence requiring the submission of the case to the jury. White v. Calcutt, 269 Mass. 252 . Beebe v. Randall, 304 Mass. 207 . We have considered all exceptions argued.
[Note 1] An identical rescript issued in the case of Edward Mernagh vs. Wilford Lillie.
Decree affirmed. This is a case under the workmen's compensation law. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, as amended. It comes here on appeal from a decree of the Superior Court that the employee did not receive an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment and that her claim for compensation be dismissed. This decree
was in conformity with the findings of the reviewing board that "the employee, while on her lunch hour on the premises of the employer, slipped on some coffee which had been spilled on the floor and fell to the floor and received an injury to her right knee," that the "employee was at liberty to have her lunch on the premises or elsewhere," and that she "was not in the course of employment at the time of her injury." There are no other findings of fact by the reviewing board. It did not adopt the findings of the single member. The claimant's case must stand or fall on the findings of the reviewing board which was the trier of fact. Its findings "entirely superseded . . . [those] of the single member which thereafter became of no importance." Ricci's Case, 294 Mass. 67 , 68. The burden rested upon the claimant of proving facts essential to establish her claim. DiClavio's Case, 293 Mass. 259 , 262. The facts found by the reviewing board were insufficient for this purpose. The mere fact that she sustained an injury when on the employer's premises is not enough to establish liability. Hallett's Case, 230 Mass. 326 , 328. Babineau's Case, 254 Mass. 214 , 215. The findings made by the reviewing board were warranted by the evidence, and we need not inquire whether findings more favorable to the claimant would have been warranted since such findings were not made.