The parties having, by agreement, disposed of all issues intended to be raised under the appeal, and having presented to the Probate Court a supplemental final account, the decree appealed from is reversed, without prejudice, and the case is remanded to the Probate Court for further proceedings.

Decision affirmed. This is an appeal by the respondent from a decision of the Land Court foreclosing the right of redemption from tax sales. The respondent argues only the failure to give certain requested rulings of law. Those requested rulings appear in the "decision." The appeal, under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 185, Section 15, and c. 231, Section 96, brings here nothing but the correctness in point of law of an "order decisive of the case" which is "founded upon matter of law apparent on the record." The "record" does not include the action of the judge upon the requested rulings of law, even though shown by the "decision." The case is fully covered by Harrington v. Anderson, ante, 1873. The facts disclosed in the "decision" disclose no error.

Decree affirmed with costs. The plaintiff alleged that he was a creditor of the corporate defendant "for goods sold and delivered." The judge ordered the bill dismissed, finding that the only possible claim of the plaintiff was upon promissory notes. From the final decree, dismissing the bill with costs, the plaintiff appealed. Some exhibits are before us, but the evidence otherwise is unreported. We have nothing before us that shows any error of law or fact.

Exceptions overruled. This is an action of tort to recover compensation for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the defendant. A verdict was directed for the defendant upon the plaintiff's opening. The plaintiff excepted. There was no error. It was stated in the opening that the plaintiff was hanging on the rear of a bus, that when the bus slowed down the plaintiff alighted therefrom, and that he was struck and injured by an automobile that was travelling in the same direction as the bus. There were further

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statements as to the circumstances of the accident. The automobile that struck the plaintiff was referred to in the opening as "the defendant's automobile." Even if this reference imported that the defendant was the owner of this automobile and if, as we need not decide, the facts stated warranted a finding that this automobile was being operated negligently, the facts stated were not sufficient to impose liability upon the defendant. Ownership of the automobile alone was not sufficient. No facts were stated showing that at the time of the accident the automobile was being operated or was under the control of the defendant or of a person for whose conduct the defendant was legally responsible. Porcino v. De Stefano, 243 Mass. 398, 400. Vallavanti v. Armour & Co. 260 Mass. 417, 418. There was no statement that the automobile was "registered in the name of the defendant as owner," constituting "prima facie evidence" under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, Section 85A, that the automobile "was then being operated by and under the control of a person for whose conduct the defendant was legally responsible." Kelly v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. 315 Mass. 301.