Exceptions overruled. This is an action of tort brought by the plaintiff Cecile Prince to recover compensation for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by her as a result of falling on a common stairway in the control of the defendant. Her husband is also a party plaintiff seeking consequential damages. See G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, Section 6A, inserted by St. 1939, c. 372, Section 1. The case is before us on the plaintiffs' exceptions to the action of the judge in entering a verdict for the defendant under reserved leave. There was no error. No evidence was offered to show any promise on the part of the defendant (see Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451 ) to take the case out of the general rule that the burden of proof rested upon the plaintiffs to establish that the defendant had negligently failed to use reasonable care to keep the common stairway in question in as good a condition as that in which it was or appeared to be at the time of the letting. Griffin v. Rudnick, 298 Mass. 82 , 84. Sullivan v. F. W. Woolworth Co. 305 Mass. 378 , 380. Chambers v. Durling, 306 Mass. 327 , 329, 330. Sneckner v. Feingold, 314 Mass. 613 , 614, and cases cited. In its aspect most favorable to the plaintiffs, the evidence would not warrant a finding that the alleged defective condition of the common stairway arose after the letting or was not then apparent.
Decree affirmed. This is a workmen's compensation case. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152. The insurer appealed from a decree of the Superior Court, awarding compensation for partial incapacity to the employee, rendered upon the findings and decision of the Industrial Accident Board. The evidence before the board warranted its findings and decision that the employee is partially incapacitated for work and entitled to partial incapacity compensation.
Petition dismissed. Ordered further that the said clerk send a copy of this rescript to the clerk of the Superior Court for the county of Suffolk, to be filed in the case of Samuel Stern vs. Dennis McGrath. This petition to establish the truth of exceptions must be dismissed. Even if the truth of the exceptions were established, the bill of exceptions would present no "question of law of such gravity as properly to call for consideration of the court." Commonwealth v. Vallarelli, 273 Mass. 240 , 247. Graustein, petitioner, 305 Mass. 571 . Compare Lovell v. Lovell, 276 Mass. 10 , 11-12. The only exception stated in the bill of exceptions is an exception to a general
finding for the defendant. Other than in exceptional cases, of which this is not one, see Leshefsky v. American Employers' Ins. Co. 293 Mass. 164 , 166-167, such an exception has no standing. Stowell v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. 288 Mass. 555 , 556-557. Sreda v. Kessel, 310 Mass. 588 , 589-590.