325 Mass. 760

February 1, 1950

Exceptions overruled. This is an action of tort in which the plaintiff seeks to recover for injuries received while a passenger on a street car of the defendant. The action is here on the plaintiff's exceptions to a verdict for the defendant by order of the judge and to the exclusion of two questions on direct examination. There was nothing in the bill of exceptions to indicate where the street car was at the time of the accident, but in their briefs both the plaintiff and the defendant assert that it was on a public highway. The plaintiff testified that she got on the street car and the doors locked behind her; that the car started and she had taken several steps when the car suddenly stopped; that she steadied herself, and before she could turn around and sit down or lay her hands on a strap or support the car started again and she fell forward; "that the force was so fast, `it was a stop suddenly, and start; it was just like a repeat.'" There was no error in directing a verdict for the defendant. This court has held in numerous cases that a common carrier, such as the defendant, is not liable to a passenger for personal injury from jerks or jolts unless unusual and beyond common experience. Such jerks or jolts are of necessity incident to the ordinary operation of a street car. There is no evidence here that would reasonably warrant an inference that there was anything unusual in the operation of this street car. Carson v. Boston Elevated Railway, 309 Mass. 32 , 35. See Cushman v. Boston, Worcester & New York Street Railway, 319 Mass. 177 , 178. It should be further noted that no evidence was offered to show why either the sudden stop or the start was made. Cuddyer v. Boston Elevated Railway, 314 Mass. 680 , 685. The exceptions of the plaintiff to the exclusion of evidence must be overruled. The plaintiff made no offer of proof and did not show what the expected answers would be. We need not consider their admissibility. Berman v. Greenberg, 314 Mass. 540 , 544.


325 Mass. 760

February 2, 1950

Decision of District Court dismissing the petition affirmed. The testimony of the claimant at a hearing upon his first application for unemployment benefits that he would not accept employment paying only $25 a week was competent evidence in the present proceedings which are based upon a second application for benefits. The ground of the instant appeal and the only contention of the claimant is that there was error of law in the decision denying his second application for benefits because that decision resulted from incorporating the evidence adduced at the previous hearing into the hearing given upon his second application. Such a contention is not supported by anything appearing in the record and consequently cannot be sustained.

Home ALFRED T. CLARK vs. ELEANOR C. CLARK & another.

325 Mass. 760

February 3, 1950

Appeal dismissed. This is a libel brought in the Probate Court seeking a divorce on the ground of adultery. The libellant moved to amend the libel by inserting the name of a corespondent, and permission to do so was granted. From this action the corespondent appealed. The corespondent requested the

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judge to report the material facts found by him in the allowance of the libellant's motion. The request was denied and the corespondent appealed. See Sullivan v. Sullivan, 320 Mass. 114 , 116. We treat the denial of the request as an interlocutory decree. The sole question for decision is whether the judge erred in denying the request. Since it will not affect the result, we assume in favor of the corespondent that his request for a report of material facts was made within the period that would entitle him, as of right, to such a report. It appears that the request was not filed until nineteen days after the allowance of the motion to amend the libel, but it does not appear when the corespondent had notice of such allowance. See G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 215, Section 11, as amended by St. 1947, c. 365, Section 3. We also assume without deciding that the allowance of the libellant's motion to amend the libel was a matter as to which the judge could be required to make a report of material facts. See G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 208, Section 11, as amended. The appeal, however, is not rightly here. The decree appealed from was interlocutory. It is settled that an appeal from an interlocutory decree, in the absence of a report by the trial judge, can come to this court only after a final decree. Slater v. Munroe, 313 Mass. 538 , 540. There has been no final decree here.