Decree affirmed. The special administrator of the estate of Mary C. Brown, who died on November 10, 1952, seeks to set aside a joint bank account created by the decedent with her daughter Theresa L. Brown. The judge found that the decedent intended her daughter, if she should survive, as she did, to have the account, and entered a decree that the daughter owned the account. The special administrator appealed. An examination of the reported evidence shows no error of fact or of law. Hiller v. Hiller, 305 Mass. 163 . MacLennan v. MacLennan, 316 Mass. 593 , 595.
Orders sustaining demurrers affirmed. This is a bill in equity to enjoin the defendant Fiorenza from leasing a certain parcel of land in the town of Winchester for use as a gasoline filling station and to enjoin the defendant board of selectmen of the said town from issuing a permit for the storage of gasoline and oil on the said parcel. The plaintiff, who is described in the bill as one who "has a buyer, ready, able and willing to buy the said land and deed it" to a neighboring church, appeals from orders sustaining the defendants' demurrers. The plaintiff concedes that the bill cannot be regarded as a taxpayers' petition to restrain illegal expenditures. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 40, Section 53. His present contention that the bill may be maintained on the theory of a resulting trust based upon an oral promise made in 1935 to one now deceased by Caroline J. Murray, a former owner, also now deceased, cannot be upheld. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 203, Section 1. Sprague v. Kimball, 213 Mass. 380 . It is unnecessary to enumerate other fatal defects in the bill.
Decree affirmed. This case comes here upon an appeal from a decree of the Superior Court dismissing an employee's claim for additional compensation under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152 as amended. The employee was injured on April 17, 1952, by reason of an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment. He was paid total disability and dependency compensation until July 6, 1952. After hearing upon conflicting medical evidence, the single member found that "there has been no disability as a result of the employee's injury of April 17, 1952, since July, 1952, when he returned to work and worked until April 23, 1953, at which time his employment was terminated . . .. His claim for [further] compensation, therefore, is dismissed." The reviewing board affirmed and adopted the findings and decision of the single member and, as we have indicated, the decree of the Superior Court is in accord with the findings and decision of the reviewing board. There was no error. The decision of the reviewing board as to the disability of the employee was a "pure question of fact. The finding to be made on that point depended upon . . . the weight of evidence given chiefly by medical witnesses. . . . The decision of the reviewing board must be accepted as final if there is any evidence to support it." Ricci's Case, 294 Mass. 67 , 68. This principle of law has been repeated so often that it has become axiomatic and there is no need to cite other cases to support it. In the case at bar there was ample medical
testimony to support the conclusion of the reviewing board. Because not argued in his brief we do not consider the claim of the employee for specific compensation because of disfigurement (c. 152, Section 36 [h]).