Order denying jury issues affirmed. Although the proceedings in the Probate Court came on to be heard on the usual three issues, statements of counsel referred only to the issue of fraud and undue influence and fell far short of justifying the granting of an issue upon that subject. Hannon v. Gorman, 296 Mass. 437 . Wood v. McDonald, 332 Mass. 220 .
Order sustaining demurrer affirmed. Judgment for the defendant. The demurrer was rightly sustained. Each count of the declaration fails to state with certainty the substantive facts necessary to constitute the cause of action. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, Section 7, Second; Section 18, Fourth. Indeed, it is not possible by reading the declaration to ascertain with accuracy what cause of action was intended to be set forth in each of the counts. See Bowles v. Clark, 326 Mass. 31 , 33-34. In each of the four counts, in lieu of alleging substantive facts, the declaration alleges merely, in general terms and by way of conclusions, that the defendant took action or made statements which the declaration characterizes as "false and fraudulent," "false and fictitious," "falsity," "false and groundless." Such general allegations cannot take the place of substantive allegations setting forth the essential elements of a recognized cause of action. Caverno v. Fellows, 286 Mass. 440 , 443. McCarthy v. Hawes, 299 Mass. 340 , 342-344. See North Station Wine Co. v. United Liquors, Ltd. 323 Mass. 48 , 52. It does not appear that the plaintiff was given or sought leave to amend and it is appropriate to enter judgment for the defendant. Keljikian v. Star Brewing Co. 303 Mass. 53 , 61-62. Bowles v. Clark, 326 Mass. 31 , 34.
Appeal dismissed. This is an action of contract which was referred to an auditor whose findings of fact were to be final. The auditor found for the plaintiff in the sum of $2.60. The case was heard by a judge solely on the auditor's report. The defendants presented a motion for judgment in accordance with the report. The plaintiff presented a motion that judgment be entered for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,816.46. On March 20, 1956, the judge granted the defendants' motion and ordered judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $2.62 (sic). On the same day the judge denied the plaintiff's motion for judgment. On April 11, 1956, the plaintiff filed a claim of appeal "from the order . . . denying the plaintiff's motion for judgment . . .." The defendants contend that the plaintiff's appeal is not properly before us and we are of opinion that this contention must be sustained. Since the findings of the auditor were final, the plaintiff could have appealed from the order for judgment on the report under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, Section 96. Edinburg
v. Allen-Squire Co. 299 Mass. 206 , 207. The plaintiff, however, appealed from the denial of her motion for judgment. This was not appealable under Section 96; it was not an appeal from an order for judgment on an auditor's report; nor was it from an "order decisive of the case." Old Mill Point Club, Inc. v. Paine, 308 Mass. 505 , 506. But even if we should treat the paper filed by the plaintiff as in substance an appeal from the order for judgment on the auditor's report, the plaintiff's position is no better. Section 96 provides that "An appeal from an order . . . shall be claimed within twenty days after it is made." This requirement is mandatory and an appeal which does not comply with it is not properly before this court. See Attorney General v. Barbour, 121 Mass. 568 , 573; Humphrey's Case, 226 Mass. 143 , 145; Golden v. Crawshaw, 302 Mass. 343 ; Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 333 Mass. 501 . The plaintiff's claim of appeal, which was made more than twenty days after the order for judgment (if such it was), was not seasonable.