Final decree affirmed with costs to Federal Land Bank of Springfield. Winters and his wife executed a note for $15,600 secured by a statutory power of sale mortgage upon land in Barre, and, as part of the transaction, bought $780 of stock in the mortgagee land bank. This was held "as collateral security for the loan." See 12 U. S. C. Section 733 (1958, and Supp. IV, 1962). The mortgagors became delinquent in making payments. At the time of foreclosure, "after giving [proper] credit for stock, the amount due . . . [to the] bank . . . was $17,167.37." On September 20, 1960, the bank purchased the property for $1,200 at the foreclosure sale, which had been duly advertised and of which the mortgagors had actual notice. Proceedings relating to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 had been instituted and the sale was made in compliance with the applicable statutes "and by decree of . . . [the] Superior Court." The bank sold the foreclosed property by deed dated September 15, 1961, for $20,000. These facts were found by a master appointed in these proceedings to obtain an accounting for what the bank received from the foreclosure and resale of the property and for the bank stock. The bill was properly dismissed. The facts found by the master do not justify any inference of bad faith or improper conduct by the bank. See Cambridge Sav. Bank v. Cronin, 289 Mass. 379 , 383; West Roxbury Co-op. Bank v. Bowser, 324 Mass. 489 , 491-493; Cohen v. Bay State Cafe, Inc. 341 Mass. 1 , 5-6. See also Federal Land Bank v. County Commrs. 368 U.S. 146, 151-152. The finding that the bank stock held as collateral was "properly credited" is conclusive as to that question.
Decision affirmed. The petitioner appealed (see Comeau v. Manzelli, 344 Mass. 375 , 376) from the decision and order of the Land Court dismissing the petition to register a narrow strip of land with frontage of 8.10 feet on Green Street, Brookline. The petitioner in 1955 registered the land adjoining the locus on the east. The respondents own the land adjoining the locus on the west. The locus is land which cannot be accurately accounted for when (a) the aggregate of the lot frontages on the northerly side of Green Street, between Harvard Street and Dwight Street, shown by the deeds to those lots, is compared with (b) the total actual measured distance between Harvard Street and Dwight Street. The Land Court decision did not adopt the view of an expert who suggested that the true easterly boundary and the true westerly boundary of the petitioner's registered land (title to which was gained by the same deeds upon which the petitioner now relies) each lie about eight feet west of the lines determined by the 1955 decree. The Land Court correctly
ruled that the "petitioner . . . has shown no record title to [the] locus." Although the petitioner's theory of the case may be consistent with several monuments now on the ground on or near the locus, those monuments do not appear to be referred to in any deed by which the petitioner claims or on an 1894 plan of the land mentioned in the deed by which the petitioner gained what title it has. These monuments have not been shown to have application to land for which the petitioner has a deed, so that there is no occasion for applying the principle that courses and distances must yield to monuments. See Holmes v. Barrett, 269 Mass. 497 , 499-500. The 1955 registration decree is consistent with the calls in the deed by which the petitioner gained title and with measurements (based on lot frontages) from at least one monument east of the registered land.