These two actions represent the third stage of protracted litigation commenced in 1951 wherein judgment was recovered against the present plaintiff in tort for wrongful death, which was followed by an action of contract on the judgment resulting in a second judgment against the present plaintiff, who now brings an action against his original adversary for abuse of process and an action against his adversary's counsel in three counts respectively for abuse of process, deceit, and "damage." The plaintiff appeals from orders sustaining the defendants' demurrers and denying the plaintiff's motions for jury trial on the demurrers. The declarations as a whole, and each of the counts, are vague, argumentative, verbose, and otherwise fail to meet the requirements of G. L. c. 231, Section 7, Second. The orders sustaining the demurrers are affirmed. The appeals from the orders denying the motions are not properly before us and are dismissed. Judgments are to be entered for the defendants under G. L. c. 231, Section 125.

Interlocutory decree and final decree affirmed. Taxpayers seek to enjoin the town from spending funds appropriated at a town meeting on March 25, 1963, upon art. 22 of a warrant reading, "To see what sums . . . the [t]own will raise and appropriate for [c]hapter 90 projects." They appeal from an interlocutory decree sustaining the town's demurrer and from a final decree dismissing the bill. The bill is diffuse, argumentative, and ambiguous and contains much irrelevant matter. Article 22 of the warrant was adequate. Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 219. The bill does not allege facts showing any impropriety, by reason of conflict of interest or otherwise, in the filing by two selectmen (with others) of a petition to the county commissioners to widen and relocate a public highway. See Denman v. County of Barnstable, 346 Mass. 412, 414, 415, where the selectmen filed a comparable petition. No facts alleged show any inadequacy in a notice, served upon the town clerk, by posting and by publication,

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given pursuant to G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 82, Section 3, or that subsequent proceedings did not conform with c. 82, Sections 4 and 5. It is not alleged that any person interested in opposing the petition before the county commissioners lacked actual notice of the petition or the hearing thereon. Other contentions argued by the plaintiffs are without merit.