Home DANIEL E. DUNKLEE, JR., & another vs. LOUIS H. MCGLOIN, JR.

348 Mass. 776

December 2, 1964

The minor plaintiff alleges injuries and his father seeks consequential damages in this action of tort. The son was the driver of a car which, while trying to make a U-turn across an unbroken double white line which divided opposing lines of traffic at the end of a traffic island, was struck by a car driven by the defendant. Exceptions are alleged (1) to the denial by the judge of the plaintiff's motion to expunge from the auditor's report prior to a jury trial a finding of negligence on the part of the plaintiff "in trying to make a U-turn at the end of the traffic island across two solid white traffic lines with other traffic following him on the west bound lanes" when the defendant was entitled to presume he would not do so, and (2) to the refusal of the judge to charge that no statute or regulation was violated by the plaintiff in trying to make the U-turn. There was no error. The auditor's finding of negligence on the part of the minor plaintiff had support in the subsidiary facts which he found. The judge's charge adequately dealt with the law to be considered by the jury in their assessment of the case. See Squires v. Fraska, 301 Mass. 474, 476.

Exceptions overruled.

Home JANE H. LORD & another vs. EARLE T. CHENEY & another.

348 Mass. 776

December 2, 1964

Judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs' amended declaration purported to charge a conspiracy on the part of the defendants and others not named as defendants. The defendants' demurrer was sustained, and the plaintiffs appealed. The demurrer, one of the grounds of which was that the declaration failed to state a cause of action, was rightly sustained.

Order sustaining demurrer affirmed.

Home LOUIS CHAITMAN vs. LEDGEHILL HOMES, INC.

348 Mass. 776

December 2, 1964

In this action of contract, which was tried to a judge, the sole evidence introduced was a written contract which, it was agreed, was executed by the parties. In the contract the plaintiff agreed with the defendant corporation to sell to it sixty-four shares of common stock for $10,000; one Kardon in the same agreement likewise agreed with the defendant to sell to it thirty-two shares of common stock for $5,000. To secure payment both the plaintiff and Kardon deposited their stock in escrow with a trustee. The plaintiff brings this action to recover an unpaid balance of $2,100. The judge found for the plaintiff. The questions presented arise from the defendant's exceptions to the action of the judge

Page 777

with respect to certain requests for rulings. There was no error. The judge rightly ruled that the plaintiff was not a joint obligee and could sue without joining Kardon. And he rightly ruled that the action did not have to be brought by the trustee named in the escrow agreement.

Exceptions overruled.