A judge of the Superior Court ordered that a writ of certiorari to review action of the school committee be dismissed. Gosselin's Dairy, Inc. (Gosselin's) appealed. The committee advertised for written bids to supply milk during the school year, 1964-1965, reserving the right to reject any bids. Gosselin's, which has its principal office in Chicopee, submitted a bid estimated to cost the city $65,650. The award was made to a firm, which submitted a bid estimated to cost the city $67,210. That firm was "located in Holyoke." The sole question is whether the award must be to the lowest responsible and eligible bidder because of G. L. c. 30, Section 39M (inserted by St. 1963, c. 842, Section 1, entitled "An Act to require that all contracts for construction and for materials be awarded to the lowest responsible and eligible bidder, and to assure full competition in the taking of bids for such contracts"). In context Section 39M (e) defining "material" as "any article, assembly, system, or any component part thereof," must be interpreted as referring only to materials used in the construction, alteration, or repair of any public work. See 1963 Senate Doc. No. 563 and House Doc. No. 3470. The balance of Section 39M is principally devoted to public works construction. We hold that this award was governed by G. L. c. 40, Section 4B (as amended through St. 1960, c. 592, Section 1), which refers to contracts "for the purchase of equipment, supplies or materials" and does not require award to the lowest responsible bidder. The arguments advanced by Gosselin's, to show that in the public interest a requirement like that in Section 39M should apply to municipal purchases of supplies like milk, must be addressed to the Legislature. We hold that by Section 39M the Legislature as yet has not imposed such a requirement.

Order for judgment affirmed.

This litigation comes before this court for the third time. The first phase involved a bill in equity (brought by the present appellants) by way of appeal from a decision of the board of appeals of Canton granting a variance to Robert A. Falls and his wife to enable them to build a two family house on a parcel of land owned by them. In 345 Mass. 117, we held that the decision of the judge upholding the granting of the variance was erroneous. Instead, however, of annulling the decision of the board, we reversed the decree and ordered the case "to stand for further hearing in conformity with . . . [the] opinion." Thereafter, on March 18, 1963, the town adopted an amendment to its zoning by-law. Under the amendment, the Falls' land was placed in a less restrictive zone in which two family houses were permitted and there was no longer any need for a variance. The amendment was challenged in mandamus proceedings by the present appellants on the ground that it constituted spot zoning; it was held to be valid in Sullivan v. Selectmen of Canton, 346 Mass. 784. Thereafter, by a proposed amendment to their original bill in equity, the appellants sought to have the building permit issued to the Falls to build a two

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family house on the locus declared null and void. This motion was denied and a decree was entered in that case dismissing the bill because the subject matter of it had become moot by reason of a valid amendment to the zoning by-law. The present appeal, which is based on the contention that this decree did not conform to the rescript in 345 Mass. 117 is, for the reason set forth in the decree, palpably without merit.

Decree affirmed.