These are cross-actions in tort arising out of a collision of automobiles on October 30, 1959. The case of Daniel A. LaRose, the owner of one of the cars involved, is for property damage and is against Jean M. Leger, administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Robert R. Leger, who was the driver of the other car and who was fatally injured in the accident. The other case is for personal injuries suffered by Jean M. Leger, Daniel F. Leger and G. Bruce Wickett and by Jean M. Leger, administratrix, for conscious suffering and death of Robert R. Leger, against Bernard D. LaRose and Daniel A. LaRose. Bernard is the son of Daniel and was the driver of the LaRose car. In the first case the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. In the second case the jury returned verdicts for the defendants on all counts. The cases are here on the exceptions of the defendant in the first case, and by the plaintiffs in the second case. They contend that the trial judge was in error in refusing to charge the jury in accordance with a number of their requests for instructions. We have examined the many requested instructions and discern no benefit to our judicial lore from an enumeration or discussion of them. We are satisfied that the substantive principles to which they relate were adequately covered in the instructions to the jury. Commonwealth v. Monahan, 349 Mass. 139 , 170-171.
The judge of the Land Court ruled that the petitioner was entitled to a decree registering title to certain land (the locus) in Swansea described in the petition. The respondent appeals, contending that the locus includes a parcel of land owned by him. "An appeal . . . brings before this court only questions of law apparent upon the record. Findings of fact cannot be revised." Cerel v. Framingham, 342 Mass. 17 , 18. Comeau v. Manzelli, 344 Mass. 375 , 376. "The question is whether the ultimate order is correct in law upon the facts found by the judge in his decision, including the documents incorporated therein by reference." Ide v. Bowden, 342, Mass. 22, 24. In light of this standard, a review of the record before us, which includes documents, leads us to the conclusion that there was no error in law and that the judge was right in his ultimate finding "that the petitioner has sustained the burden of proof that he holds title to the land described in the petition."