The will of Bartholomew J. Donnelly, dated June 12, 1935, gave a part of the residue of his estate to the "Catholic Institute for the Blind at Jersey City, New Jersey, conducted by the Little Sisters of the Poor." The judge found on undisputed evidence that at the time of the execution of the will there was a Roman Catholic institution in Jersey City providing assistance to the blind, operated by the Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace. The corporate name of this community from 1900 to November 30, 1936, was Institute for the Blind, Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace. On November 30, 1936, that corporation and three other New Jersey charitable corporations all conducted by the Sisters of St. Joseph, a religious order of Catholic nuns, merged to form a single New Jersey charitable corporation: St. Joseph's Home for the Blind -- Sisters of St. Joseph of Newark (designated in the final decree as "the Saint Joseph's Home for the Blind"). The institution conducted by the Sisters of St. Joseph is the only Catholic institution which has conducted a home for the blind in Jersey City or elsewhere in the State of New Jersey. The judge rightly determined that the share designated for the "Catholic Institute for the Blind at Jersey City, New Jersey," be paid to St. Joseph's Home for the Blind -- Sisters of St. Joseph of Newark. Tucker v. Seaman's Aid Soc. 7 Met. 188 , 208. Minot v. Boston Asylum & Farm Sch. for Indigent Boys, 7 Met. 416 , 418. The words of the will describe the intended recipient with particularity. Except for the addition of the descriptive phrase "conducted by the Little Sisters of the Poor," the designation was precise. The testator's mistaken reference to a specific order of nuns affords no basis for disregarding the principal descriptive words. Nothing turns on the finding that there is a religious order of Catholic nuns in Newark, New Jersey, under the corporate name of Little Sisters of the Poor. Costs and expenses of appeal are to be awarded in the discretion of the Probate Court.
These are appeals from two decisions of a judge of the District Court which affirmed decisions of the board of review which upheld the determination of the director of the division of employment security that the petitioners were employers subject to the provisions of G. L. c. 151A, inserted by St. 1941, c. 685, Section 1, as amended. The issues and facts in each of these decisions are similar and they have, therefore, been consolidated for review. The employing unit had only one employee. The petitioners appear to make three contentions. (1) The act "exceeds constitutional limitations"; (2) "The changes made in the . . . [act] since its original enactment exceed constitutional limitations"; and (3) "The terms of the . . . [act] are so vague as to deny due process of law." General Laws c. 151A was held to be constitutional in the case of Howes Bros. Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commn. 296 Mass. 275 , 283-284. See Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co. 301 U.S. 495, 509. The reasoning in the Howes
case is just as controlling in sustaining the amendments to the act. The petitioners argue that the provisions of Section 14 of the act make it "impossible for employers of intelligence to determine what their tax rate will be for any given year" and consequently the statute is so vague that it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. We do not agree. For a somewhat analogous situation dealing with classification of risks and premium charges, see Century Cab Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins. 327 Mass. 652 . The decisions of the District Court are affirmed.