The plaintiff appeals from an interlocutory decree confirming the master's report and from a final decree dismissing a bill seeking to enjoin the Division of Fisheries and Game from making "use of the land used by the Falmouth Municipal Airport" and to restrain the division "from interfering with the continued use and operation of the Falmouth Municipal Airport on the premises it now occupies." The trial judge was correct in ruling that the "case is governed by the decision in Executive Air Serv. Inc. v. Division of Fisheries & Game, 342 Mass. 356 ."
Interlocutory and final decrees affirmed.
In this action of contract the plaintiff, a minor, seeks to recover from the seller the purchase price of an automobile. The judge found for the plaintiff. We see no point in quoting the defendant's requests for rulings or the judge's rulings on these requests. There was no error. The fact that the plaintiff's brother, who was over twenty-one years of age, was present and participated in the transaction does not remove the minor from the protection of the law if it is found that the minor was the sole purchaser of the vehicle. Frye v. Yasi, 327 Mass. 724 . There was ample evidence to support such a finding.
The assigned errors in these appeals under G. L. c. 278, Sections 33A-33G, do not require the reversal of the defendant's convictions on three indictments charging him with receiving stolen goods. (1) The admission in evidence of a guaranty slip, bearing the serial number of one of the stolen instruments and found in a cellar beneath the defendant's apartment during an allegedly illegal search, was harmless
since it tended to show only what was conclusively established by other evidence, including the admission of the defendant: that the stolen goods had been stored in the cellar. See Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87. (2) The judge acted promptly, emphatically and decisively when the prosecutor remarked during an exchange with defence counsel, "That man is lying." The judge again referred to the impropriety in his charge. There was no abuse of discretion in denying a motion for a mistrial. Commonwealth v. Godis, 266 Mass. 195 . (3) The defendant, having testified on direct examination that he was employed by his brother as a salesman in 1963, admitted on cross-examination, subject to exception, that he made no report of this income. The latter evidence was admissible, not as tending to show the defendant's guilt of the crime charged, but rather as pointing to the improbability of the fact testified to on direct examination. It was so limited by the judge in his instructions. Commonwealth v. Turner, 224 Mass. 229 , 237.