The defendants' exceptions are to the denial of motions of the defendants concerning the denial of a motion to amend an order disallowing their bill of exceptions and the denial of leave to file a substitute bill. No abuse of discretion appears.
One of the plaintiffs' exceptions relates to the use of interrogatories to which the plaintiffs did not object when the answers were introduced in evidence. The other relates to the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial and the requests for rulings in connection with the motion. There is no merit to the plaintiffs' argument that the judge was required "to hear counsel on the principles set forth in the requests." The exceptions are frivolous and approach absurdity. Double costs are to be assessed under G. L. c. 211, Section 10.
This petition for writ of error, filed January 10, 1966, seeks to set aside judgments on two indictments in Middlesex County. On October 11, 1962, the petitioner, who was represented by counsel, pleaded guilty to murder in the second degree and to armed robbery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. The single justice affirmed the judgments, and made complete findings and rulings, which we adopt as the opinion of this court.
The defendant was convicted on two indictments, one of which charged him with indecent assault and battery upon a child under the age of fourteen, and the other with assault with intent unlawfully and carnally to know and abuse a female child under the age of sixteen years. He brings his appeals here under the provisions of G. L. c. 278, Sections 33A-33G, with several assignments of error, the first of which is directed to the judge's refusal to direct a verdict on the opening statement of the Commonwealth. However, "a judge cannot be required to direct a verdict on an opening." Commonwealth v. Hartford, 346 Mass. 482 , 489. The second assignment argued charges error in permitting testimony from a gynecologist in which he stated his belief that the child had been assaulted "most probably" by an attempted insertion of a male organ "into the private parts." The witness was thoroughly qualified to state this opinion which was in his domain of professional knowledge and which would be of assistance to the jury. Commonwealth v. Dawn, 302 Mass. 255 , 259. That the opinion rendered dealt with the precise point to be determined by the jury gives rise in this instance to no "valid objection where the judge could find that the witness was qualified to express an opinion in the domain of professional knowledge which would be of assistance to the jury." Commonwealth v. Chapin, 333 Mass. 610 , 625. Compare Duggan v. Bay State St. Ry. 230 Mass. 370 , 383.
Without elaboration or the recitation of a set of revolting facts, it suffices to say that ample evidence was presented to warrant the judge in denying the defendant's motions for directed verdicts. The assignments disclose no reversible error.