The petitioner is a voting member and director of the respondent association. His petition for a writ of mandamus prayed that the association be ordered to furnish a list of its members, together with their names, addresses and number of shares held, so that the petitioner could use the list to solicit proxy votes for the membership meeting of January 15, 1968. The petition also requested that the association be restrained from using the membership list to solicit proxies for the meeting and that the court grant such other relief as it deemed just. The case purportedly was heard both on the merits and on the respondent's demurrer. The judge sustained the demurrer and also denied the petition "as a matter of law and discretion." We do not reach the merits. The specific relief sought referred to the membership meeting of January 15, 1968. Since that meeting has already been held, the questions raised by the petition have become moot. The possibility that the same issues might arise in the future and that it might be advantageous for the parties to have their rights determined in advance is not enough to call for the rendition of a judgment. Cole v. Chief of Police of Fall River, 312 Mass. 523 , 526. It follows that the order sustaining the demurrer and the order dismissing the petition must be reversed, not on the merits, but because the case has become moot, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court with directions to dismiss the petition without prejudice. See Nilsson v. Pearson, 301 Mass. 228 , 229; Vigoda v. Superintendent of Boston State Hosp. 336 Mass. 724 , 726-727.
The reviewing board adopted meager findings by a single member of the Industrial Accident Board and, like him, denied compensation to Johnson, the employee of Edward R. Davis, for an injury incurred while Johnson, working in the absence of Davis, was using a snowblower at the request of one Phillips on the latter's premises. Davis and Johnson, over a period of time, had been doing construction work for Phillips. The Superior Court judge refused to recommit the case for clarification of the board's findings. Decisions of the board should contain (a) adequate subsidiary findings warranted by substantial evidence, and (b) conclusions which are supported by the subsidiary findings. See DiClavio's Case, 293 Mass. 259 , 261-262. Recitals of testimony do not constitute findings. Here the single member improperly confused his findings with recitals of testimony. His findings (as opposed to such recitals) do not require as matter of law any award. His subsidiary findings however, are insufficient to enable us to determine whether an
award of compensation would have been permissible or whether the board applied correct principles of law. For example, findings would have been appropriate concerning Davis's instructions to Johnson about taking orders from Phillips, the area and the circumstances in which Johnson used the snowblower, and the prior arrangements between Davis and Phillips concerning work by Johnson. The final decree is reversed. In the Superior Court, the case is to be recommitted to the board for amplification of its findings and for such further proceedings consistent with this opinion as the board in its discretion may order. See Herson's Case, 341 Mass. 402 , 407-408, and cases cited; Curtin's Case, 354 Mass. 45 , 48.