This petition to establish the truth of exceptions was dismissed by the single justice on the respondent's motion. The petitioners excepted. One ground of the motion was violation of G. L. c. 231, Section 113, requiring that the exceptions "be reduced to writing in a summary manner." A Superior Court judge had previously disallowed the bill of exceptions on this ground, stating that it "is inordinately and unnecessarily long . . . [and] contains much that is redundant and immaterial." There was no error in the ruling of the single justice. Graustein, petitioner, 305 Mass. 568 , 569. Emsheimer, petitioner, 352 Mass. 778 . Somerville, petitioners, 353 Mass. 755 .
This is an action of tort. In her declaration the plaintiff alleges that when a pedestrian on a sidewalk in Springfield, she was hurt by a motor vehicle which "had been parked and negligently secured in a position on the south side of Stockbridge Street, and permitted to roll backwards, and . . . [that the vehicle] was under the joint supervision of the owner and the agent or servant of the defendant, while repairs were being made to the same by the agent or servant of the defendant." The evidence did not warrant findings to support these allegations. There was no error in directing a verdict for the defendant, nor in striking evidence concerning a purchase of brake fluid which was not shown to be relevant.
The plaintiff, a business invitee, sustained personal injuries at the Somerset Hotel controlled by the defendants. The case is here on the plaintiff's exception to the entry of a verdict for the defendants under leave reserved. The case had previously been tried before an auditor who found for the defendants. The plaintiff was secretary of an organization called the Pythian Sisters. "She went to the Regent Room in the hotel to attend a meeting and . . . she noticed a platform there . . . about twelve feet long and about six feet wide and about fifteen to eighteen inches high." It was movable and about two feet from the wall. There were four desks and four chairs on the platform and the plaintiff occupied one of the chairs. She knew "[t]he chairs on the platform were not fastened down and the rear legs of the chairs were about eight inches from the edge of the platform." At the close of the meeting she reached over to get a member's sweater which was on the back of one of the chairs. Her chair went "backwards when she moved, and she fell." We think that the judge was correct in apparently concluding that the evidence would not sustain a finding that the defendants were negligent. See Lookner v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R. 333 Mass. 555 , 556-557.
This is a petition to register a parcel of land in West Springfield. In the view we take of the case many of the facts contained in the
judge's decision need not be recited. Suffice it to say that the judge found that the petitioners acquired title to the locus under a deed from William E. Mulcahy on September 9, 1949. The deed, which was without consideration, ran to Joseph T. Mulcahy, Sr. and Raymond J. Mulcahy as joint tenants, and they were the original petitioners. The judge also found that the petitioners' title was acquired by adverse possession for the requisite period of time. Since the petition was brought Joseph died, and Raymond, the surviving joint tenant, now seeks to register the property in his name. From the decision of the judge ordering a decree that title be registered in the name of Raymond J. Mulcahy, two of the respondents (Abbie Mulcahy and Joseph T. Mulcahy, Jr.) appealed. They do not challenge the finding with respect to Raymond's title. Rather they contend that he holds the property upon a constructive trust in favor of themselves and the other respondents, all of whom comprise a family group. The judge found "that the evidence does not establish the . . . respondents' claim of a constructive trust." The respondents' appeal brings before us only questions of law apparent on the record. Findings of fact cannot be revised. G. L. c. 185, Section 15. Bacon v. Kenneson, 290 Mass. 14 , 15. The judge's decision rests on "all the evidence," but the evidence is not before us, so that we can consider only whether the specific facts found are as matter of law inconsistent with the general finding for the surviving petitioner. Bacon v. Kenneson, supra, at page 15. McCarthy v. Lane, 301 Mass. 125 , 127. We perceive no inconsistency.