The libellee appeals from a decree by the Probate Court dismissing her petition to revoke a decree nisi granting a divorce to the libellant on grounds of cruel and abusive treatment. There was no appeal from the decree nisi. The probate judge filed a report of material facts dealing with the petition to revoke the decree in which he stated that there was failure to comply with Probate Rule 45 (1959) in that a statement of objections to the decree becoming absolute did not specifically set out the facts on which the statement was founded, and such facts as were set forth were not set forth by affidavit. He appears to have arrived at correct conclusions. Without further discussion of the judge's report, it suffices to say that in addition there is sufficient before us (inclusive of the transcript of evidence of the hearing on the libel for divorce, together with a petition for separate support and an equity petition filed by the libellee, also on for hearing before the court at that time) to indicate that the court had jurisdiction of the libel. G. L. c. 208, Section 5. There was evidence which, if believed, was sufficient to establish the jurisdictional requirements. The libellee made no attempt to contradict the libellant's testimony as to his residence. See McFatridge v. McFatridge, 345 Mass. 768 , 769, and cases cited. There was evidence of cruel and abusive treatment sufficient to sustain the judge's findings. Reed v. Reed, 340 Mass. 321 , 323. There is no evidence to indicate that the libellee's petition to revoke is meritorious or substantial. Lye v. Lye, 322 Mass. 155 .
The petitioner is here on various exceptions to rulings of the trial court during the trial of a proceeding for the assessment of damages under G. L. c. 79 for the taking by the respondent of certain land and buildings located in Worcester. The taking was made by eminent domain in January
of 1967 for a renewal project. We see no error in the rulings on evidence made by the trial judge. A real estate expert who had stated his qualifications at great length was allowed to testify over the objection of the petitioner on the fair market value of the several parcels. The record makes it apparent he had a considerable background in the field and had reviewed appraisals on nearly 200 parcels of land taken by the Commonwealth in Worcester some years prior to the trial. The qualifications of the witness were for the judge, and his decision was conclusive unless upon the evidence it was erroneous as a matter of law. Klous v. Commonwealth, 188 Mass. 149 , 152. Nor was there error in permitting certain questions relative to the expert's appraisal techniques. Evidence given by the chairman of the board of assessors relative to a 1964 abatement on the assessment of the property was not erroneously admitted since in effect it did not seek to vary or add to the record of the board's acts. Carbone, Inc. v. Kelly, 289 Mass. 602 , 605. See G. L. c. 59, Section 60. Other exceptions of the petitioner are without merit.