The defendants were found guilty by a judge sitting without a jury on complaints charging violations of the gaming laws. Prior to the trial each defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence but the motions were denied subject to the defendants' exceptions. The correctness of the ruling presents the only question brought here. Although the search under the warrants was challenged on several grounds, at the arguments only one was pressed, namely, whether the affidavits were sufficient to justify a search as extensive as that called for in one of the warrants. This warrant authorized a search of the "rooms of the first floor" of the Venetian Cafe in Weymouth. The first floor consisted of two dining rooms, two rest rooms and a kitchen. The defendants contend that the warrant and affidavits are insufficient on their face to support a search of this breadth since the affidavits refer only to the activities carried on in the dining area and the kitchen. It was conceded at the arguments that the affidavits were a sufficient basis for a warrant calling for a search of the dining area and the kitchen, but, it is urged, they did not justify the issuance of a warrant covering all the rooms on the first floor of the cafe. On the basis of the affidavits, which contained detailed information as to the gaming activities carried on in the cafe, the magistrate issuing the warrant could reasonably find probable cause to believe that the first floor -- and not just the kitchen and dining area -- was being used for unlawful gaming.
[Note 1] Commonwealth vs. John H. Pica.
The libellant appeals from a decree of the Probate Court dismissing his libel for divorce on the ground of cruel and abusive treatment. The parties were married in June of 1947 and lived together off and on until December of 1951. The libellant and a witness testified that about a week before Christmas in 1951 the libellant was ill in bed with pneumonia. His wife left him and "went back to her mother's." The libellant's mother "got the doctor." The following evening his wife and her sister "came to the door and wanted to know if . . . [he] was all right. They didn't even come in the house." This was the only material evidence on the issue of cruel and abusive treatment. The probate judge ruled that the libellant "had not made out a case which would warrant . . . [a] finding that he was entitled to a divorce." We agree. Bonney v. Bonney, 175 Mass. 7 .
The libellant objects to certain portions of the judge's voluntary "Report of Material Facts" wherein he made reference to the evidence and his findings at a prior hearing in 1953 before him between the same parties. That case was a petition for separate support brought by the wife. Slavinsky v. Slavinsky 287 Mass. 28 , 31. We disregard the portion of the judge's report of material facts objected to as irrelevant and unnecessary to his decision.