This appeal brings no justiciable matter before us.
The plaintiff seeks specific performance from the defendant John D. Smith under an option to purchase a gasoline station property contained in a lease dated May 8, 1951, from Smith's grantor, Earl C. Beauregard. The defendant Margaret Bandzul, trustee, acquired title to the property from John D. Smith on October 21, 1965, and leased it to John D. Smith on October 18, 1966. All of the transactions were duly recorded. The defendants appeal from a decree of the Superior Court ordering specific performance. The sole issue is whether the plaintiff properly exercised its option by giving the notice required under the terms of the lease. The trial judge ruled "that the . . . [plaintiff's] telegram dated June 1, 1966, and the . . . [plaintiff's] letter dated July 7, 1966, directed to the . . . [defendant] Smith effectively and validly exercised the . . . [plaintiff's] option to purchase the property . . . under the terms and conditions contained in the lease of May 8, 1951." The judge's findings of fact were ample to support his ruling. There was no error. Bishop v. Eaton, 161 Mass. 496 . Berman v. Coakley, 257 Mass. 159 , 162. See Durkin v. Siegel, 340 Mass. 445 .
Decree affirmed with costs of appeal to the plaintiff.
This is an action for negligence in which the plaintiff excepted to the allowance of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence at trial, and to the refusal of the judge to allow the case to go to the jury under leave reserved. The action stems from an incident in which the plaintiff was struck in the eye by a stone while riding as a paying passenger on one of the defendant's trains, causing him to lose the sight of that eye. There was evidence indicating that the window of the vestibule through which the stone entered had probably been left open by one of the
defendant's employees and that had it been closed the stone would have ricocheted. The plaintiff was standing in the vestibule because the seats in all the cars had been taken. The conductor who took his ticket, who had been employed by the defendant for twenty-five years, did not close the window or tell the plaintiff to move into one of the cars. Although there was evidence that intentional stonings of the defendant's trains on this route had been frequent for a year preceding the incident, there was no evidence that the plaintiff knew of them. There was enough evidence indicating negligence on the part of the defendant to warrant submission of the case to the jury.