The State Tax Commission appeals from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board granting partial abatements to M S F Leasing Corp. (taxpayer) of its corporation excise for the years 1966, 1967, and 1968. The taxpayer is a domestic business corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of the American Brush Company, Inc., a domestic manufacturing corporation. The sole business of the taxpayer was leasing machinery and equipment to the parent company, which used it in manufacturing in Massachusetts. General Laws c. 63, Section 30, cl. 7, as in effect in the years in question, exempted from the corporation excise for a period of five years a portion of the value of so much of "a corporation's machinery and equipment" as was situated in Massachusetts on the last day of the taxable year, had a useful life of eight or more years, and was not subject to local taxation. St. 1962, c. 756, Section 2; St. 1966, c. 698, Sections 47, 87. The State Tax Commission concedes that the taxpayer's machinery and equipment met the necessary criteria for the exemption but contends that the exemption was intended to apply only to corporations actually engaged in manufacturing. We find nothing in the legislative history that would warrant superimposing such a requirement upon the plain, literal meaning of the statute. See Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v. State Tax Commn. 355 Mass. 592 , 596. The heading on the original 1962 House No. 3834, as amended, and Senate No. 785 is: "An Act . . . to modify the property measure of the corporation excise in order to stimulate investment in machinery and equipment and to promote new industry in the Commonwealth." The machinery and equipment of the taxpayer were used in manufacturing in Massachusetts, and thus, although not owned by a manufacturing corporation, were nonetheless performing the very function for which the exemption was designed.
Decision of the Appellate Tax Board affirmed.
The defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree of one Bress and one Dowling, and for assault and bettery with a dangerous weapon upon three other persons. He was found guilty of murder in the second degree of the two persons named, and of the crimes charged as to the other three. The defendant, after a severe, unprovoked beating at the hands of Bress and another, which started in a restaurant
and continued into the street, ran a short distance to his house. He unlocked the front door, went upstairs and unlocked the door of his apartment, looked at his bruised face in the mirror in the bathroom, removed his shotgun from its zippered case in the bedroom, took a handful of shells from his hunting jacket there, and loaded the magazine of the shotgun. He said he was going back; he hadn't done anything to them. Carrying the loaded gun, the defendant ran down the stairs and through the back door of the house and by way of backyards to the back door of the restaurant. Pushing through the half-opened door, he saw Bress and overheard him saying to another person that if he, Bress, saw the defendant again, he would kill him. The defendant said, "Here's your chance" or similar words, and, with a pumping action, firing and refiring the gun, emptied the magazine, leaving on the floor five empty shells. The pellets killed Bress and Dowling and wounded the other three, all in the immediate vicinity in the restaurant. Of these only Bress had taken part in the beating. The defendant lost the gun in a scuffle in the restaurant and ran away and hid, turning himself in to the police after he learned the results of his shooting. On these appeals under G. L. c. 278, Sections 33A-33G, the defendant claims error in the judge's refusal to charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter with regard to the killing of Dowling; the judge charged as to murder and voluntary manslaughter regarding both Bress and Dowling. The judge would be required to charge on involuntary manslaughter if the evidence provided a basis for it, see Commonwealth v. Kinney, 361 Mass. 709 , 712, but upon a reading of the transcript we agree with the trial judge that there was no such basis. See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 356 Mass. 442 , 445. We are asked in all events to exercise our powers under Section 33E and direct the entry of a verdict of manslaughter with respect to Bress and Dowling, but we do not find this to be an appropriate case. The defendant was hurt and angered by the assault but there was a space of time thereafter for reflection. Compare Commonwealth v. Rollins, 354 Mass. 630 , 635, Commonwealth v. Boyer, 355 Mass. 762 , 764-765, Commonwealth v. Hicks, 356 Mass. 442 , 446, and Commonwealth v. Talbert, 357 Mass. 146 , 148, with Commonwealth v. Baker, 346 Mass. 107 , 119, Commonwealth v. Ransom, 358 Mass. 580 , 583-584, and Commonwealth v. Kinney, supra, at 713.