JOHN T. BERRIAULT & others vs. WAREHAM FIRE DISTRICT & others.

REARDON, J. In this case, by our decision on October 20, 1971, 360 Mass. 160, we held that St. 1969, c. 407, did not suffice to cure certain defects in procedures followed by the defendants in levying betterment assessments incident to supplying water to the area known as West Wareham. The fact situation which confronted the court was thoroughly recited in the 1971 case and need not be repeated here since the question we decide concerns the adequacy of new curative legislation, St. 1972, c. 515, [Note 1] the provisions of which are to be applied to the same facts. This new statute

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is to be compared with St. 1969, c. 407, the subject of the earlier opinion. [Note 2]

We refer first to the title of the statute which is broad in scope and, as argued by the defendants, gives evidence of clear legislative intent to validate betterment assessments notwithstanding that the Wareham fire district had previously failed to comply with Sections 42G-42I of c. 40, and Sections 1 and 2 of c. 80 of the General Laws in making those assessments. A comparison of titles of the two statutes indicates the greater breadth of St. 1972, c. 515. We have had occasion in the past to refer to the importance of titles as an aid to interpretation of legislative intent. Commonwealth v. Jarrett, 359 Mass. 491, 495 n.5 (1971). We

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stated in Canton v. Bruno, 361 Mass. 598, 606-607 (1972), that a "validating statute, by its very title, is one designed to cure past errors, omissions, and neglects, and thus to make valid that which before its enactment was invalid." See Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Milk Control Commn. 340 Mass. 672, 678 (1960). We noted in the previous Berriault case that the 1969 statute did not "cure the defects in the district's action under c. 40, Sections 42G and 42H," and we further said that a "validating, curative statute, which `may affect personal or property rights [here liability of particular land to betterment assessments and liens] . . . should be precise and clear.'" 360 Mass. at 165. The vice in the 1969 statute has now been cured in Section 1 of the 1972 statute in language which is precise and clear. We view St. 1972, c. 515, thus as curative and also retrospective and meeting the test of Loriol v. Keene, 343 Mass. 358, 362 (1961), which calls for precision and clarity in curative statutes. See Opinion of the Justices, 360, Mass. 894, 898 (1971), and cases there cited. We view the legislation as a confirmation and validation of the act of the Wareham fire district originally void because of noncompliance with the law, and as an act which the General Court could have originally authorized. See Donnelly v. Dover-Sherborn Regional Sch. Dist. 341 Mass. 497, 501 (1960); Canton v. Bruno, 361 Mass. 598, 606-607 (1972).

In so concluding we note that the interpretation we give the corrective statute is in harmony with the Constitution of the Commonwealth and will effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Assessors of Newton v. Pickwick Ltd. Inc. 351 Mass. 621 (1967). First Natl. Bank v. Attorney Gen. 362 Mass. 570, 579 (1972). Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm. in the Dept. of Community Affairs, 363 Mass. 339, 354 (1973). It is further without question that every presumption must be indulged "in favor of the validity of a legislative enactment." Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 358 Mass. 686, 694 (1971). In short, it is our view that St. 1972, c. 515, accomplishes the legislative purpose which led to its

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enactment. We see no need to discuss other questions which have been raised by the parties.

It follows that the final decree is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for an entry of a new final decree upholding the validity of St. 1972, c. 515, as a valid curative and retrospective act, and in other respects defining the rights of the parties conformably to this opinion.

So ordered.