A single justice of this court denied a petition of the plaintiff (Slotnick) and Slotnick appealed. In his petition Slotnick sought relief under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), and G. L. c. 211, Section 3, from dismissal of a prior action brought by Slotnick against the three defendants. That action was commenced in the Superior Court in August, 1972, and the defendants' demurrers were sustained later that year. Slotnick appealed. Judgment of dismissal was entered on December 5, 1978, under Mass. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) (1), 365 Mass. 803 (1974), for lack of prosecution of the appeal. Slotnick commenced the instant action in the county court on June 23, 1981, seeking reinstatement of the action which had been dismissed. As grounds for his petition Slotnick recites various allegations against the attorneys and against a Superior Court judge, in conclusory words without any specific and relevant factual allegations. After a hearing, the single justice denied the petition. There was no error. On the sparse record before us, there is neither allegation nor proof that warrants relief under either rule 60 (b) or G. L. c. 211, Section 3. The order of the single justice denying the petition is affirmed.
The plaintiff's brief represents that
this is a consolidated appeal of (1) denial by a single justice of this court of the plaintiff's motion for relief from the judgment which ensued by reason of this court's decision in Matter of an Application for Admission to the Bar of the Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 795 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980), and (2) dismissal by the single justice of a new complaint filed by the plaintiff. Both matters deal with the plaintiff's claim that she is entitled to be admitted to the Massachusetts Bar. In her brief the plaintiff asserts, inter alia, that she was not afforded a hearing on her complaint, that there was a contract by which the Board of Bar Examiners and a single justice of this court agreed to admit her as an attorney, and that there is newly discovered evidence on the matter previously litigated in the 1979 case. There is nothing before us other than the bare assertions of the plaintiff's brief. Not even a copy of the complaint is offered. Aside from the obvious fact that it would be extraordinary, or impossible, for the plaintiff to show that she is entitled by "contract" to be admitted to the Bar, it is apparent from the assertions of her brief that her present contentions are merely a restatement of the unsuccessful claims she offered in 1979.
Decision of the single justice affirmed.