Brown contested before the Appellate Tax Board (board) the board of assessors' (assessors) valuation of three parcels of real property owned by Brown. The assessors filed pleas in bar based upon Brown's failure to comply with requests for information made to him by the assessors under G. L. c. 59, Section 38D (1984 ed.). The board allowed the pleas in bar and ordered dismissal of Brown's appeals.

General Laws c. 58A, Section 13 (1984 ed.), provides in relevant part: "The board shall make a decision in each case heard by it and may make findings of fact and report thereon in writing . . . the board shall make such findings and report thereon if so requested by either party . . . If no party requests such findings and report, all parties shall be deemed, to have waived all rights of appeal . . . upon questions as to the admission or exclusion of evidence, or as to whether a finding was warranted by the evidence."

In some circumstances, the failure of a property owner to comply with requests for information under G. L. c. 59, Section 38D, is a bar to a statutory appeal of the assessors' determinations. Brown now raises issues of statutory interpretation as to the validity of the requests for information which the assessors sent to him. Brown's appeal must fail because there are no findings of fact or report of the board before us, nor did either party request such findings or report. We have no way of knowing what took place before the board; consequently, no question of law is presented to us for decision. Assessors of Norwood v. Barton, 384 Mass. 699 (1981). See Fox Ridge Assocs. & Co. v. Assessors of Marshfield, 387 Mass. 1002 (1982), appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 801 (1983).

Decisions of the Appellate Tax Board affirmed.

The review examiner found that the claimant was so dissatisfied with a salary increase from her employer, the Beverly Savings Bank, that she first accepted

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and then returned two paychecks which reflected the increase. When a vice president of the employer told her that she had to be paid for her services and that if she would not accept the salary in the amount offered, she would have to leave, she left.

The review examiner ruled that her discharge was a voluntary leaving "without good cause attributable to the employing unit." G. L. c. 151A, Section 25 (e)(1) (1984 ed.). The claimant's application for review was denied (G. L. c. 151A, Section 40 [1984 ed.]), rendering the review examiner's decision the decision of the board of review. G. L. c. 151A, Section 41 (1984 ed.). The claimant appealed to a District Court which affirmed the decision of the board of review. G. L. c. 151A, Section 42 (1984 ed.). She then appealed to this court. We affirm.

The statute [Section 25 (e)(1)] "establishes two distinct prerequisites to temporary disqualification from unemployment benefits. The departure from work must be both (1) voluntary and (2) without good cause attributable to the employing unit or its agent." Raytheon Co. v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 364 Mass. 593, 596 (1974). The claimant has failed to carry her burden on these issues. Cantres v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 396 Mass. 226, 231 (1985).

As to involuntariness, she has failed to meet a test which has had our approval for many years by demonstrating that she was "thrown out of work through no fault of [her] own." Howes Bros. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 296 Mass. 275, 282, cert. denied, 300 U.S. 657 (1936), quoted with approval in Olmeda v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 394 Mass. 1002, 1003 (1985).

The claimant also failed to carry her burden of proving that her departure was founded on good cause attributable to her employer. She left because she was disappointed in the size of her salary increase. We have decided that such disappointment does not constitute good cause attributable to the employer. See Fanion v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 391 Mass. 848, 852 (1984).

Judgment affirmed.