ALLIANCE, AFSCME/SEIU, AFL-CIO vs. SECRETARY OF ADMINISTRATION & others [Note 1] (and two companion cases [Note 2]).

LYNCH, J. In these consolidated actions the plaintiffs, three State employee labor unions (unions), [Note 3] seek a declaration

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under G. L. c. 231A, Section 2 (1990 ed.), that the various wage increases and other cost items contained in certain collective bargaining agreements with the Commonwealth are enforceable. Two of the unions also seek mandatory relief requiring the defendants to take all steps necessary to pay the wage increases, even without any legally effective appropriations. The cases are here on reservation and report by a single justice based on the plaintiffs' complaints, the defendants' motion to dismiss, and the parties' statement of agreed facts. We conclude that the increases have not become effective and are not enforceable.

1. Facts. We summarize the statement of agreed facts as follows: After negotiations between the unions and the Commonwealth, five collective bargaining agreements were executed on December 15, 1990, and January 2, 1991, in the final days of the administration of the outgoing Governor. [Note 4] The then Secretary of Administration signed the collective bargaining agreements on behalf of the Commonwealth, and the Alliance, MOSES, and NAGE signed the agreements on behalf of their respective collective bargaining units. All the contracts are for the period July 1, 1990, through June 30, 1993, and called for a thirteen per cent wage increase to be phased in over the course of three years and for increases in various payroll costs such as shift differentials, weekend differentials, and employer contributions to the health and welfare fund. Each agreement contained an article entitled "Appropriation by the General Court," which included the following: "The cost items contained in this Agreement shall not become effective unless appropriations necessary to fully

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fund the cost items have been enacted by the General Court in accordance with M.G.L. c. 150E, section 7." [Note 5]

On February 1, 1991, the Governor submitted five bills to the Legislature requesting appropriations to fund the wage and cost item increases for fiscal year 1991 (FY 1991), the first year of the agreements. [Note 6] The Governor also sent a written message to the Legislature urging that the bills be rejected "[i]n light of the extraordinarily difficult fiscal circumstances now facing the Commonwealth, for both the current fiscal year and the ensuing one, and in light of other significant cost items for existing employee benefits which the Administration did not negotiate and cannot support and which would be continued under the recently signed agreements."

On December 17, 1991, the House, and on December 20, the Senate, approved the bills which were then laid before the Governor. On December 30, 1991, the day the Legislature was to adjourn, the Governor returned the bills to the Legislature unsigned. Accompanying each bill was a message noting the financial problems of the Commonwealth and that the agreements' provisions for wage increases were "not in any way performance based which is the philosophy" of the current administration. Additionally, the Governor asked the Legislature to amend the bills to provide that funding the first year of the agreements would not make them effective.

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for the entire three-year term, and he also proposed that G. L. c. 150E (1990 ed.), be amended to relieve a successor employer from the obligation to abide by and secure funding for a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by a predecessor. [Note 7]

The Legislature adjourned without taking further action on the bills.

The unions contend that the cost items, specifically the wage increases, became effective once the Legislature "passed" the bills approving the funding, notwithstanding the Governor's refusal to sign the bills, because the bills were "enacted" in the sense required by G. L. c. 150E, Section 7, and the agreements. The unions claim that, even if the Governor's signature was necessary, he was statutorily and contractually obligated to sign the bills. The unions also argue that the increases became effective as soon as the agreements were executed, and that the subsequent submission and passage of the appropriation bills was not necessary, because the general appropriations act for FY 1991, which was in effect,

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already contained sufficient funding for the increases. We do not agree. [Note 8]

2. Analysis. The unions misunderstand the enactment process, the constitutional powers of the Governor, and the roles of the Governor and Legislature in relation to appropriations.

The power to appropriate money is exclusively that of the Legislature. Bromfield v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 390 Mass. 665, 670 n.9 (1983). Opinion of the Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 612, 616 (1939). The Governor, however, has the power to disapprove an appropriation entirely. Barnes v. Secretary of Admin., 411 Mass. 822, 826 (1992). Opinion of the Justices, 294 Mass. 616, 620 (1936). Furthermore, although the words "enact" and "enacted" in art. 63, Sections 3 and 4, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, refer solely to legislative action, see Opinion of the Justices, 300 Mass. 630, 640 (1938), "those words . . . are also used to indicate not only action by the Legislature but also approval by the Governor." Opinion of the Justices, 370 Mass. 869, 872 (1976). "Our system contemplates action by both the legislative and executive branches before a bill may be enacted into law." Opinion of the Justices, 384 Mass. 840, 844-845 (1981). Accordingly, a bill may become law only with the Governor's approval by signature, by his acquiescence, or by a legislative override of his veto. Tuttle v. Boston, 215 Mass. 57, 59 (1913). The governing statute, G. L. c. 150E, Section 7, and the agreements themselves recognize the necessity for a valid appropriation to fund the cost items of the agreements. The public employment practices of the Commonwealth similarly require both legislative and executive action to fund collective bargaining agreements on a local level as well. See Labor Relations Comm'n v. Selectmen of Dracut, 374 Mass. 619 (1978). The unions, therefore, cannot prevail in the absence of a valid appropriation. Chapter 150E does not eliminate the need for the Governor's signature on an appropriation bill. Even where, as here, the Governor proposes

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the bill, the Governor's approval of the bill cannot be presumed, nor can presentment to the Governor be dispensed with as a mere formality. Opinion of the Justices, 375 Mass. 827, 838 (1978). Since an appropriation requires gubernatorial and legislative action, there have been no "appropriations . . . to fully fund the cost items" since there has been no appropriation bill enacted into law to fund those items.

In arguing to the contrary the unions seek to fractionalize the law-making process by claiming that the funding bills were "enacted" absent gubernatorial action or that the acts of a previous administration somehow impinged on the constitutionally mandated discretion of the next. We decline to adopt such a strained and constitutionally questionable interpretation of the statute and the agreements. Both required the Governor to submit an appropriation request to the Legislature, but the request for legislative action is not a substitute for exercise of the Governor's independent prerogatives. See Labor Relations Comm'n v. Selectmen of Dracut, supra at 626. See also Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. School Comm. of Boston, 370 Mass. 455, 474-475 (1976). The Governor was not required to sign the appropriation bills nor could he have been since the act of signing is a constitutionally granted discretionary power. See Part II, c. 1, Section 1, art. 2, of the Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by art. 90, Section 1, of the Amendments; art. 63, Section 5, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by art. 90, Section 4, of the Amendments; art. 56 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by art. 90, Section 3, of the Amendments. [Note 9] Obviously, when the Governor returned to the

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Legislature the unsigned bills with amendments, he did not approve those bills. Because the Governor neither signed the funding bills nor acquiesced in them, and since there has been no legislative override, no appropriation was enacted into law. Consequently, there was no appropriation to fund the cost items of the agreements and the cost items never became effective.

There is also no basis to the unions' claim that the appropriation bills became law because art. 56 did not authorize the Governor to return them to the Legislature. "It is a fundamental principle of constitutional construction that every word and phrase in the Constitution was intended and has meaning." Powers v. Secretary of Admin., 412 Mass. 119, 124 (1992). "Words occurring in different places in the Constitution and its amendments ordinarily should be given the same meaning unless manifestly used in different senses." Raymer v. Tax Comm'r, 239 Mass. 410, 412 (1921). Although art. 63, Section 5, specifically grants the Governor a selective veto power over appropriation bills. [Note 10] see Opinion of the Justices, 375 Mass. 827, 834 (1978), there is nothing in that amendment, or in any other, that suggests that the broad powers conferred on the Governor under art. 56 are inapplicable to appropriation bills or that art. 63 is the exclusive

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constitutional provision applicable to appropriations bills. Rather, art. 56 grants the Governor the right to return any bill or resolve and does not except appropriation bills. [Note 11] Moreover, the item veto power under art. 63 is an essential gubernatorial check on the legislative power of appropriation and was intended to supplement, rather than supplant, the Governor's unitary veto power granted in Part II, c. 1, Section 1, art. 2, of the Massachusetts Constitution. [Note 12] Opinion of the Justices, 384 Mass. 820, 824 (1981). Considering the similarly broad language of Part II, c. 1, Section 1, art. 2, it follows that art. 63 also does not supplant or limit art. 56. We therefore conclude that the Governor, as he did in this case, may return any bill, and he may recommend any amendment or amendments to any bill, including appropriation bills.

Likewise, there is no merit to the unions' claim that the cost items became effective when the agreements were signed because, as they argue, there were sufficient funds in the general appropriations act of FY 1991. The language of the agreements referencing G. L. c. 150E, Section 7, and obligating the Governor to request appropriations from the Legislature

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clearly contemplates appropriations subsequent to the execution of the agreements in order to fund the cost items. See G. L. c. 150E, Section 7 (b), which clearly envisions appropriations enacted "after the . . . agreement is executed." Neither is there any reference to funding from a general appropriation nor is there a single line item in the budget of FY 1991 devoted to funding the agreements. There has been no "appropriation" as that term is used in the contracts and as has been hereinabove explained. [Note 13]

The unions' claim of due process violations under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (1988) and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as arts. 1, 10, and 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights also fails. These claims are premised on a deprivation of contractual and statutory rights and presume the effectiveness of the cost items. As discussed above, the cost items remain unfunded and have never been given legally binding effect. Therefore, the rights the unions have under the contract and the statute have not been violated.

In conclusion, we direct that a judgment enter in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk declaring that the cost items have never become effective and dismissing the plaintiffs' other claims for relief.

So ordered.