Timothy-Michael Joseph Bloom (petitioner) appeals pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, 421 Mass. 1303 (1995), from the denial of relief by a single justice of this court. A Superior Court judge had denied his "motion for attorney-client communication."

Rule 2:21 (2) requires that the petitioner "set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means." The petitioner, who has been indicted for murder in the first degree, and is confined in the departmental disciplinary unit at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Cedar Junction, sought, through his motion below, access to a telephone up to three times a week so he may communicate with counsel.

He now contends that for any relief to be meaningful, it must be granted prior to trial. We review interlocutory rulings in criminal cases only in the most exceptional circumstances. Gilday v. Commonwealth, 360 Mass. 170, 171 (1971). The petitioner must show that he has a substantial claim that an important substantive right of his is being violated, and that the error is irreversible. Costarelli v. Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 677, 679 (1978).

Although the petitioner makes the succinct assertion noted above, he does not provide the requisite explanation which would satisfy the tests to which we refer.

Judgment affirmed.

The plaintiff (petitioner), which had sought relief from an interlocutory ruling of the Superior Court, appeals to the full court under S.J.C. Rule 2:21, 421 Mass. 1303 (1995), from a single justice's denial of relief under G. L. c. 211, s. 3. [Note 1]

Rule 2:21 (2) requires that a petitioner "set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means." The Superior Court judge had denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss claims, preclude the use of privileged information, and disqualify counsel. The petitioner focuses its argument to us on only the claim of use of privileged information; mentions the disclosure of "confidences and secrets"; and refers to the use of "those secrets to advance his claims" (emphasis added). We read the Superior Court judge's decision as pertaining solely to "the information divulged by Lochlin," a senior officer of the petitioner, which the judge concluded was not confidential and that communication of it by Afrow to his attorney would not

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breach client confidences. The judge also stated that if the information divulged by Lochlin were privileged, Afrow had not violated an ethical rule by relaying it to his attorneys for purposes of this litigation. We are not persuaded by the petitioner's argument that review on appeal or by other means would be inadequate. [Note 2]

Judgment affirmed.