Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Civil, Appeal, Bond.
The petitioner appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying her petition under G. L. c. 211, s. 3. We affirm.
The petition requests that the single justice grant relief from a decision of a single justice of the Appeals Court, pursuant to G. L. c. 239, s. 5, declining to waive an appeal bond in an underlying summary process action that originated in the Housing Court. The single justice of this court correctly denied the c. 211, s. 3, petition because the petitioner had an alternative remedy. The proper course for her to have followed, if she wished further to challenge the bond, was to refuse to pay the bond, suffer the dismissal of her summary process appeal, and then appeal to the Appeals Court (on the limited bond issue) from the order of dismissal. Ford v. Braman, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 968 , 970 (1991). See PGR Mgt. Co. v. Credle, 427 Mass. 636 , 638-639 (1998); Tamber v. Desrochers, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 234 (1998); Home Sav. Bank v. Camillo, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 910 (1998).
We do not decide various claims raised by the appellant that were not raised before the single justice. Nor do we express any view on the merits of her claims concerning the bond.
Sandra M. Singer, pro se.
Stewart A. Engel (Jonathon Wagner with him) for Diana Davis.
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law.
Michael A. Molloy for the plaintiff.
Walter E. Palmer (petitioner) appeals pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, 421 Mass. 1303 (1995), from the denial of relief by a single justice of this court. A Superior Court judge had denied the petitioner's motion to continue his trial on certain indictments "until civil actions for the same causes pending against him be tried or otherwise disposed of."
Rule 2:21 (2) requires that the petitioner "set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means." The petitioner asserts that if a trial on the indictments precedes the civil proceedings, and if he is convicted, the plaintiffs in the subsequently tried civil action would be precluded from recovering (from him) under a certain professional
liability policy. This statement of potential impact on those plaintiffs does not constitute the requisite explanation why review on appeal, or by other available means, would be inadequate.