Peter E. Phillips appeals from the denial of his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition by a single justice of this court. We affirm.

Phillips filed a motion in the Probate Court for the production of audiotape recordings of certain proceedings and transcriptions of those recordings at no cost, pursuant to G. L. c. 261, §§ 27A-27D. A judge in the Probate Court allowed the motion in part and denied it in part. Phillips then appealed to a single justice of the Appeals Court under G. L. c. 261, § 27D. The single justice dismissed the appeal as untimely and lacking in merit. Phillips then sought relief through his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition. The case is now before us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001).

The decision of the single justice of the Appeals Court is, in accordance with G. L. c. 261, § 27D, final. See Hurley v. Superior Court Dep't of the Trial Court, 424 Mass. 1008, 1009 (1997). "Rarely should we employ our superintendence power to review rulings in matters in which the Legislature has expressly stated that the decision of another court or judge 'shall be final' " (citation omitted). Id. See Im v. Commonwealth, 432 Mass. 1018, 1019 (2000). The single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in declining to exercise his power under G. L. c. 211, § 3. Judgment affirmed.

The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law.

Peter E. Phillips, pro se.

Kurt Hospot appeals from the denial of his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, by a single justice of this court. Hospot had sought relief from

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orders of a judge in the Housing Court granting partial summary judgment for Samson Lumpkin in the circumstances described below, and striking certain expert affidavits proffered by Hospot. [Note 2] We affirm the judgment of the single justice.

Lumpkin commenced an action in the Housing Court against Kurt Hospot; Raymond Hospot; and Bellco Realty, Inc., claiming damages as a result of lead poisoning allegedly contracted in the apartment where he was living. Lumpkin's complaint alleged three counts: violations of G. L. c. 111, §§ 190 et seq.; G. L. c. 186, § 14; and G. L. c. 93A. On Lumpkin's motion, the judge ordered the entry of partial summary judgment for Lumpkin on the issue of liability on the first and third counts. [Note 3] The judge concluded that the extent of Lumpkin's injuries and damages remained a matter for trial.

Hospot has filed a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). Because the entry of partial summary judgment and the order striking affidavits were interlocutory orders, we consider whether Hospot has "set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means." S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (2). Hospot claims that an appeal from a final adverse judgment would be an inadequate remedy because, by that time, he would have been deprived of a fair trial on the remaining issues in the case owing to the Housing Court judge's having already ruled against him on the question of liability on two of the counts. [Note 4] That claim is unconvincing. First, Hospot may, on appeal from a final adverse judgment, challenge the propriety of the Housing Court judge's orders granting partial summary judgment and striking affidavits. See Spring v. Geriatric Auth. of Holyoke, 394 Mass. 274, 279, 282-286 (1985); Krasnecky v. Meffen, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 418, 420 (2002). Second, Hospot has offered no adequate explanation why he cannot, on appeal from a final adverse judgment, challenge the fairness of his trial on the remaining issues if, as he claims, the trial is tainted by the interlocutory order granting partial summary judgment. Hospot has failed, therefore, to meet his burden under rule 2:21 (2).

The judgment of the single justice is affirmed.

So ordered.

The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law.

John J. Regan for the defendant.