STEVEN ALVES'S CASE.

IRELAND, J. General Motors Corporation (General Motors), as a workers' compensation self-insurer, compensated Steven Alves for a work-related injury. Because it was Alves's second injury, General Motors was entitled to reimbursement of some of that compensation, pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 37. The reviewing board of the Department of Industrial Accidents (board) held that there is no statute of limitations applicable to General Motors's filing its claim for reimbursement, where Alves's injury occurred while the 1985 version of the statute was in effect. The Workers' Compensation Trust Fund (Fund) appealed to the Appeals Court. We granted the Fund's application for direct appellate review and now affirm the decision of the board.

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Background and procedure. In order "to encourage the employment of previously injured persons," Daly v. Commonwealth, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 100, 101-102 (1990), citing G. L. c. 152, § 37, as appearing in St. 1973, c. 855, §§ 2, 5, the Legislature created a fund to provide some reimbursement to workers' compensation insurers for compensation they pay if such an employee suffers a subsequent injury. The insurer's eligibility for reimbursement does not begin until it pays the first 104 weeks of compensation. St. 1973, c. 855, § 2. General Laws c. 152, § 37, was further amended in 1985. That amendment increased the amount of reimbursement an insurer could recoup from fifty per cent to seventy-five per cent. St. 1985, c. 572, § 48. It also created the Fund. G. L. c. 152, § 65, as appearing in St. 1985, c. 572, § 55. Money for the Fund comes from an assessment on employers. Id. See Daly v. Commonwealth, supra at 103. Most relevant to our purposes is that the 1985 version of G. L. c. 152, § 37, did not contain a statute of limitations on the filing of reimbursement claims by insurers.

In 1991, § 37 was amended again to add a two-year statute of limitations on the filing of claims for reimbursement for injuries occurring after December 23, 1991. St. 1991, c. 398 §§ 71, 111. [Note 1] The Legislature specifically made the amendment to § 37 "substantive," St. 1991, c. 398, § 106, i.e., the changes were to be applied only prospectively. Austin v. Boston Univ. Hosp., 372 Mass. 654, 657 (1977). See Mills v. Continental Transp. Network, Inc., 44 Mass. App. Ct. 916, 916 (1998), citing G. L. c. 152, § 2A (1991 amendment to G. L. c. 152, § 66, allowing twenty-year statute of limitations on actions against employer, was prospective only).

Steven Alves was employed by General Motors. He suffered a work-related injury within the meaning of G. L. c. 152, § 37, in January, 1987. General Motors began paying reimbursable weekly benefits to Alves on March 10, 1989, ending with a lump-sum payment on March 8, 1991. In April, 2003, General

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Motors filed its claim for reimbursement for its payments beginning in March, 1989. It is uncontested that the 1985 version of § 37 applies to the reimbursement claim.

In July, 2003, at a conference before an administrative judge, held pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 10A, the Fund was ordered to reimburse General Motors. [Note 2] The Fund requested a hearing, which was held before another administrative judge. The Fund argued that a statute of limitations should be read into the 1985 version of § 37 and thus General Motors's claim was time barred. [Note 3] In his written decision of March, 2005, the administrative judge stated that he was bound by the board's decision in Walsh v. Bertolino Beef Co., 16 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rptr. 151, 153-154 (2002) (Walsh), where the exact issue was raised and rejected by the board. [Note 4]

The Fund appealed and the board summarily affirmed the judge's decision, in December, 2005. The Fund appealed to the Appeals Court. G. L. c. 152, § 12 (2). [Note 5]

Discussion. As the Fund points out, its appeal focuses on "a discrete legal issue concerning the timeliness of the self-insurer's petition for reimbursement" pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 37. That "discrete legal issue" involves the validity of the board's interpretation of the 1985 version of § 37. "The interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with primary responsibility for administering it is entitled to substantial deference." Gateley's Case, 415 Mass. 397, 399 (1993). The party challenging the board's decision bears a "heavy" burden of proving that the decision is invalid. Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v.

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Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 448 Mass. 45, 51 (2006), citing Box Pond Ass'n v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 435 Mass. 408, 412 (2001).

The Fund's argument is premised on the assumption that where a statute does not specify a statute of limitations, courts always borrow one. [Note 6] Because the 1985 version of § 37 contains no statute of limitations, it follows, according to the Fund, that the board erred in not borrowing a statute of limitations. The Fund suggests that the most analogous statutes from which to borrow would be either G. L. c. 152, § 41 (four years), or G. L. c. 260, § 3A (three years). [Note 7]

Although it is true that courts often borrow a statute of limitations when none is supplied, it is not always the case. See State Bd. of Retirement v. Woodward, 446 Mass. 698, 708 (2006) (no

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statute of limitations in G. L. c. 32, § 15 [4], because of Legislature's clear expression); O'Brien v.Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 405 Mass. 439, 445 (1989) (G. L. c. 260, § 7, tolling statute has unlimited statute of limitations for mentally ill). We also must give substantial deference to the board's interpretation of G. L. c. 152, unless it is incorrect. Kszepka's Case, 408 Mass. 843, 846-847 (1990) (board erred in interpreting mandatory language in statute). Moreover, if there is any ambiguity in a statute, "the reviewing board's interpretation of the statute is entitled to our deference." McCarty's Case, 445 Mass. 361, 367 (2005), citing Richards's Case, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 701, 706 (2004).

As the administrative judge stated in his written decision in this case, the board had already analyzed, in Walsh, the statute of limitations issue raised by the 1985 version of the statute. In Walsh, supra, the board first quoted the administrative judge at length, whose decision pointed out:

"Within its various Sections, the statute contains explicit language limiting the period for which certain benefits shall be paid, limitations on when various notices must be filed by employers and insurers, and also contains limitations on the time within which certain claims for benefits must be filed. Thus, the Legislature included specific limitations where it wanted them to be applied -- and conversely, excluded them where it did not want limitations to apply. Only in the most arcane and unlikely circumstances would it be necessary or appropriate to find guidance in analogous statutes than within the Workers' Compensation Act itself. . . . [Moreover if] the Legislature felt that the Trust Fund would have been prejudiced in some way that required retroactive application of this [1991] limitations period, then it could have enacted a retroactive limitation on petitions, an action it specifically chose not to do here."

Id. at 152.

In its Walsh appeal, the Fund urged the board to borrow statutes of limitations, particularly G. L. c. 152, § 41, or G. L. c. 260, § 2. Id. at 153- 154. The board rejected these arguments for several reasons. It stated that the entire concept of borrowing as it pertains to § 37 had "no bearing on the [Walsh] case." Id. at 153, citing

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Nantucket v. Beinecke, 379 Mass. 345 (1979). The board relied on the 1991 amendment to § 37 with its explicit prospective application to conclude:

"To apply this statute of limitations to the 1985 version of § 37 would render the Legislature's prospective characterization of this provision utterly meaningless. Indeed, if the Legislature had intended the new statute of limitations to have retroactive application, 'it would have been natural for the Legislature to express such an intention,' as it did for the vast majority of the amendments enacted in 1991. See St. 1991, c. 398, § 107. Where there is such a plain and rational meaning to be applied, we are obliged to apply it, rather than set off on an interpretive quest. See O'Brien v. M.B.T.A., 405 Mass. 439, 443-444 (1989), quoting Commonwealth v. Vickey, 381 Mass. 762, 767 (1980) ('a basic tenet of statutory construction is to give the words their plain meaning in light of the aim of the Legislature, and when the statute appears not to provide for an eventuality, there is no justification for judicial legislation')."

Id. at 154.

Moreover, the board explicitly rejected the Fund's argument that the board should borrow the statute of limitations from G. L. c. 152, § 41, as "meritless," stating that § 41 covers employee claims for compensation, whereas § 37 covers claims for reimbursement. [Note 8] Id. at 154. See Mills v. Continental Transp. Network, Inc., 44 Mass. App. Ct. 916, 916 (1998) (rejecting employee's request to borrow statute of limitations from § 41 for G. L. c. 152, § 66, where action was one in tort for damages and not workers' compensation claim). The board also rejected the application of G. L. c. 260, § 2, because it had previously concluded that rights and obligations under § 37 are not contract based. Id. at 154, citing Carmilia v. General Elec.,

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15 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rptr. 261, 275 (2001). [Note 9] See Ahmed's Case, 278 Mass. 180, 184 (1932) (workers' compensation act "creates rights and remedies and procedures all its own, not previously known to the common or statutory law").

Although it is outside the record in this case, we note that the Fund appealed from the Walsh decision to a single justice of the Appeals Court. The appeal was dismissed because the Fund and the insurer settled.

We will not substitute our judgment for that of an administrative agency if its interpretation of a statute is reasonable. Massachusetts Med. Soc'y v. Commissioner of Ins., 402 Mass. 44, 62 (1988). In its singular focus on its premise that the board erred in Walsh because courts always borrow a statute of limitation where none is indicated, the Fund does not explain how the board's interpretation of the 1985 version of the statute, including the board's rejection of borrowing from other statutes, is unreasonable. [Note 10] Thus the Fund has not met its heavy burden in this case.

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It is not unreasonable for the board to conclude that incorporating any statute of limitations into the 1985 version of the statute renders meaningless the prospective nature of the 1991 amendment. "[I]f possible a statute is to be interpreted in harmony with prior enactments to give rise to a consistent body of law." Hadley v. Amherst, 372 Mass. 46, 51 (1977), citing Everett v. Revere, 344 Mass. 585, 589 (1962) (court's "interpretation results in a harmonious body of law and explains the subsequent enactments"). Cf. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 371 Mass. 186, 193-194 (1976) (Legislature's failure to enact proposed bill amending G. L. c. 151B was "hazardous basis" on which to infer intent of earlier version of statute). It also is not unreasonable for the board to have concluded that, in expressly adding a prospective statute of limitations, the Legislature manifested its intent that

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the 1985 version of the statute have no statute of limitations. Walsh, supra at 153. Cf. Ferguson v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 316 Mass. 318, 323 (1944) (court will not read discriminatory tax provision into statute where Legislature has not provided "any indication of an intention so to discriminate"). In addition, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the board's interpretation is in keeping with the purpose of § 37 (facilitating the rehiring of injured workers) by making sure that insurers are reimbursed. Our conclusion is consistent with this "remedial statute," Walker's Case, 443 Mass. 157, 161 (2004), where the Legislature anticipated that second injuries caused more serious disabilities. Daly v. Commonwealth, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 100, 102 (1990). See School Comm. of Wellesley v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 376 Mass. 112, 116 (1978), quoting Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Department of Pub. Health, 372 Mass. 844, 850 (1977) (agency's interpretation of statute given deference "particularly 'where [it] must interpret a legislative policy which is only broadly set out in the governing statute' ").

The Fund argues that concluding that no statute of limitations applies to the 1985 version of the statute would cause present employers to be assessed unfairly for the costs of reimbursements and benefit those employers who went underassessed in the 1985-1991 period. We do not consider this argument because, as the Fund concedes, there is nothing in the record indicating that this issue was raised before the board and no evidence that it is true. [Note 11]

We are aware that the board's interpretation of the statute results in insurers that made payments for injuries that occurred between 1985 and 1991 having an unlimited time to file claims for reimbursement pursuant to § 37, whereas insurers who pay for injuries sustained after 1991 only have two years in which to file for reimbursement. However, the Legislature is presumed

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to intend and understand all the consequences of its actions. Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., 417 Mass. 580, 583 (1994). Inconsistencies are for the Legislature to remedy. See Louis's Case, 424 Mass. 136, 142-143 (1997) (legislative amendments to G. L. c. 152, § 35, created differing benefits for workers injured at different times; inconsistency requires legislative attention). In addition, because we presume that the Legislature is aware of the 2002 decision by the board in Walsh (a presumption not addressed by the dissent) and has not acted to amend the statute, we cannot state that the board's continual reliance on its holding in Walsh is unreasonable. McCarty's Case, 445 Mass. 361, 366 (2005) (Legislature presumed to be aware of reviewing board decisions). See Nelson v. Neles Jamesbury, Inc., 16 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rptr. 172, 173 (2002) (quoting analysis in Walsh case to reject Fund's argument that board should borrow statute of limitations for 1985 version of G. L. c. 152, § 37). [Note 12]

Conclusion. For the reasons set forth above, the Fund has not met its burden to show that the board's interpretation of the statute is unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the board's decision.

So ordered.

BOTSFORD, J. (dissenting, with whom Marshall, C.J., and Cordy, J., join). The court today in effect holds that, while all employees who have suffered or suffer second injuries must file for compensation within four years, [Note Botsford-1] and insurers who have compensated employees for post-1991 second injuries must file for reimbursement within two years of the payments for which they seek to be reimbursed, [Note Botsford-2] insurers who have compensated employees for second injuries occurring during the six-year period

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between 1985 and 1991 have an unlimited time in which to seek reimbursement. The court reaches this result on the ground that it should defer to the determination reached by the reviewing board (board) of the Department of Industrial Accidents (department). Ante at 174-175, 177. In doing so, the court in my view has misapplied the general principle of deference to administrative agency decisions. Because I can discern no clear indication of a legislative intent to provide an indefinite reimbursement period to these insurers for the time period at issue, I respectfully dissent.

1. Scope of review of agency action. At issue in this case is the proper interpretation of what have been known as the "Second Injury Fund" [Note Botsford-3] provisions in G. L. c. 152, § 37 (§ 37), as amended by St. 1985, c. 572, §§ 48, 49 (1985 Act). [Note Botsford-4] As the court points out, "[t]he interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with primary responsibility for administering it is entitled to substantial deference." Ante at 173, quoting Gateley's Case, 415 Mass. 397, 399 (1993). However, we have often noted that "this principle is one of deference, not abdication," Leopoldstadt, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Div. of Health Care Fin. & Policy, 436 Mass. 80, 91 (2002), quoting Protective Life Ins.

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Co. v. Sullivan, 425 Mass. 615, 618 (1997), and that "[t]he duty of statutory interpretation is for the courts." Slater's Case, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 326, 330 (2002), quoting Police Comm'r of Boston v. Cecil, 431 Mass. 410, 413 (2000). See Walker's Case, 443 Mass. 157, 160-170 (2004) (reversing board's interpretation of 1981 amendment to G. L. c. 152 based on court's examination of legislative history and intent); Police Comm'r of Boston v. Cecil, supra at 413-416 (vacating motion judge's acceptance of administrative agency's statutory interpretation as "not unreasonable," and adopting alternate interpretation). I believe that in this case, that duty requires us to overrule the board's conclusion that claims for reimbursement brought under § 37, as amended by the 1985 Act, are subject to no statute of limitations.

While a core principle of administrative law mandates that we "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it," G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), judicial deference to agency action is most appropriate when the agency acts on the basis of its technical or policy expertise, and least appropriate when the agency ventures into the courts' own "traditional area of expertise." Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1031, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See 5 K.C. Davis, Administrative Law § 29:3 (2d ed. 1984) (scope of review of agency action should vary according to courts' and agencies' comparative qualifications). The question at the center of this case is whether, in amending § 37 in 1985 without expressly adding a limitations period, the Legislature intended to give insurers an unlimited period of time in which to file petitions for reimbursement of compensation paid to employees who had suffered a second injury. Discerning legislative intent about a limitations period presents an issue of statutory interpretation with which courts are amply familiar, and one that courts, rather than administrative agencies, are traditionally called on to address.

The court in this case defers to the board's decision in Walsh v. Bertolino Beef Co., 16 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rptr. 151 (2002) (Walsh), apparently the first administrative appeal in which the board interpreted the 1985 Act to provide employers paying compensation to employees suffering a second injury

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between 1985 and 1991 (referred to by the parties as "Mid-Act" claims) an unlimited time to seek reimbursement from the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund (Fund). In reaching this result, the board drew on no arguments related to the policies or experiences of the department in enforcing or administering the Workers' Compensation Act, [Note Botsford-5] and gave no indication that the department had been involved in the drafting of either the 1985 Act or the later revision of § 37 enacted in 1991, St. 1991, c. 398, § 71 (1991 Act). Cf. Amherst-Pelham Regional Sch. Comm. v. Department of Educ., 376 Mass. 480, 491-492 (1978) (weight should be given to reasonable construction of regulatory statute adopted by agency responsible for its enforcement where [as in that case] statute gave agency broad power to fill in administrative details and agency participated in drafting legislation). Cf. also Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 447 Mass. 814, 821-822 & n.10 (2006) (deferring to agency's statutory interpretation where it had promulgated rule pursuant to specifically delegated authority). [Note Botsford-6] In this context, then, a searching judicial review of the board's legal conclusions is appropriate.

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2. Interpretation of the 1985 Act. There is no dispute that § 37, as amended by the 1985 Act, did not contain any language that operated as a statute of limitations on insurers' claims for second injury compensation reimbursement. [Note Botsford-7] This court has consistently adhered to the principle that "[w]here, as here, the statute does not make reference to any period of limitations, we must inquire whether there is anything in the statute or its legislative history that indicates an express or implied legislative intent that [the actions permitted or required by the statute] are not time limited." State Bd. of Retirement v. Woodward, 446 Mass. 698, 707 (2006). [Note Botsford-8] See Nantucket v. Beinecke, 379 Mass. 345, 348 (1979) ("We find nothing in the legislative history of

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G. L. c. 268A, § 21, which would suggest that the Legislature, by not specifically prescribing a period of time within which an action under § 21 must be brought, intended that actions not be time-limited. If such a result had been intended, it would have been natural for the Legislature to express such an intention"). Accord Locator Servs. Group, Ltd. v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 443 Mass. 837, 858-859 (2005) (borrowing analogous statute of limitations after finding no evidence that "the Legislature intended to permit actions seeking additional interest payments under [G. L. c. 79,] § 7D, and brought under [G. L. c. 79,] § 10A, to be filed indefinitely after an alleged breach"). [Note Botsford-9]

It is thus necessary to focus on the language and any available legislative history of the 1985 Act to determine whether in amending § 37 at that time, the Legislature did intend that there be no time limit on an insurer's right to claim reimbursement. However, the court in the present case does not take on this task itself, but rather defers to the analysis of language and legislative history offered by the board in its Walsh decision. Ante at 175-177. I therefore consider the board's decision. The board posited two sources of what it considered clear expressions of a legislative intent to have no limitations period apply to insurers' § 37 reimbursement claims that are governed by the 1985 Act: the 1991 Legislature's decision to make the statute of limitations it added to § 37 in the 1991 Act prospective only, and the fact that G. L. c. 152, as amended by the 1985 Act, includes specific statutes of limitations in some sections but not in § 37. The court calls the board's interpretation "not unreasonable." Ante at 178. I respectfully disagree.

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In the Walsh case, the board distinguished Nantucket v. Beinecke, 379 Mass. 345 (1979), by relying on the action of the 1991 Legislature as an expression of legislative intent relevant to the 1985 Act. See Walsh, 16 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rptr. at 153 ("Unlike [Nantucket], where no express legislative intent addressed time limitations, here the Legislature did, in fact, express just such intent when it amended § 37 in 1991"). In the board's view, by designating the 1991 Act's revision of § 37 prospective only, the Legislature expressed its intention that claims for reimbursement arising under the 1985 Act should not be time limited. Id. The problem with this inference is that "[t]he views of a subsequent [Legislature] form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one." Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 371 Mass. 186, 194 (1976), quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960). See Massachusetts Wholesalers of Malt Beverages, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 409 Mass. 336, 344 (1991), quoting Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 393 Mass. 726, 729 n.3 (1985) ("What the . . . legislation involved in this case means cannot rationally be influenced by [subsequent] legislation"); Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1460 n.27 (2007), quoting Cobell v. Norton, 428 F.3d 1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("[P]ost-enactment legislative history is not only oxymoronic but inherently entitled to little weight").

Certainly it was within the power of the 1991 Legislature to declare that from that time forward there would be no statute of limitations applicable to insurers' reimbursement claims for second injuries that had occurred between 1985 and 1991 -- as opposed to changing the intent of the 1985 Legislature itself. However, in order for us to conclude that the 1991 Legislature adopted this position, we must find that intent to be clearly expressed. Nantucket v. Beinecke, 379 Mass. at 348 ("If such a result had been intended, it would have been natural for the Legislature to express such an intention"). It is true that the 1991 Legislature did choose to make all its amendments to § 37, including the two-year limitations period on claims, prospective in operation and therefore applicable only to reimbursement claims for second injuries occurring after December 23,

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1991, the effective date of the 1991 Act. However, in contrast to the board, I do not discern in this choice any clear intention to prescribe that cases governed by the 1985 Act should have no limitations period applied to them at all. The language of the 1991 Act does not expressly address the 1985 Act or claims falling under it. As for legislative history concerning the 1991 Act, neither the board, the court, nor the parties refer to any that might provide guidance on this issue, and I have found none. [Note Botsford-10]

The board, in quoting the decision of the administrative judge, also purported to find an expression of legislative intent in the fact that G. L. c. 152, as amended by the 1985 Act, "contains explicit language limiting the period for which certain benefits

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shall be paid, limitations on when various notices must be filed by employers and insurers, and also contains limitations on the time within which certain claims for benefits must be filed," and yet fails to specify a limit on the time for an insurer or self-insurer to claim reimbursement under § 37. Walsh, 16 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rptr. at 152. From this distinction, the board concluded that "the Legislature included specific limitations where it wanted them to be applied -- and conversely, excluded them where it did not want limitations to apply." Id. However, the "inclusion of a [statute of limitations] elsewhere in the statute . . . does not necessarily indicate that the Legislature intended that there be no limitations period for claims" arising under § 37. Locator Servs. Group, Ltd. v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 443 Mass. 837, 859 (2005). [Note Botsford-11] Additionally, the fact that the department currently has in place regulations specifying statutes of limitations for sections of G. L. c. 152 that fail to provide time limits undermines the board's argument that causes of action without a limit in the statute should be treated as having none. See, e.g., 452 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.03(3) (1999) (imposing two-year statute of limitations on requests for reimbursement of cost of living adjustments pursuant to G. L. c. 152,

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§ 65 [2] [a] or [b]). Therefore, I conclude that the board also erred in reading the contrast among various sections of G. L. c. 152 as a clear indication of legislative intent that insurers' right to seek reimbursement under § 37 for "Mid-Act" claims should last indefinitely.

Statutes of limitations provide many well-recognized benefits for the administration of justice, including allowance for "the temporal finality necessary for the orderly conduct of human affairs," Doe v. Harbor Sch., Inc., 446 Mass. 245, 256 (2006), and "suppress[ing] fraudulent and stale claims." Joslyn v. Chang, 445 Mass. 344, 351 (2005), quoting Spring v. Gray, 22 F. Cas. 978, 984-985 (C.C.D. Me. 1830), aff'd, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 151 (1832). While we would certainly be bound to respect the Legislature's choice to impose no statute of limitations if it were clearly expressed, [Note Botsford-12] I believe the lack of any such expression in this case stems from the fact that the Legislature actually entertained no such intent.

Because the Legislature has not clearly expressed an intent that reimbursement claims arising under the 1985 Act should be subject to no time limitation, it is our interpretive duty to look to the essence of the claim and identify an appropriate limit to apply. [Note Botsford-13] See State Bd. of Retirement v. Woodward, 446 Mass. at 707 (where evidence of legislative intent to have no limitations period is absent, "we look to the nature of the claim to determine which existing statute of limitation most closely is associated with the asserted claim"); Nantucket v. Beinecke, 379 Mass. 345, 348 (1979) (same). It was error for the board to conclude otherwise, and, I believe, the court is mistaken in deferring to and accepting the board's analysis. I respectfully dissent.