CHARLES H. TURNER & others [Note 1] vs. CITY OF BOSTON & others. [Note 2]

BOTSFORD, J. Charles H. Turner, an elected Boston city councillor, was convicted of attempted extortion and other Federal crimes on October 29, 2010. On December 1, 2010, before Turner had been sentenced on the convictions, the city council of Boston (city council, or council) voted to remove Turner from his office of city councillor pursuant to Rule 40A (rule 40A) of the Rules of the Boston City Council (rules), a rule adopted in 2009 by that body. On December 30, 2010, Turner, joined by several residents from his city council district, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) in the United States District

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Court for the District of Massachusetts against the city of Boston (city), the city council, and eleven of the city councillors (collectively, defendants), alleging, inter alia, that the council's vote to remove him was void, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages. The District Court judge subsequently certified the following questions to this court pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 1:03, as appearing in 382 Mass. 700 (1981):

"[1]. Did the Charter of the City of Boston, or any other provision of the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, authorize the Boston City Council to promulgate Rule 40A of the Rules of the Boston City Council and employ it to remove an incumbent Councillor from office before he was sentenced and removed automatically by operation of M.G.L. c. 279, § 30?

"[2]. If so, is Rule 40A a civil or a criminal provision of law?"

Turner v. Boston, 760 F. Supp. 2d 208, 215 (D. Mass. 2011). In answer to the first question, we conclude that the city council was authorized to promulgate rule 40A but did not have the authority, under the Charter of the City of Boston (city charter) or under any provision of State law, to employ the rule to remove Turner from office. In light of this answer, we need not provide an answer to the second question.

Background. In a November 19, 2008, criminal complaint filed in the United States District Court, Turner was charged with extortion, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006), and making false statements to a Federal official, 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) (2006). On November 24, 2008, the then-president of the city council removed Turner from his positions as chairman of the council's committee's on education and on human rights. [Note 3] In a superseding indictment dated December 9, 2008, Turner was charged with several felonies, including one count of attempted extortion under color of official right, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

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§ 1951, and three counts of making false statements to Federal officials, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. A second superseding indictment dated April 7, 2009, contained identical charges against Turner.

On January 25, 2009, the council adopted rule 40A. The rule authorizes the council president to refer a matter to the council on the president's determination that a councillor "engaged in conduct unbecoming a member of the Boston City Council or may be unqualified to sit on the body," and mandates such a referral by the council president "upon a felony conviction [of a city councillor] by any state or federal court." [Note 4] Turner voted to adopt rule 40A.

On October 29, 2010, at the conclusion of Turner's criminal trial in the District Court, the jury found him guilty on all charges then pending against him; sentencing was scheduled for January 25, 2011. On December 1, 2010, in an eleven-to-one vote, the city council voted to remove Turner, claiming that it was authorized to do so under the city charter and rule 40A. The council then scheduled a special preliminary election for February 15, 2011, and a special final election for March 15, 2011, for the purpose of filling the council seat that Turner had held.

On December 30, 2010, Turner and several constituents from the city council district that he had represented filed suit against the city, the city council, and the eleven councillors who had voted for his removal. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the council lacked authority under State law to expel Turner from that body, that the expulsion violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and that rule 40A constituted an ex post facto punishment in violation of art. I, § 10, of the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs also sought damages for the alleged deprivations of their constitutional rights.

On January 10, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, in which they sought to enjoin the city from holding the February 15, 2011, special preliminary election and the March

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15, 2011, special final election. On January 25, 2011, Turner was sentenced to three years in Federal prison. As noted by the District Court judge, the parties agree that once Turner was sentenced to prison, his city council seat was vacated by operation of State law pursuant to G. L. c. 279, § 30. [Note 5] On February 7, 2011, the District Court judge denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.

Concluding that resolution of the plaintiffs' Federal claims "depend[ed] entirely" on whether the city council, in removing Turner from his office of city councillor, exceeded its authority under Massachusetts law, the District Court judge certified to this court the questions quoted at the outset. [Note 6]

Discussion. The first certified question contains two separate inquiries: whether the city council had authority to promulgate rule 40A, and whether it could employ rule 40A to remove an incumbent councillor, an elected official. We consider them in order.

1. Authority to promulgate rule 40A. The defendants argue that the council was authorized to enact rule 40A pursuant to the city charter. [Note 7] The city charter is "a series of State statutes and not a single code," City Council of Boston v. Mayor of Boston, 383 Mass. 716, 719 (1981), but as a charter, it "contains

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the basic provisions which establish the form, structure and organization of [Boston's] government, and the powers and duties of various officials." D.A. Randall & D.E. Franklin, Municipal Law and Practice § 2.3, at 35 (5th ed. 2006). Section 17 of the city charter expressly authorizes the city council "from time to time [to] establish rules for its proceedings." St. 1948, c. 452, § 17, as appearing in St. 1951, c. 376, § 1. Rule 40A authorizes the council president to "refer a matter to the council upon his/her determination that any member has engaged in conduct unbecoming a member of the Boston City Council or may be unqualified to sit on the body," and requires such a referral "upon a felony conviction of any [councillor] by any state or federal court." Under the terms of the rule, any action taken by the council in response to the council president's referral requires a two-thirds majority and "will be in accordance with local, state and federal law"; the rule itself does not define what actions the council might take. [Note 8]

Rule 40A provides a means of referring matters concerning the conduct of councillors to the full city council for action. In this regard, rule 40A is similar to other procedural rules governing council proceedings and adopted by the council pursuant to § 17 of the city charter. See, e.g., rule 1 (meeting time); rule 12 (agenda); rule 23 (committee assignment and action); rule 35 (committee action); rule 36 (committee appointment, structure, and role). As a procedural directive that provides a means of referring matters to the council, rule 40A clearly falls within the

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scope of the rulemaking authority that the city charter vests in the council. Consequently, the council was empowered to adopt this rule. [Note 9]

2. Use of rule 40A to remove a councillor. We turn to the second part of the first question, that is, whether the council could employ rule 40A to remove a councillor from that body. Historically, the rule has been that municipalities in Massachusetts have "no power to remove public officers except that which is given by the statutes." Attorney Gen. v. Stratton, 194 Mass. 51, 53 (1907). The election, removal, and replacement of public officers are "subjects of elaborate legislation," and "[i]n the absence of any . . . provision [for their removal] . . . they cannot be removed by a vote of the town, either with or without a hearing before the town or a committee thereof." Id. at 56. See Del Duca v. Town Adm'r of Methuen, 368 Mass. 1, 7 (1975) ("a municipality cannot ordinarily remove members of a board or agency established pursuant to a general law, even where there exists cause for removal, unless the general law itself explicitly or implicitly authorizes such removal"). [Note 10]

The defendants agree that rule 40A is simply a procedural

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rule, and at this juncture they appear to accept that the substantive authority to remove Turner must derive from a statutory source, that is, a law enacted by the Legislature. [Note 11] They point to the Commonwealth's conflict of interest statute, G. L. c. 268A, as that source. In particular, they argue that G. L. c. 268A, § 23 (e), "specifically authorized" the council to remove Turner, and that rule 40A merely supplied the procedural means of enforcing this statutory provision. [Note 12] We turn to the specific language of this statute.

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General Laws c. 268A, § 23 (§ 23), establishes standards of conduct for public employees, including municipal officers and employees. [Note 13] See § 23 (a) ("In addition to the other provisions of this chapter, and in supplement thereto, standards of conduct, as hereinafter set forth, are hereby established for all state, county, and municipal employees"). The specific components of the standards of conduct are detailed in § 23 (b) and (c); of particular relevance are § 23 (b) (2) (i) and (3) (prohibiting public officers and employees from receiving "anything of substantial value" because of their official positions, and from acting in a manner that would cause a reasonable person to believe they can be improperly influenced). [Note 14] Section 23 (e) provides:

"Where a current employee is found to have violated the provisions of [§ 23] appropriate administrative action as is warranted may also be taken by the appropriate constitutional officer, by the head of a state, county or municipal agency. Nothing in this section shall preclude any such constitutional officer or head of such agency from establishing and enforcing additional standards of conduct." (Emphasis added.)

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The defendants claim that, because Turner's convictions establish that he violated § 23 (b) (2) (i) and (3), his removal by the council was therefore authorized as an "appropriate administrative action" under § 23 (e). [Note 15]

This court has held previously that the elected municipal board or council is the appropriate body to enforce the provisions of § 23 in relation to the conduct of one of its members. See Selectmen of Avon v. Linder, 352 Mass. 581, 583 (1967). See also District Attorney for the Hampden Dist. v. Grucci, 384 Mass. 525, 529 (1981). Therefore, the defendants are correct that § 23 (e) authorized the city council to take "appropriate administrative action" in relation to Turner if he was found to have violated the standards of conduct set forth in § 23. We also agree with the defendants that having been convicted of the Federal crime of attempted extortion, Turner may be deemed to have been "found to have violated the provisions of" § 23, and of § 23 (b) (2) (i) and (3) in particular (see note 14, supra). As we next discuss, however, we do not agree that the council's removal of Turner as an elected city councillor fits within the permissible scope of "appropriate administrative action" authorized by § 23.

The phrase "appropriate administrative action" is not defined in G. L. c. 268A. Nevertheless, the other provisions and structure of the statute indicate clearly that such "action" is distinguishable from criminal prosecution, see, e.g., G. L. c. 268A, §§ 2-5, and the types of damages and restitution that the State Ethics Commission is empowered to order a municipal employee, see G. L. c. 268A, § 21 (b). [Note 16] As a source of interpretative guidance, the defendants point to the final report of the special

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commission that was appointed pursuant to St. 1961, c. 610, § 2, to study and recommend legislation relating to conflict of interests and ethics in government. [Note 17] The special commission, which drafted the legislation enacted as G. L. c. 268A, took the view that "appropriate administrative action" against a public employee found to have violated the standards of conduct might include discharge, and the defendants appear to rely on the view of the commission's members, as the drafters of the legislation, as an accurate reflection of legislative intent. [Note 18] Cf. Halebian v. Berv, 457 Mass. 620, 630, 632, 633 (2010) (in construing meaning of particular provision of Massachusetts Business Corporations Act, G. L. c. 156D, court considered commentary of expert task force that drafted act); New Bedford v. New Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 330 Mass. 422, 429 (1953) (in construing meaning of particular statute, court may rely on report and recommendations of special commission on whose report statute was based).

The argument goes too far. As noted by then-Professor Robert Braucher, one of the members of the special commission (who also served on the three-member subcommittee assigned to draft the proposed legislation), although § 23 establishes a code of conduct and permits "appropriate administrative action" to be taken for violations of that code, proceedings for the suspension or removal or other discipline of municipal employees "must follow the usual procedures," meaning procedures laid out in specific statutes such as those governing, for example, civil service employees, teachers, and police. R. Braucher, Conflict of Interest in Massachusetts, in Perspectives of Law, Essays for Austin Wakeman Scott 35-36 & n.99 (R. Pound, E. Griswold, A. Sutherland eds. 1964).

More importantly, we take from both the Massachusetts Constitution and the General Laws that the removal or suspension

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of a public officer requires specific constitutional or legislative authorization. Our Constitution specifies that "officers of the Commonwealth" may be removed from office only by compliance with its specific impeachment provisions set out in Part II, c. 1, § 2, art. 8, of the Massachusetts Constitution. See Matter of Dugan, 418 Mass. 185, 187 (1994). [Note 19] "Judicial officers" may only be removed by compliance with the address provisions in Part II, c. 3, art. 1, of the Massachusetts Constitution. See id. at 187-188. The Legislature has directed that clerks of court and certain other court officials, as well as county commissioners, county treasurers, sheriffs, and district attorneys, be subject to removal by this court. See G. L. c. 211, § 4. In G. L. c. 279, § 30, the Legislature has mandated specifically that one who holds public office, including one who holds municipal office, is automatically removed from office only when he or she is sentenced to prison on a felony conviction in State or Federal court.

Legislative authorization also is required with respect to suspensions of public officers and employees while under indictment for criminal offenses. General Laws c. 30, § 59, sets out specific provisions and procedures that authorize and govern the suspension of an appointed or elected officer or employee of the Commonwealth or of any State agency, department, board, commission, or authority while under indictment for misconduct in office; G. L. c. 268A, § 25, similarly authorizes and prescribes specific procedures for the suspension of county and municipal officers and employees "by the appointing authority" when any such officer or employee has been indicted for misconduct in office. [Note 20] When considered against the backdrop of these constitutional provisions and statutes, the terse and

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general phrase "appropriate administrative action" in § 23 (e) cannot be read as a specific grant of permission to a municipal body such as the city council to remove one of its members as a sanction for violating the standards of conduct in § 23. [Note 21]

For the above reasons, we conclude that the city charter does not provide the requisite authority for the city council's removal of Turner from office before he was sentenced to prison, and further that such authority cannot be found in G. L. c. 268A, § 23 (e), or any other Massachusetts statute. [Note 22] Accordingly, we answer the first certified question, "No." There is no need to answer the second question.

The Deputy Reporter of Decisions is directed to furnish attested copies of this opinion to the clerk of this court. The clerk in turn will transmit one copy, under the seal of the court, to the clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, as the answer to the questions certified, and will also transmit a copy to the parties.